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University  of  California  •  Berkeley 

Stephen  P.  Teale 
Don  A.  Allen 


Regional  Oral  History  Office 
The  Bancroft  Library 

Regional  Oral  History  Office  University  of  California 

The  Bancroft  Library  Berkeley,  California 

Governmental  History  Documentation  Project 
Goodwin  Knight/Edmund  Brown,  Sr.,  Era 


Stephen  P.  Teale    The  Impact  of  One  Man-One  Vote  on 

the  Senate:   Senator  Teale  Reviews 
Reapportionment  and  Other  Issues, 

Don  A.  Allen       A  Los  Angeles  Assemblyman  Recalls  the 

Reapportionment  Struggle 

Interviews  Conducted  by 
James  H.  Rowland 
in  1978  and  1979 

With  an  Introduction  by  James  H.  Rowland 

Copy  no .  / 
Copyright  (c)  1980  by  the  Regents  of  the  University  of  California 


Covering  the  years  1953  to  1966,  the  Goodwin  Knight-Edmund  G.  "Pat" 
Brown,  Sr. ,  Oral  History  Series  is  the  second  phase  of  the  Governmental 
History  Documentation  Project  begun  by  the  Regional  Oral  History  Office 
in  1969.   That  year  inaugurated  the  Earl  Warren  Era  Oral  History  Project, 
which  produced  interviews  with  Earl  Warren  and  other  persons  prominent  in 
politics,  criminal  justice,  government  administration,  and  legislation 
during  Warren's  California  era,  1925  to  1953. 

The  Knight-Brown  series  of  interviews  carries  forward  the  earlier 
inquiry  into  the  general  topics  of:  the  nature  of  the  governor's  office, 
its  relationships  with  the  legislature  and  with  its  own  executive  depart 
ments,  biographical  data  about  Governors  Knight  and  Brown  and  other 
leaders  of  the  period,  and  methods  of  coping  with  the  rapid  social  and 
economic  changes  of  the  state.   Key  issues  documented  for  1953-1966  were: 
the  rise  and  decline  of  the  Democratic  party,  the  impact  of  the  California 
Water  Plan,  the  upheaval  of  the  Vietnam  War  escalation,  the  capital  punish 
ment  controversy,  election  law  changes,  new  political  techniques  forced  by 
television  and  increased  activism,  reorganization  of  the  executive  branch, 
the  growth  of  federal  programs  in  California,  and  the  rising  awareness  of 
minority  groups.   From  a  wider  view  across  the  twentieth  century,  the 
Knight-Brown  period  marks  the  final  era  of  California's  Progressive 
period,  which  was  ushered  in  by  Governor  Hiram  Johnson  in  1910  and  which 
provided  for  both  parties  the  determining  outlines  of  government  organiza 
tion  and  political  strategy  until  1966. 

The  Warren  Era  political  files,  which  interviewers  had  developed 
cooperatively  to  provide  a  systematic  background  for  questions,  were 
updated  by  the  staff  to  the  year  1966  with  only  a  handful  of  new  topics 
added  to  the  original  ninety-one.   An  effort  was  made  to  record  in  greater 
detail  those  more  significant  events  and  trends  by  selecting  key  partici 
pants  who  represent  diverse  points  of  view.  Most  were  queried  on  a 
limited  number  of  topics  with  which  they  were  personally  connected;  a  few 
narrators  who  possessed  unusual  breadth  of  experience  were  asked  to  discuss 
a  multiplicity  of  subjects.  Although  the  time  frame  of  the  series  ends 
at  the  November  1966  election,  when  possible  the  interviews  trace  events 
on  through  that  date  in  order  to  provide  a  logical  baseline  for  continuing 
study  of  succeeding  administrations.   Similarly,  some  narrators  whose  exper 
ience  includes  the  Warren  years  were  questioned  on  that  earlier  era  as  well 
as  the  Knight-Brown  period. 


The  present  series  has  been  financed  by  grants  from  the  California  State 
Legislature  through  the  California  Heritage  Preservation  Commission  and  the 
office  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  by  some  individual  donations.   Portions 
of  several  memoirs  were  funded  partly  by  the  California  Women  in  Politics 
Project  under  a  grant  from  the  National  Endowment  for  the  Humanities,  in 
cluding  a  matching  grant  from  the  Rockefeller  Foundation;  the  two  projects 
were  produced  concurrently  in  this  office,  a  joint  effort  made  feasible  by 
overlap  of  narrators,  topics,  and  staff  expertise. 

The  Regional  Oral  History  Office  was  established  to  tape  record  autobio 
graphical  interviews  with  persons  significant  in  the  history  of  California 
and  the  West.   The  Office  is  under  the  administrative  direction  of  James  D. 
Hart,  Director  of  The  Bancroft  Library,  and  Willa  Baum,  head  of  the  Office. 

Amelia  R.  Fry,  Project  Director 
Gabrielle  Morris,  Project  Coordinator 

May,  1980 

Berkeley,  California 



Advisory  Council 

Don  A.  Allen 
James  Bassett 
Walton  E.  Bean* 
Peter  Behr 
William  E.  Bicker 
Paul  Bullock 
Lou  Cannon 
Edmond  Costantini 
William  N.  Davis 
A.  I.  Dickman 
Harold  E.  Geiogue 
Carl  Greenberg 
Michael  Harris 
Phil  Kerby 
Virginia  Knight 
Frank  Lanterman 
Mary  Ellen  Leary 
Eugene  C.  Lee  * 

James  R.  W.  Leiby 
Albert  Lepawsky 
Dean  McHenry 
Frank  Mesple'* 
James  R.  Mills 
Edgar  J.  Patterson 
Cecil  F.  Poole 
A.  Alan  Post 
Robert  H.  Power 
Bruce  J.  Poyer 
Albert  S.  Rodda 
Richard  Rodda 
Ed  Salzman 

Mortimer  D.  Schwartz 
Verne  Scoggins 
David  Snyder 
Caspar  Weinberger 

Project  Interviewers 

Malca  Chall 
Amelia  R.  Fry 
Gabrielle  Morris 
James  Rowland 
Sarah  Sharp 
Julie  Shearer 

Special  Interviewers 

Eleanor  Glaser 
Harriet  Nathan 
Suzanne  Riess 
Miriam  Feingold  Stein 
Ruth  Teiser 

*Deceased  during  the  term  of  the  project. 



Through  its  Governmental  History  Documentation  Project,  the  Regional 
Oral  History  Office  has  designated  the  subject  of  senate  reapportionment  as 
part  of  its  Goodwin  J.  Knight-Edmund  G.  Brown,  Sr.  era  volume  series.   The 
volume  contains  interviews  with  Senator  Stephen  P.  Teale  (Democrat-Railroad 
Flat)  and  Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  (Democrat-Los  Angeles),  key  legislators 
in  the  design  of  the  1966  senate  reapportionment. 

As  interviewer/editor  for  the  Knight-Brown  era  project,  I  was  honored 
with  the  opportunity  to  interview  the  leading  political  figures  in  the  senate 
reapportionment  struggle,  a  topic  I  had  encountered  briefly  in  my  master's 
thesis  interviews  with  Senator  Teale.   The  topic  of  reapportionment  can  be 
confusing  without  an  historical  summary  to  familiarize  the  reader  with  events 
and  issues  mentioned  in  this  volume  of  interviews.   The  following  summarizes 
the  twists,  turns,  and  emotions  of  the  reapportionment  drama. 

In  1926  voters  approved  a  referendum  to  apportion  the  senate  by  counties 
while  retaining  assembly  apportionment  by  population.   Heralded  as  the 
"federal  plan"  and  vigorously  supported  by  rural  interests  and  the  San 
Francisco  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  referendum  provided  that  for  a  forty- 
member  senate:   1)  no  county  be  divided  so  as  to  contain  more  than  one 
senatorial  district,  2)  no  more  than  three  counties  could  be  combined  into 
any  one  district,  and  3)  no  part  of  any  county  could  be  united  with  any  other 
county  to  form  a  district.   The  "federal  plan"  reference  implied  that  since 
the  U.S.  Senate  was  apportioned  by  states  and  the  U.S.  House  of  Representa 
tives  by  population,  the  California  Senate  would  be  apportioned  by  counties 
while  the  California  Assembly  would  be  apportioned  by  population. 

With  the  post-war  population  boom  in  Los  Angeles  County,  protests 
emerged  charging  unfair  and  unequal  representation  of  that  county  in  the 
state  senate.   By  the  mid-1950s,  Los  Angeles  County  had  a  population  of  five 
million  represented  by  one  state  senator,  while  the  one  senate  district  of 
Alpine,  Mono,  and  Inyo  counties  combined  had  a  total  population  of  14,000 
represented  by  one  state  senator.   As  a  result  of  the  1926  referendum,  the 
state  senate  drew  a  mix  of  predominately  rural  northern  California  legislators 
while  the  assembly  increased  its  urban  representation  due  to  its  decennial 
census  reapportionments.   Critics  of  the  federal  plan  charged  it  produced  a 
senate  which  favored  north  against  the  south,  rural  against  urban,  and 
conservative  against  liberal. 

After  losing  attempts  to  modify  or  eliminate  the  federal  plan  through 
initiatives  in  1948,  1960  and  1962  (the  latter  two  authored  by  Los  Angeles 
County  Supervisor  Frank  Bonelli) ,  the  courts  sounded  the  death  knell  for  the 
federal  plan.   The  Warren  supreme  court  ruled  in  1964,  in  its  one  man-one 
vote  decision,  that  given  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  U.S.  Constitution, 
the  principle  of  equal  population  must  prevail  in  both  houses  of  a  state 
legislature.   Ironically,  as  governor,  Earl  Warren  had  been  a  strong  defender 
of  the  federal  plan  against  the  1948  initiative  to  modify  senate  apportionment. 

The  Los  Angeles  federal  district  court  continued  the  precedent  by 
ruling  that  the  federal  plan  of  apportioning  the  California  senate  was  uncon 
stitutional  and  added  that  a  new  plan  must  be  adopted  no  later  than  July  1, 
1965,  a  deadline  the  legislature  failed  to  meet.  After  defaulting  on  the 
federal  court  deadline,  the  California  Supreme  Court  gave  a  reprieve  in  the 
form  of  ordering  that  both  the  senate  and  assembly  be  reapportioned  in  time 
for  the  1966  primary.   This  signaled  a  two-way  street  agreement  between 
senate  and  assembly  leaders  that  resolved  inter-house  differences  and  paved 
the  way  for  the  eventual  1966  reapportionment  formula. 

The  inter-house  differences  and  the  senate's  aversion  to  the  one  man- 
one  vote  decision  illustrate  a  relationship  of  personalities  and  politics, 
and  deserves  further  inquiry.   In  the  senate,  an  odd  concoction  of  remedies 
were  proposed  to  modify  reapportionment.   Among  them:   a  unicameral  legisla 
tive  proposal  introduced  by  Senator  F.rank  Petersen  (Democrat-Mendocino)  at  the 
request  of  Governor  Brown.   (The  senator  was  reported  to  have  hid  to  escape 
his  fellow  senators"' wrath  after  the  bill's  introduction),  and  a  split- the- 
state-in-half   movement  proposed  by  the  Northern  California  County  Supervisors 
Association  and  introduced  as  a  legislative  measure  by  Senator  Richard  Dolwig 
(Republican-San  Mateo) . 

The  senate's  Maginot  Line  against  reapportionment  was  the  Dirksen  amend 
ment.   Sponsored  by  U.S.  Senator  Everett  Dirksen,  it  would  have  created  a 
federal  constitutional  amendment  to  the  U.S.  Constitution  to  allow  one  house 
of  a  state  legislature  to  be  apportioned  on  a  basis  other  than  population. 
In  its  support  several  prominent  California  senators  toured  nation-wide 
speaking  to  governors  and  state  legislative  bodies.   Among  the  touring  Cali 
fornia  delegates  was  Senator  Stephen  Teale  (Democrat-Railroad  Flat),  who  came 
to  the  realization  that  the  federal  court  decisions  would  not  be  reversed. 
It  was  Teale 's  reluctant  decision  to  seek  a  reapportionment  formula  that  won 
him  the  chair  of  the  Senate  Reapportionment  Committee  in  1964. 

Senate  Bill  6,  authored  by  Senator  Teale,  became  the  senate's  reappor 
tionment  formula.   When  SB  6  passed  the  senate,  the  inter-house  shouting 
match  began.   As  the  bill  stalled  in  the  Assembly  Elections  and  Reapportion 
ment  Committee,  chaired  by  Don  Allen,  the  senate  charged  assembly  leaders 
with  attempting  to  seize  control  of  the  upper  house  through  crippling  and 
questionable  amendments  to  SB  6.   The  assembly  leaders  countered  with  charges 
of  senate  smoke  screen  and  diversionary  tactics  to  delay  reapportionment  in 
hopes  of  passage  of  the  Dirksen  amendment. 


While  charges  and  counter-charges  were  exchanged,  the  legislature 
defaulted  on  the  federal  court  deadline  of  July  1,  1965.   Granted  a  reprieve 
from  the  California  Supreme  Court,  the  legislature  now  had  until  the  1966 
primary  to  devise  a  reapportionment  formula,  provided  the  assembly  be  reap- 
portioned  as  well  as  the  senate.   Burying  the  hatchet,  both  houses  united 
behind  Assembly  Bill  1,  authored  by  Don  Allen,  which  eventually  met  the  fed 
eral  and  state  court  mandates.   But  the  passage  and  signing  of  AB  1  did  not 
end  the  reapportionment  drama. 

The  postscript  came  in  the  form  of  protests  that  the  governor's  office 
had  interfered  with  the  legislature  by  meddling  in  the  reapportionment  solu 
tion.   As  early  as  1961  the  senate  charged  Governor  Brown  with  interference 
for  creating  the  Blue  Ribbon  Reapportionment  Commission  (Wellman  Commission) 
after  voters  defeated  the  1960  Bonelli  initiative  to  re-district  the  senate. 
And  again  in  1964  the  governor  dodged  jabs  of  meddling  in  senate  reapportion 
ment  for  his  administrative  bill  to  create  a  unicameral  legislature.  After 
the  storm  had  seemingly  passed  and  reapportionment  had  become  a  reality  with 
the  signing  of  AB  1,  Assemblyman  Don  Allen  charged  the  governor  with  betrayal 
of  an  oral  agreement  to  sign  a  reapportionment  correction  bill  containing 
liberal  retirement  benefits  for  reapportioned  legislators.  The  reader  is 
directed  to  the  Allen  interview  for  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  governor's 
veto  and  Assemblyman  Allen's  reaction. 

The  effects  of  reapportionment  brought  major  transformations  in  senate 
operations.   Out  of  22  newly  elected  members  to  the  senate  after  the  1966 
elections,  15  were  former  assemblymen  familiar  with  assembly  rules  and  proce 
dures.  Partisanship  and  party  caucuses  replaced  seniority  and  bi-partisanship, 
and  Senate  President  pro  Tern  Hugh  Burns  gradually  witnessed  his  base  of 
support  eroding.  For  those  who  were  able  to  survive  the  reapportionment  elec 
tions,  like  Senator  Teale,  the  new  senate  resembled  the  assembly,  with 
increased  staffing,  perquisities,  and  pay.  For  those  defeated,  resentment 
and  bewilderment  would  reign  until  this  day.  Not  only  was  it  the  court  that 
killed  the  old  federal  plan  senate,  but  it  was  the  Earl  Warren  supreme  court 
that  delivered  the  one  man-one  vote  decision  that  doomed  the  federal  plan  of 

This  volume  contains  by  no  means  the  sum  of  remarks  and  reactions  to 
the  1966  reapportionment  struggle.  The  reader  is  directed  to  the  following 
interviews  in  the  Knight-Brown  series  for  further  discussion  on  the  subject: 
lobbyist  Coleman  Blease,  Governor  Edmund  G.  Brown,  Sr.,  Senator  and  President 
pro  Tern  Hugh  M.  Burns,  lobbyist  Robert  McKay,  Frank  Mesple,  Lieutenant  Gover 
nor  Harold  J.  "Butch"  Powers,  Senator  Joseph  Rattigan,  and  Senator  Richard 


It  is  hoped  that  this  volume  will  contribute  to  the  understanding  of 
legislative  procedure  and  process  and  add  to  the  primary  documentation  of 
reapportionment  from  those  at  the  helm  of  the  battle. 

James  H.  Rowland,  Interviewer- Editor 
Governmental  History  Documentation  Project 

25  March  1980 

Regional  Oral  History  Office 

486  The  Bancroft  Library 

University  of  California  at  Berkeley 

Regional  Oral  History  Office  University  of  California 

The  Bancroft  Library  Berkeley,  California 

Governmental  History  Documentation  Project 
Goodwin  Knight /Edmund  Brown,  Sr. ,  Era 

Stephen  P.  Teale 


An  Interview  Conducted  by 
James  H.  Rowland 
in  1978 

Copyright  (c)  1980  by  the  Regents  of  the  University  of  California 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  —  Stephen  P.  Teale 


Family  History  1 
Growing  Up  in  California  2 

Campaigning  for  Calaveras  County  Supervisor  4 
Senate  Campaign:  1953  5 
Ties  to  the  Democratic  Party  7 

The  Wellman  Commission  13 
U.S.  Supreme  Court  Decision:  Challenge  to  States'  Rights  15 
Senators  in  Support  of  Dirksen  Amendment  16 
Redistricting  Los  Angeles  19 
California  Supreme  Court  Decision:  A  Two-Way  Street  23 
Retirement  Benefits  and  Reapportionment  28 

Impressions  of  Caspar  Weinberger  44 
Role  of  the  Liquor  Lobby  45 
The  Issue  of  Fair  Trade  47 

Chessman  Case  59 
Legislating  the  Death  Penalty  61 
Pressures  on  a  Lame  Duck  Governor  62 

Comparing  Citizen  and  Special  Interest  Lobbies  67 
Changing  the  Style  of  Lobbying  68 
Comparing  Legislative  Secretaries  for  Governor  Brown  69 

Joe  Shell  and  the  Independent  Oil  Companies  71 
The  Question  of  Tidelands  Oil  Revenue  72 


INDEX  78 


Senator  Stephen  Teale  was  interviewed  by  the  Regional  Oral  History  Office 
for  the  Goodwin  J.  Knight-Edmund  G.  Brown,  Sr.  era  segment  of  its  Governmental 
History  Documentation  Project.   Senator  Teale's  extensive  background  in  state 
government  and  his  principal  role  in  the  designing  of  senate  reapportionment 
in  1966  made  him  a  valuable  contributor  in  our  documentation  of  legislation, 
issues  and  events  during  the  Knight-Brown  era. 

As  a  medical  doctor  as  well  as  a  California  native  son  whose  ancestry 
goes  back  to  Spanish  California,  Stephen  Teale  brought  a  unique  background 
to  the  legislature  when  he  entered  in  1954.   Born  in  San  Francisco  in  1916, 
he  attended  Fresno  State  College  and  the  California  College  of  Medicine. 
Upon  completing  medical  school,  he  settled  in  Calaveras  County  in  1945  to 
open  a  family  practice  where  he  met  hostility  from  local  politicians  for  his 
insistence  on  open  hospital  admission  of  all  county  residents  regardless  of 
income.   Taking  his  case  to  the  people,  he  was  elected  county  supervisor  in 
1948.   In  his  five  year  tenure  as  Calaveras  County  Supervisor  he  established 
an  emergency  hospital  for  patients  in  his  district  unable  to  drive  seventy 
miles  to  the  nearest  general  hospital. 

With  the  death  of  state  Senator  Jesse  Mayo  in  1953,  Teale  threw  his  hat 
in  the  ring  as  a  contender  in  the  open  special  senate  election.  Declaring 
himself  a  Democrat,  he  was  assisted  by  Democratic  notables  Don  Bradley, 
Roger  Kent,  and  Pierre  Salinger  in  a  dark  horse  race  against  a  strong 
Republican  voting  tradition.  Winning  the  campaign  on  his  popularity  and  the 
strength  of  absentee  ballots,  he  entered  the  senate  in  1954  as  one  of  the 
first  Democrats  in  the  resurgence  of  the  party  after  decades  of  Republican 

My  first  encounter  with  Senator  Teale  occurred  while  I  was  a  graduate 
student  at  San  Francisco  State  University.   I  had  interviewed  him  on  his 
criticisms  of  the  state  un-american  activities  committee,  of  which  he  was  a 
member.   After  getting  my  first  sample  of  Teale's  depth  of  knowledge  on  the 
mechanics  of  state  government,  I  felt  honored  to  continue  interviewing  him 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Knight-Brown  era  project. 

We  arranged  two  interviews  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1978.  Held  at  his 
comfortable  home  in  Railroad  Flat,  Calaveras  County, and  assisted  by  his 
astute  and  attractive  wife  Shirley,  herself  a  veteran  of  state  government, 
both  interviews  covered  a  wide  range  of  topics  during  Teale's  twenty  year 
tenure  in  the  senate.   The  principal  topic  was  reapportionment  based  on  his 
authorship  of  senate  Bill  6  in  1965,  the  upper  house's  design  for  court 
ordered  re-districting  of  the  senate  based  on  population.  Other  topics 
covered  were  his  personal  history,  political  campaigns,  the  liquor  control 
controversy  of  1954,  the  problems  of  legislating  the  death  penalty,  lobbyist- 
legislator  relations,  and  the  tideland  oil  debate. 


After  rough  editing,  the  interview  transcripts  were  forwarded  to 
Senator  Teale  for  review.   He  returned  the  transcripts  with  few  annotations 
or  corrections,  leaving  the  interviews  in  their  original  format. 

Highlighted  by  anecdote,  charm,  and  country  wisdom,  the  Teale  interviews 
reflect  a  warmth  and  humor  missing  from  present  political  circles.   Indeed, 
some  veterans  of  the  capitol  scene  lament  the  vanishing  qualities  of  bi 
partisanship  and  state-wide  vision  that  Stephen  Teale  and  other  legislators 
in  his  era  possessed.   It  is  hoped  that  these  interviews  will  preserve  not 
only  valuable  recollections  from  a  veteran  legislator,  but  will  serve  as 
another  model  of  political  behavior  for  students  of  state  government. 

James  H.  Rowland 
Interviewer /Editor 

10  April  1980 

Regional  Oral  History  Office 
486  The  Bancroft  Library 
University  of  California,  Berkeley 

[Interview  I:   18  July,  1978 ]## 

Family  History 

Rowland:  There  are  certain  historians  who  want  to  dig  into  ancestry  and  the 
whole  family  history  of  individuals.  We  want  to  get  that  on  tape. 
A  little  bit  of  your  geneology,  your  childhood,  and  perhaps 
turning  points  in  your  formative  years. 

Teale:    The  family  is  rooted  in  California;  in  fact  all  four  of  my 

grandparents  were  born  here.  The  first  one  that  came  into  the 
state  was  a  fellow  named  Tucker,  Reasin  Tucker.   He  was  a 
mountain  man  and  a  fur  trapper,  worked  with  the  American  fur  trade 
in  the  1820 fs  and  1830's.   He  made  his  first  trip  into  California 
in  1832,  and  he  became  a  friend  of  Mariano  Vallejo.   Eventually, 
Vallejo  got  him  a  Spanish  grant  in  Napa  County  that  took  in, 
among  other  things,  the  town  site  of  Calistoga.   He  made — I  think 
he  made  about  eleven  trips  on  foot  between  here  and  Indiana.   He'd 
come  out  here  one  year  and  go  back  the  next.   Every  time  he'd 
come  out,  he'd  bring  one  of  his  boys  with  him. 

Rowland:  Who  was  the — 

Teale:  Reasin  Tucker. 

Rowland:  Reasin  Tucker.  R-e-a — sin? 

Teale:  Yes.   Reasin  P.  Tucker.   The  last  trip  he  made,  he  came  across 

##This  symbol  indicates  a  tape  or  a  segment  of  a  tape  has  begun  or 
ended.   For  a  guide  to  the  tapes  see  page  77. 

Teale:    part  way  with  the  Donner  party,  and  then  left  them  back  in  the 
mid-Nebraska  area,  and  came  on  to  California  on  mule  back.   He 
was  a  friend  of  Reed,  the  Reed  that  got  tossed  out  of  the  Donner 
party.   During  the  winter,  Reed  hunted  him  up.   Reasin  was  up 
at  his  ranch  at  Calistoga,  and  he  and  Reed  organized  some  rescue 
parties.   He  walked  into  the  Donner  party  three  times.   I  think 
Reasin  went  in  on  the  second,   third,  and  fourth  rescue  trips. 
He  didn't  make  the  first  one  because  he  was  sick. 

None  of  Reasin 's  family  married  into  the  Donner  group,  but 
there  were  a  lot  of  the  Donner  people  who  had  settled  around 
Calistoga,  so  my  grandfather  grew  up  with  them.   Tucker  was  my 
great-great  grandfather.   My  grandfather  Teale 's  mother  was  a 
Tucker;  she  was  the  only  one  of  the  girls  who  came  from  Indiana. 
Great-grandfather  Teale  married  her  and  brought  her  out  here,  and 
my  grandfather  was  born  in  a  covered  wagon  up  around  Bald  Rock, 
in  Plumas  County.   They  mined,  raised  grapes,  and  trapped.   Most 
of  the  family  stayed  around  Napa  County  until  World  War  I. 

My  mother's  side  of  the  family  also  was  around  St.  Helena. 
One  of  her  uncles  was  a  lawyer  and  a  politician.   His  name  was 
Theodore  Bell.   He  ran  for  governor  against  Hiram  Johnson  in  1912. 
He  was  a  congressman  for  several  terms,  and  that  perhaps  is  where 
I  get  some  of  my  bent  toward  political  activity. 

Growing  Up  in  California 

Rowland:   So  you  grew  up  in  Coalinga? 

Teale:    Yes;  I  went  to  Coalinga  in  1920,  when  I  was  four.   And  then  we 
moved  all  over. 

Rowland:  You  went  to  public  schools  in  that  area? 

Teale:  Yes;  .by  the  time  I  graduated  from  high  school,  I'd  been  in  twenty- 
five  different  schools.  [Rowland  laughs]  That's  hard  to  believe, 
but  we  moved  about  once  every  six  months. 

Rowland:   How  come  you  moved  so  much? 

Teale:    Well,  because  the  oil  industry  was  exploding  all  over  the  state, 
and  my  father  was  in  the  drilling  end  of  it.   He'd  wake  up  one 
morning  and  they'd  say,  "Well,  we  want  you  in  Santa  Fe  Springs 
tomorrow."  Or,  "We  want  you  back  in  Coalinga." 

Rowland : 


Rowland : 


Was  he  working  for  any  particular  company? 

He  worked  for  Shell  most  of  his  life.  And  then  he  did  some  time 
in  South  America  and  in  Iraq  doing  oil  exploration. 

And  were  you  there,  too? 

No,  we  never  got  there.  But  while  he  was  overseas,  we  lived  in 
different  places.   We  lived  in  the  San  Joaquin  Valley  up  around 
Fresno  for  a  while,  and  we  lived  in  Antelope  Valley  one  time,  when 
he  was  gone  for  a  couple  of  years.   In  any  event,  I  went  to 
twenty-five  different  schools  before  I  got  out  of  high  school. 
Now  that  gave  me  a  pretty  broad  base  on  elementary  and  secondary 
education  in  California.   [Rowland  laughs] 

I  should  say. 

It  also  gave  you  a  good  perspective  on  the  state, 

The  first  school  I  went  to  was  in  Dyerville,  up  in  the  redwoods  in 
Humboldt  County.   There  was  an  oil  strike  on  in  1920,  and  my  dad 
moved  the  family  up  there.   He  had  a  friend  that  was  in  the  redwood 
business;  he  worked  there  making  grape  stakes  and  railroad  ties 
out  of  down  timber  in  what  is  now  the  redwood  parks.   They  needed 
one  more  kid  in  that  school  to  get  two  teachers ,  so  my  mother 
took  me  up  and  enrolled  me.   I  went  three  hours  a  morning,  so  the 
school  could  get  an  extra  teacher.   I  was  one  of  three  or  four 
blondes  in  the  school;  the  rest  of  the  students  were  all  Indians. 

I've  been  to  school  in  this  state  from  one  end  of  it  to  the 
other,  and  I  have  a  good  grasp  of  the  geography  and  economics  and 
all  the  social  problems  that  you'd  find  in  the  various  parts  of 


Campaigning  for  Calaveras  County  Supervisor 

Rowland ; 

Rowland : 
Rowland ; 
Teale : 
Rowland : 

Were  you  politically  active  in  high  school? 

No,  I  didn't  get  politically  active  until  after  I  had  got  out  of 
medical  school.   I  didn't  have  time.   I  got  politically  active 
up  here  in  1948.  I  moved  to  this  county  in  '45  and  started 
medical  practice.  At  that  time,  the  supervisors  acted  as  their 
own  social  workers,  and  they  admitted  everybody  to  the  hospital, 
and  granted  aid.  We  had  a  supervisor  locally  that  wouldn't  give 
anybody  form  Oklahoma  a  permit  to  go  the  hospital.   I  was 
having  a  heck  of  a  time  during  the  winters,  when  nobody  was 
working,  and  there  was  no  medical  insurance.   If  somebody  got 
sick,  they  either  had  to  go  to  the  county  hospital  or  not  go  at 
all.   This  old  man,  he  wouldn't  allow  anybody  in  the  hospital 
unless  they  were  natives  of  the  area.   I  got  sick  and  tired  of 
that,  so  I  ran  against  him  as  supervisor  and  beat  him. 

This  was  in  1948? 

1948,  yes. 

What  was  the  individual's  name? 

His  name  was  Claude  Smith. 

This  is  Calaveras  County. 

Calaveras;  yes.   I  was  supervisor  for  four  and  a  half  years, 
that  period  of  time,  we  got  a  district  hospital  started. 


Rowland:   That's  the  hospital  down  in  San  Andreas? 

Teale:    Yes.  We  changed  the  eligibility  rules,  and  we  made  it — I  think 
probably  we  were  the  first  county  hospital  in  the  state  in 
which  you  couldn't  tell  a  paying  patient  from  a  charity  patient. 
You  just  couldn't  tell.   They  were  in  the  same  kind  of  a  bed  and 
in  the  same  rooms.   Nobody  except  the  hospital  business  management 
knew  where  to  send  the  bill.  We  contracted  for  medical  services 
with  the  local  doctors,  and  developed  a  pretty  good  medical  care 

Senate  Campaign:   1953 

Teale:    Then,  in  '53,  Senator  [Jesse  M.  ]  Mayo  died,  and  I,  just  on  a  long 
hunch,  ran  for  senator. 

Rowland:  Who  was  supporting  you  for  that  race? 

Teale:  Just  me  and  my  wife. 

Rowland:  There  wasn't  any  organized  Democratic  grassroots — 

Teale:  There  never  has  been  any  organized  Democrats. 

Rowland:  So  you  didn't  go  out  and  seek  endorsements  first? 

Teale:    Yes,  I  did.   I  sought  them,  it  was  just  like  always:   the  Democrats 
just  split  wide  open.  We  had  six  Democrats  running,  and  most  of 
the  Democratic  county  central  committee  supported  the  Republican. 

Rowland:  Who  were  your  opponents  in  that  election?  Do  you  recall? 

Teale:  Yes,  I  think  I  can  remember.  There  was  a  guy  named  Avery  More; 
and  Bob  Romaggi,  a  young  guy  named  Curran,  who  ended  up  as  D.A. 
of  San  Diego  County  eventually,  Bob  Curran. 

Rowland:   Bob  Curran.   More  was  a  Democrat? 
Teale:    More  was,  yes;  all  Democrats. 
Rowland:  This  was  the  primary? 

Teale:    Primary.   No  it  was  an  open  special  election.   And  there  was  a  guy 
named  Clyde  Sherwood,  and  myself  on  the  Democratic  side.   There 
was  a  fellow  named  Vern  Rue,  who  was  a  Republican.   Rue  should 
have  won  it,  but  he  went  to  sleep.   He  forgot  about  absentees. 


Rowland : 

Rowland ; 
Rowland : 

Teale : 

Rowland : 

Teale : 

Anyway,  that  was  the  first  of  eight  or  nine 
that  Democrats  won. 

How  would  you  analyze  your  victory  now? 

special  elections 

Very  tight.   I  won  by  forty-nine  votes.   And  I  won  it — I  had  a 
little  pocket  of  votes  down  in  Mariposa  County,  and  a  little  pocket 
around  the  sawmills  in  Tuolumne  County,  and  seventeen  hundred  votes 
right  up  here  in  my  own  supervisorial  district,  around  West  Point. 
I  won  it  with  a  total  of  twenty-one  hundred. 

How  come  you  won?   Can  you  pinpoint  it,  like  your  achievements 
as  supervisor? 

Just  because  I'd  taken  care  of  these  local  people  as  a  supervisor. 
They  were  the  ones  who  voted  for  me. 

The  essence  of  our  whole  political  system  is  that  if  you  really 
serve  your  constituents,  you're  almost  guaranteed  your  election. 
But  you  really  have  to  serve  your  constituents. 

A  lot  of  elected  politicians  forget  that — they  get  an  idea  that 
they  are  serving  the  best  interests  of  the  state,  and  that  they 
have  a  high  and  mighty  mission  to  perform.   They're  just  vice- 
presidents  in  charge  of  little  old  tiny  chicken  manure'  sort  of 
operations.   [laughter]   If  they  take  care  of  the  constituents, 
the  constituents  will  take  care  of  them.  And  that's  all  there  is 
to  it.  It's  just  that  simple.  You're  the  buffer  between  the 
people  you  represent  and  the  state  government.   That's  your  major 
function.   Incidentally,  you  solve  some  major  problems.   But  that 
isn't  the  function  that  the  voter  looks  at.   The  voter  looks  at 
what  you  did  for  him  yesterday,  and  what  you're  going  to  do  for 
him  tomorrow.   And  the  voter  remembers  a  little  ten  cent  transaction 
a  lot  longer  than  he  does  the  fifty  dollar  one. 

That's  true.   I  think,  U.S.  Senator  Eastland,  who  is  a  controver 
sial  character  himself  in  Mississippi,  once  said,  "The  reason  I'm 
re-elected  all  the  time  is  because  I  get  the  veterans'  benefit  for 
some  guy  who  lives  in  my  district  who  comes  here  all  the  way  to 
Washington  to  try  to  get  his  retirement  pay,  and  I  go  out  of  my 
office,  and  I  get  his  retirement  pay  right  then.  And  that  word 
is  passed  around  in  my  district,  and  that's  why  I'm  re-elected." 

I've  got  a  woman  who  lives  down  my  road  here  about  a  half  a  mile. 
She  was  my  county  campaign  chairman  in  1966,  or  1968 — I  can't 
remember  which — but  she  told  me  the  other  day  that  the  first  time 
she  ever  saw  me  was  back  in  1962,  and  I  was  in  the  service  station 
in  Mokelumne.   They  were  in  there.   She  was  telling  the  service 


straightened  out." 

Teale:    station  operator  about  her  husband's  troubles  with  the  Veteran's 
Administration.   They  couldn't  get  a  loan  in  Calaveras  County 
because  there  weren't  any  sidewalks  or  streetlights.   I'd 
listened  in  while  I  was  signing  my  credit  card,  and  as  I  left,  I 
said  to  her,  "Well,  you  go  to  Sacramento,  and  you  see  a  man  by 
the  name  of  Johnson  in  the  VA,  and  tell  him  that  I  sent  you  to  see 
Senator  Teale  sent  you  to  see  if  you  could  get  this  loan 
And  I  just  turned  around  and  walked  away. 
She  said  they  decided  they'd  take  a  chance  and  see.  They  weren't 
getting  anywhere  anyway.   So  they  drove  to  Sacramento  and  they 
saw  Mr.  Johnson.   They  walked  in,  and  he  says,  "What  can  I  do 
for  you?"  and  they  said,  "Well,  Senator  Teale  told  us  to  come  and 
see  you  about  our  veteran's  loan.  We're  having  difficulty  with 
it."  She  said,  "We  had  it  by  the  time  we  walked  out."  And  she 
says,  "It's  a  hell  of  a  thing  if  you  have  to  be  a  name-dropper  in 
order  to  get  something,"  but  she  says,  "that  was  my  first  contact 
with  you,  and  it  was  very  impressive."  What  she  didn't  see  was 
that  behind  her  episode  I'd  had  about  six  or  eight  cases  up  here 
that  I  had  to  go  to  bat  for  and  work  for  months  and  months  and 
months  to  get  the  problem  straightened  out.   I  had  to  get  them  to 
recognize  that  our  land  was  just  as  valuable  and  was  to  be  resold 
just  as  well  as  a  tract  in  Modesto  or  Sacramento.   Even  though 
it  didn't  look  as  attractive  to  those  bankers  that  were  running 
the  veteran's  loan  program  down  there. 

Rowland:  Down  in  San  Francisco  and  Los  Angeles? 
Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:  Well,  why  don't  we  jump  into  the  meat  of  this  here.   I'm  interested 
in  your  connections  and  your  function  in  the  Democratic  party  as 
a  senator.   And  also  in  your  analysis  of  the  thesis  that  there 
were  rural  versus  urban  and  north  versus  south  divisions  in  the 
party  that  overlap  to  the  reapportionment  battle.  We  have  a  note 
in  our  office  that  your  former  wife  was  chairman  of  the  Calaveras 
County  Democratic  party  in  1953. 

Ties  to  the  Democratic  Party 

Teale:    Yes.   Yes. 

Rowland:   So  you  had  some  roots  there  in  1953. 

Teale:    Yes.   It  was  kind  of  funny  how  she  got  involved.   She  came  in  one 
day,  and  she  said,  "What  the  heck  is  this  central  committee  on  the 


Teale:    ballot?"  And  I  said,  "I  don't  have  any  idea  what  they  do."  She 

said,  "I  think  I'll  find  out."  So  she  went  up  and  she  got  about 
fifteen  people  to  write  her  name  in,  and  she  got  elected  to  the 
Democratic  central  committee  of  Calaveras  County,  and  then  it  was 
about  six  or  eight  months  after  that  episode  that  I  decided  to  run 
for  senator.   So  she  was  on  the  central  committee  at  that  time. 
I  don't  remember  whether  she  was  the  chairman  of  it  or  whether 
she  was  just  a  member,  but  that's  how  she  got  on.   She  got  on  out 
of  curiosity. 

These  small  county  central  committees  really  don't  do  very 
much  here.   In  1953  there  were  only  about  eight  members  of  the 
Calaveras  central  committee,  and  they'd  been  there  for  forty 
years  prior  to  that.   So  there  wasn't  much  doing. 

Really,  in  the  first  years  I  was  in  politics,  the  Democratic 
party  in  California  was  pretty  disorganized.  The  Republicans 
had  lived  with  the  slogan,  "Vote  for  the  man,  not  the  party"  for 
about  twenty  or  thirty  years,  ever  since  Hiram  Johnson  was  elected. 
Even  though  the  Democrats  outnumbered  the  Republicans  two  to  one, 
they  made  it  sound  like  it  was  a  dirty  thing  if  you  professed  to 
be  a  Democrat.  Now,  it  was  all  right  for  the  Republicans  to  be 
Republicans,  but  they  weren't  partisan,  by  their  explanation  of  it. 

When  I  decided  to  run  for  the  senate,  I  decided  that  I  would 
take  a  chance  and  be  a  Democrat.   I  ran  on  a  Democrat  name.   I 
advertised  it  on  my  billboards  and  every  place  I  spoke;  I  made 
it  real  plain  right  at  the  outset  that  I  was  a  Democrat.   I'm  not 
sure  that  I  understood  what  the  Democrats  stood  for  in  those  days. 
I  thought  the  Democratic  party  was  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt 
re-incarnated,  you  know. 

I  was  sixteen  when  Roosevelt  got  elected.   I  still  think  that 
the  only  reason  I  ever  survived  the  damn  Depression  was  that 
Roosevelt  was  there  and  got  the  business  going  again  so  we  could 

Rowland:  You  think  there  was  still,  in  1953,  a  grass-roots  support  for  the 
image  of  Wilson  and  FDR  in  the  Democratic  party? 

Teale:    Yes,  yes.   Particularly  people  who  had  been  hungry  during  the 

Depression.  Roosevelt  was  a  God  for  them,  and  then  Harry  Truman 
had  come  along  and  really  reinforced  the  image.   I  guess  even 
today  there  are  a  great,  great  many  people  who  think  that 
Harry  Truman  was  a  vast  improvement  over  Roosevelt.  Maybe  because 
they  remember  him  better.   They  don't  remember  Roosevelt  in  his 
prime.   I  think  Harry  Truman  was  a  great  president,  because  he 
got  things  done.   He  was  a  little  bit  tough  and  rough  the  way  he 
did  it,  but  he  got  things  done. 

Rowland:  Moving  up  to  the  California  Democratic  Council,  what  was  your 
relationship  with  the  CDC? 

Teale:    I'm  not  sure  that  I  approved  of  everything  they  did.  When 

Unruh  came  along,  he  made  that  his  own  personal  operation.   I 
thought  the  CDC  served  a  real  function  in  trying  to  put  the 
Democratic  party  back  together  again. 

Rowland:  Were  you  active  at  all?  Did  you  seek  any  positions  in  the  CDC? 
Teale:    No,  I  went  as  a  delegate  for  a  number  of  years.  And  I  served  as — 
Rowland:   Delegate  to  their  conventions? 

Teale:    Yes,  and  I  served  as  head  of  their  resolutions  committee  a  couple 
of  times.   Made  some  good  friends  with  people  like  Cranston,  and 
those  folks,  when  they  were  running  it.   I  became  friendly  with 
George  Miller  right  away,  as  soon  as  I  went  to  the  senate.   In 
fact,  he  came  up  here  to  help  me  in  my  campaign.  He  and 
Van  Dempsey  and  Pierre  Salinger.   In  fact,  my  campaign  was  the 
first  one  that  Salinger  worked  on. 

Rowland:  When  was  that? 
Teale:    1953. 

Rowland:  That's  very  interesting.  You've  heard  the  argument  about  Salinger 
coming  to  California  in  1964  to  get  Clair  Engle's  seat?  Some 
people  have  said  that  he  was  a — carpetbagger. 

Teale:    Yes.  Well,  Salinger  took  two  weeks  off  and  came  to  Calaveras 
County  and  he  moved  right  in  the  house  with  me.   Of  course,  we 
only  had  a  six  weeks'  campaign,  so  the  campaigning  had  to  be  real 
fast.   But  we  put  together  our  press  and  advertising  and  sat 
right  here  at  this  table. 

To  get  back  to  your  original  question,  I'm  not  sure  that 
anybody  was  playing  a  very  heavy  role  in  the  Democratic  party 
with  the  exception  of  maybe  Cranston  and  Miller  in  those  first — 

Rowland:  Richard  Richards,  too,  perhaps? 

Teale:    Well,  Richards  came  along  in  1958.   He  was  trying  to  put  together 
some  stuff,  too.   There  was  also  Elizabeth  Snyder  and 
Carmen  Warschaw.  And  of  course,  the  CDC  would  develop  factions. 
The  L.A.  group  split  up  into  factions  and  they  started  fighting 
among  themselves. 


Rowland:   So  there  is  that  north  versus  south — 

Teale:    Well,  Unruh  and  Warschaw  were  fighting  Liz  Snyder  and  Richards. 

There  was  more  of  a  south  versus  south  fight,  rather  than  a  north 
versus  south.   The  guys  that  were  in  the  legislature  didn't  really 
pay  a  hell  of  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  CDC.  When  asked  to, 
myself  and  other  legislators  participated,  and  some  of  our  par 
ticipation  wasn't  particularly  welcome,  and  some  was.   It  was  kind 
of  a  mixed  bag,  and  I'm  not  sure  it  was  very  effective  as  far  as 
getting  Democrats  elected. 

In  electing  Democrats,  you  had  Roger  Kent,  you  had  Van  Dempsey, 
and  you  had  a  guy  named  Don  Bradley.  With  those  three  people  put 
together  you  had  Kent  furnishing  the  money,  and  Bradley  and 
Van  Dempsey  furnishing  the  know-how.   And  they  put  together  nine 
consecutive  special  elections  that  they  won.   I  was  the  thirteenth 
Democrat,  when  I  went  in.   It  had  been  lower  than  that;  it  had 
been  down  to  eleven  at  one  time.  After  the  1958  election,  we  had 
about  twenty- five.   So  we  doubled  our  strength  there  in  about — 

Rowland:  The  Democratic  success  in  the  '58  election  you'd  say  was  due  to 
Kent,  Bradley,  and  Van  Dempsey? 

Teale:    Basically,  yes.   I  think  they  were  the  movers.  They  went  out  and 
they  hunted  up  candidates.   They  saw  that  they  got  some  money, 
and  they  helped  the  candidates  with  know-how  on  how  to  put  their 
program  together. 

Rowland :  One  theory  holds  that  the  CDC  was  an  urban  phenomenon  that  grew 

out  of  the  Stevenson  campaign;  it  was  centered  around  Los  Angeles, 
Berkeley,  Marin,  and  had  some  friction  with  the  conservative 
Democrats  from  the  Valley,  such  as  Burns. 

Teale:    Oh,  yes.   But  the  friction  was  between  individuals.   Kent,  Cranston, 
Don  Bradley,  and  Carmen  Warschaw  put  together  the  CDC.   They  put 
it  together  starting  about  1954.   They  had  a  momentum  of  special 
elections  going  that  really  gave  them  strength.   Numerically, 
it  was  urban,  but  geographically  it  was  spread  all  over  the  state. 
Every  county  in  California,  including  Alpine  County,  had 
representation  at  those  meetings  back  in  the  mid-1950' s.   The 
people  form  the  north,  south,  east,  and  west  really  went  at  it 
hammer  and  tongs.  You  had  more  money  coming  out  of  the  urban 
areas,  but  you  had  an  awful  lot  of  grass-roots  support  from 
around  Chico  and  Redding.   Stockton  was  a  big  hot-bed,  and  also 
Sacramento,  Modesto,  Fresno,  Bakersfield.   Every  place  where  there 
was  a  collection  of  people  you'd  get  at  least  forty  people 
together.   At  that  time,  in  the  late  '50' s,  here  in  Calaveras 
County,  we  had  a  Democratic  Club  that  was  associated  with  CDC  that 


Teale:    had  about  eighty-five  members.   Hell,  previously,  you'd  never 

been  able  to  get  more  than  four  Democrats  together  at  one  time, 
and  you  had  to  have   beer  to  do  that. 

Rowland:  There  were  a  lot  of  changes  that  have  happened  with  the  Democratic 
party  during  Pat  Brown's  years. 

Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:  Wasn't  there  a  schism  between  the  CDC  and  the  Democratic  State 
Central  Committee? 

Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:   How  did  that  schism  begin?  Was  it  due  to  Jesse  Unruh? 

Teale:    I  think  it  was  Jesse  versus  Miller  and  Cranston.   Jesse  wanted  to 
control  the  CDC;  other  people  didn't  want  him  to  control  it. 
Jesse  only  understood  one  kind  of  control  and  that  was  total 
control.   He  couldn't  be  content  with  influencing. 

Rowland:  Was  Jesse  Unruh  representing  kind  of  a  Democratic  machine  politics 
from  southern  California? 

Teale:    No,  he  created  a  Democratic  machine.   I  don't  think  prior  to  that 
we  had  a  Democratic  machine. 

Rowland:  Was  he  strictly  a  southern  California  kind  of  politician? 
Teale:    Yes.   Rosalind  Weiner  used  to  be  a  city  councilwoman  down  there. 
Rowland:  W-e-i-n-e-r? 

Teale:    Liz  Snyder  could  give  you  a  better  view  on  that  than  I  could, 

because  I  didn't  pay  a  great  deal  of  attention.   I  was  considered 
an  ultra-liberal  when  I  went  into  the  senate.   It  took  me  a  long 
time  to  make  real  good  friends  with  some  of  the  older  people. 

Rowland:  You  would  say  Rosalind  Weiner  was  the  force  behind  Unruh,  one  of 
the  organizers  behind  Unruh? 

Teale:    She  was  one  of  the  people  who  was  with  him. 
Rowland:  And  she  was  an  L.A. — 

Teale:    — city  councilwoman  in  the  late  '50's,  early  '60's.  Her  husband 
held  some  office  in  the  CDC.   I  can't  remember  what  it  was,  now. 


Teale:    But  Weiner  had  the  support  of  people  in  the  legislature,  who  were 
older.   I  won't  say  that  they  were  basically  any  more  conservative 
than  the  new  people,  but  their  brand  of  liberality  was  more  of  the 
type  that  FDR  had  in  1932  than  what  Jesse  Unruh  had  in  1956-58. 

As  time  goes  on,  the  liberal  of  one  day  becomes  the  conser 
vative  of  the  next.   And  in  that  group  you  had  Hugh  Burns.   You 
also  had  George  Miller  who  was  more  liberal  than  Burns,  or  a 
different  "period"  of  liberal,  but  Miller  still  had  a  great  deal 
of  conservatism  in  him.   And  then,  I  came  along  in  1953.   By  the 
time  '65  came,  I  was  considered  a  conservative,  and  I  still  had 
the  same  liberal  tendencies  as  I  had  had  in  '53.   I  was  still 
a  civil  libertarian  and  believed  in  a  lot  of  social  programs, 
but  the  new  kids  coming  along  had  a  different  view  of  what 
liberality  meant.   The  older  you  get,  the  more  conservative  you 
get.   I  think  that's  what  happened  to  Burns,  and  it  happened  to 
other  older  men  in  the  senate. 



The  Wellman  Commission 

Rowland:  Why  don't  we  just  jump  into  the  reapportionment  question.   The 
first  thing  that  I  dug  out  of  talking  to  Frank  Mesple  yesterday, 
was  the  question  on  why  the  senate  rejected  the  Wellman  Commission 
back  in  1962.   This  was  after  Frank  Bonelli's  initiative  was 
defeated  in  1960.   Pat  Brown  called  for  a  blue  ribbon  commission 
to  study  reapportionment,  and  the  commission  recommended  that 
Los  Angeles  be  given  three  senators.  And  then  the  senate 
rejected  it.   How  come? 

Teale:    I  guess  probably  one  of  the  basic  reasons  was  that  the  people 
from  L.A.  didn't  want  it. 

Rowland:   The  L.A.  senator?  Or  the  L.A.  senator  and  assemblymen? 

Teale:    The  L.A.  senator.   The  reason  was  that,  prior  to  any  reapportion 
ment,  you  had  twenty  some  assemblymen  from  L.A.,  and  you  couldn't 
get  any  sense  out  of  any  of  them.   In  order  to  get  any  sense 
about  legislation  that  affected  L.A.  County,  the  only  way  you 
could  do  it  was  to  wait  until  the  legislation  got  to  the  senate 
and  then  talk  to  the  L.A.  senator, 
and  he  proposed  to  represent  L.A. 
pretty  good  job  of  representing  L.A.   The  L.A.  people  weren't  very 
enthusiastic;  there  were  some  people  who  wanted  a  total 
reapportionment,  but  when  they  got  that  blue  ribbon  commission's 
report,  number  one,  the  L.A.  people  weren't  very  enthusiastic 
about  it, — 

Rowland:  When  you  say  the  L.A.  people — 

Teale:    The  L.A.  senator  and  the  L.A.  assembly. 

He  spoke  with  a  single  voice, 
I  think  generally  he  did  a 


Rowland:   Is  it  that  they  felt  through  give  and  take  with  northern  senators, 
they  could  get  what  they  wanted? 

Teale:    Well,  you've  got  to  understand  how  the  senate  worked  those  years. 
If  the  L.A.  senator  said  to  the  senate,  "This  is  bad  for  L.A. 
County;  this  is  bad  f o r  the  people  I  represent,"  usually  it  didn't 
get  passed.   If  he  came  and  he  said,  "It  is  good  for  the  people 
I  represent;  we  should  have  it,  and  these  are  the  reasons,"  and 
if  the  reasons  were  fairly  substantial,  the  rest  of  the  senate 
went  along  with  him.   The  senate  was  not  as  provincial  as 
Frank  Bonelli  and  the  other  people,  old  man[Phill]  Silver  and 
those  that  prosecuted  the  lawsuit,  would  make  out.  We  did  a 
study  in  '64  or  '65,  we  had  legislative  counsel  take  a  look,  and 
find  out  where  the  major  legislation  that  affected  cities  had 
originated.   About  ninety-nine  per  cent  of  it  originated  with 
rural  senators  like  myself,  Randy  Collier,  and  Chris  Jespersen — 
people  who  had  small  districts  and  had  time  to  work. 

Rowland:   This  was  a  special  study  that  you  and  your  reapportionment  com 
mittee  did? 

Teale:    Yes.   We  had  them  dig  it  out,  and — 

Rowland:  This  was  your  senate  special  committee  on  reapportionment? 

Teale:    No.   The  rules  committee  did  it;  we  just  asked  the  legislative 
counsel  who  was  Ralph  Kleps.   We  asked  Kleps  to  take  a  look  and 
see  what  major  legislation  that  affected  cities  and  urban  areas 
was  initiated  by  rural  senators.   Urban  legislation  had  virtually 
all  been  authored  by  guys  from  very  rural  districts.   The  rural 
guys  put  together  the  water  plan  for  Brown  so  that  it  made  sense. 
We  put  together  the  highway,  freeway  program  that  linked  the  cities 
and  made  them  a  heck  of  a  lot  more  functional  at  that  time.   It 
later  became  a  dirty  word  to  talk  about  freeways.  But  for  program 
after  program  there  was  a  benefit  basically  to  cities  that  came 
out  of  rural  districts.   I  guess  that's  for  two  reasons:  number 
one,  the  men  in  the  senate  were  pretty  broad  caliber  fellows  who 
had  a  statewide  perspective,  and  number  two,  there:  was  a  certain 
economic  spin-off  from  all  of  this  legislation  that  made  the  rest 
of  the  state  prosper.  We  prospered,  too. 


U.S.  Supreme  Court  Decision;   Challenge  to  States'  Rights 

Rowland:  What  was  the  senate  reaction  to  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decision 
affecting  Alabama  and  California? 

Teale:    Well,  at  first  it  was  total  disbelief — total,  total  disbelief — 
that  anybody 'd  be  so  stupid  as  to  interfere  with  the  state 
constitution.  We  had  sort  of  the  same  reaction  that  the  Southern 
states  had  prior  to  the  Civil  War.  We  kind  of  felt  like  it 
involved  states'  rights.   Then  the  bulk  of  the  people  in  the 
legislature  said,  "Well,  we'll  just  ignore  it  for  a  few  years. 
After  all,  what  can  they  do  to  us?  What  can  they  make  us  do?" 
And  that's  where  it  stood  in  '64,  in  the  summer.   That's  when  we 
began  to  get  a  rash  of  decisions  from  not  only  Alabama,  but  other 
states,  saying  that  you  had  to  have  equal  representation  to  be 
cons  titutional . 

Rowland:  Now,  what  was  the  reaction  of  senators  who  remembered  Earl  Warren 
in  his  governorship?  What  was  the  reaction  to  people  concerning 
Earl  Warren's  decision?  Frank  Mesple  said  legislators  were  aghast. 
They  couldn't  believe  that  Earl  Warren  could  make  a  decision  like 

Teale:    It  was  total  disbelief  that  such  a  decision  was  possible. 

Well,  I  got  involved  in  reapportionment  in  July  and  August 
of  1964.   Virgil  0' Sullivan,  who  was  senator  from  Colusa  County, 
drove  with  me  to  the  national  Democratic  convention  in  Atlantic 
City.   The  reason  we  drove  is  that  we  wanted  to  look  at  some 
medical  schools  along  the  way.  We  were  on  the  budget  subcommittee 
that  was  looking  at  the  UC  medical  schools.   So  we  planned  the 
trip,  and  we  saw  about  fifteen,  maybe  eighteen  medical  schools 
across  the  United  States.  We  stopped  and  talked  to  medical 
school  administrators  about  their  financing  and  about  their  organ 
ization  and  hiring  practices — basically  about  administrative  affairs 
rather  than  academics.   But  in  the  course  of  going  across  the 
United  States — it  took  us  about  five  weeks  coming  and  going — we'd 
listen  to  the  radio  and  read  the  papers  about  reapportionment.   It 
was  getting  in  the  papers  pretty  much  then,  and  also  in  the  radio. 
In  the  course  of  that  trip,  Virgil  and  I  decided  that  reapportion 
ment  was  going  to  be  a  fact  of  life.   So  when  we  got  to  Atlantic 
City,  I  was  the  only  member  of  the  rules  committee  there.  We  had 
about  twelve  or  fourteen  [California]  Democratic  legislators 
there  also.   So  I  called  a  meeting,  and  we  sat  down  and  we 
discussed  what  was  happening  in  the  reapportionment  field.  After 
the  meeting,  they — 


Rowland:   This  meeting  was  with  the  California  congressional  delegation? 

Teale:    No,  this  was  with  state  legislators.   There  were  some  assemblymen 
and  there  were  about  eight  or  nine  state  senators.  There  was 
Bobby  Williams,  Fred  Farr,  Stan  Arnold,  George  Miller,  myself, 
and  0* Sullivan — there  was  quite  a  group.  And  so,  after  we  talked 
it  over,  they  asked  me  to  call  senate  pro  tern  Hugh  Burns  back  here 
in  California  and  see  if  I  could  set  up  a  special  committee  to 
begin  to  try  to  figure  out  what  we  could  do.   You  know,  everybody 
was  talking  about  passing  a  federal  constitutional  amendment, 
or  simply  ignore  Chief  Justice  Warren  and  tell  him  to  go  to  Hell. 
Some  guys  said,  "We're  going  to  have  to  do  it.   Maybe  if  we  can 
use  a  fifteen  per  cent  tolerance  in  the  districts,  we  can  save — " 

Senators  in  Support  of  Dirksen  Amendment 

Rowland:  Who  were  those  senators  who  stood  out  in  favor  of,  I  guess  it's 

called  the  Dirksen  Amendment,  the  federal  constitution  amendment? 

Teale:    All  forty  of  them. 

Rowland:  All  forty  of  them.  Who  were  those  state  senators  who  realized 
that  something  had  to  be  done? 

Teale:    I  think  at  that  point,  0' Sullivan  and  myself  were  the  only  two. 
We  realized  that  we'd  have  to  reapportion,  so  let's  get  on  with 
dying  and  get  moving.   So  I  called  up  Hughie  Burns  and  asked  him 
to  call  a  meeting  of  the  rules  committee  as  soon  as  I  got  back  to 
California,  (which  was  going  to  be  in  about  two  or  three  weeks 
from  then)  to  discuss  setting  up  a  special  committee.   Burns  did 
that;  he  called  a  meeting  of  the  rules  committee,  and  we  met  in 
Sacramento.   We  decided  to  make  a  thirteen  man  committee,  I  was 

Rowland:   [laughter]  Now  wasn't  there  a  committee  before  this  which 
Senator  Edwin  Regan  chaired? 

Teale:    No.   Tell  you  what  Ed  did.   Ed  and  I  worked  together  on  that.  It 
was  just  an  unofficial  committee  to  see  if  we  could  influence 
congress  to  pass  a  federal  constitutional  amendment.   I'm  not 
sure  whether  that  was  before  or  after  our  committee  was  formed. 
Ed  Regan  was  on  that  reapportionment  committee.  Let  me  shut  this 
thing  off  a  minute.   [tape  recorder  shut  off] 

Now,  talking  about  Regan  and  his  activities,  Ed  and  I  went 
to  Washington,  and  we  spent  a  week  one  time  trying  to  lobby  the 
California  congressional  delegation.   I'm  sure  this  was  right  after 
our — 


Rowland ; 
Teale : 


Was  that  with  Joe  Rattigan,  too? 

No.   Joe  Rattigan,  Begovich,  Hugh  Burns,  Jack  McCarthy  and  some 
of  the  others  did  some  work  among  the  other  states,  trying  to 
get  Texas,  Alabama,  and  Georgia  to  support  the  amendment.   They 
went  to  Georgia  and  talked  to  Lester  Maddox,  who  was  governor, 
and  they  went  and  talked  to  [John]  Connally,  governor  of  Texas, 
[tape  recorder  turned  off] 

Anyway,  Ed  Regan  and  I  went  to  Washington,  and  we  stayed 
five  days.  When  we  came  back  on  the  plane,  I  said  to  Ed,  "What 
are  you  going  to  do?"  He  said,  "I'm  going  to  get  a  judgeship." 
I  said,  "Aren't  you  going  to  work  for  an  amendment?"  He  said, 
"There  isn't  any  amendment  that  is  going  to  get  passed."  He  said, 
"You  don't  think  there  is,  do  you?"  And  I  said,  "No.   I'm  going 
to  go  back  and  work  out  a  reapportionment  plan."  And  that's  all 
that  trip  amounted  to. 

There  was  a  great  deal  of  activity  for  about  a  year  to  try 
to  get  some  change  in  the  federal  constitution.   The  federal 
people  weren't  the  least  bit  interested  in  the  amendment.   The 
federal  Senators  were  protected  by  their  constitution,  and  they 
didn't  care  about  the  rest  of  the  people.   And  congressmen  could 
care  less. 

So  nothing  happened.  We  started  in  August  of  '64  putting 
the  reapportionment  committee  together.  As  I  said,  we  had  a 
thirteen  man  committee,  and  I  was  chairman  of  it.   I  had  one 

Now,  this  was  strictly  a  senate — it  wasn't  a  joint  committee. 
No,  it  was  not  a  joint  committee.   It  was  strictly  senate. 
This  is  early  '65. 

Late  '64.   August  of  '64  we  went  to  work.   I  hired  a  fellow  named 
Art  Johnson,  who  was  a  retired  statistician  out  of  the  Army.  We 
put  him  to  work  in  September  of  '64,  and  we  sat  down  and  began  to 
assess  the  effect  of  reapportionment.   The  best  we  could  come  up 
with  would  be  that  only  twenty  of  the  forty  senators  would  be  re- 
elected  out  of  any  sort  of  a  reapportionment  plan.   That  didn't 
sit  very  well  with  the  rest  of  the  senate.  But  they  didn't  know 
what  to  do  about  it.   So  the  senate  said,  "Go  ahead  and  continue 
to  work;  see  if  you  can  work  out  anything  better." 

By  December  of  '64,  I  think,  we  pretty  well  had  the 
reapportionment  map  set.   By  that  time  we'd  done  exercises  that 


Teale:    showed  that  you  had  to  start  at  the  four  corners  of  the  state. 
And  worked  into  the  Bay  Area  and  into  L.A.  County.   Other  than 
that,  the  only  consideration  we  gave  to  any  particular  individual 
was  that  we  preserved  Hugh  Burns'  district  intact  in  Fresno  County. 
It  was  an  understanding  the  entire  senate  had  that  that  was  a 
desirable  thing  to  do. 

Rowland:   So  the  senate  Democratic  leaders'  districts  remained  intact? 

Teale:    Just  Hugh  Burns'  district.   Burns  had  three  hundred  and  sixty 
five  thousand  people  and  needed  four  hundred  thousand.   We  kept 
his  district  intact,  and  worked  around  it.   And  that's  how  we 
got  that  goofy  district  line — 

RowlancJ:  .  Was  that  done  as  a  measure  of  respect  for  Hugh? 

Teale:    Yes.   He  was  the  leader  of  the  senate;  he  was  the  pro  tern,  and 

everybody  liked  him  and  trusted  him.   Even  the  people  who  didn't 
like  him,  didn't  dislike  him  that  much. 

Rowland:   Backtracking  to  the  [Charles]  Wellman  reapportionment  commission: 
I  understand  that  the  senate  had  gotten  along  very  well  with 
Governor  Brown's  office,  but  that  it  felt  some  hostility  to 
Governor  Brown  when  he  stepped  in  and  appointed  the  Wellman  blue 
ribbon  reapportionment  commission  in  I960-.   Previously,  there  was 
a  good  relationship  because  the  senate  and  assembly  leaders  were 
fighting  it  out.  Would  you  share  that  analysis? 

Teale:    Well,  I  think  that  senators  felt  that  Brown  didn't  need  to  appoint 
the  Wellman  commission.   We  felt  that  by  our  constitution, 
reapportionment  is  the  duty  of  the  legislature,  and  nobody  else. 
When  he  appointed  the  Wellman  commission,  he  felt  that  we  weren't 
moving  fast  enough  or  not  moving  at  all  on  reapportionment. 
We  didn't  intend  to  move  at  that  time.   Brown  got  the  mistaken 
idea  that  somebody  ought  to  be  doing  something.   We  didn't  even 
have  some  final  cases,  at  that  time.  We  just  waited  to  see  what 
the  Supreme  Court  was  going  to  do.  After  that,  the  U.S.  Supreme 
Court  began  to  hand  down  a  series  of  cases.   Then  we  began  to 
move.   And  again,  I  think  that  the  only  two  people  in  the  senate 
who  thought  that  we  had  to  move  were  0' Sullivan  and  myself. 

Anyway,  we  put  together  a  basic  reapportionment  plan,  but 
we  didn't  know  what  to  do.   We  were  finally  able  to  divide  up  the 
Bay  Area  pretty  well,  but  we  couldn't  get  any  consensus  about 
downtown  San  Francisco.   So  we  came  to  the  conclusion  we  would 
have  an  at  large  district.  We  made  a  tentative  split  of  the  Los 
Angeles  area.   It  was  pretty  close  to  what  it  is  currently. 


Re-districting  Los  Angeles 

Rowland:   But  you  had  at  large  elections,  right? 

Teale:    Just  in  San  Francisco. 

Rowland:  You  didn't  have  at  large  elections  for  L.A. 

Teale:    No.   The  reason  we  didn't  was  that  Unruh  came  to  the  senate,  and 
he  and  I  discussed  the  situation.   He  said  that  he  had  some 
people  that  he  wanted  to  protect  in  Los  Angeles.   I  had  no 
objection  to  him  trying  to  protect  his  assemblymen  if  he  wanted 
to,  or  even  get  them  elected,  because  that  was  where  they  were 
probably  going  to  come  from.   So  I  laid  down  some  rules  to  him 
about  splitting  of  cities  and  getting  odd  looking  districts 
scattered  all  over  the  country — the  long  strings  of  districts  here 
and  long  strings  there.  He  said  that  he  would  be  willing  to 
abide  by  that  agreement,  so  I  said,  "Go  ahead  and  make  a  tentative 
description."  He  did,  and  then  we  took  those  descriptions — 

Rowland:  This  was  before  it  was  presented  as  senate  bill  6? 

Teale:    Oh,  yes.   It  took  us  about  fifteen  months  to  put  this  together. 
We  took  Unruh 's  division  of  Los  Angeles  County  and  we  worked  it 
out.   And  we  worked  it  on  census  tracts  and  put  it  together,  and 
ironed  out  the  little  jogs  and  jigs  that  were  in  it,  so  that  they 
made  pretty  square,  good  looking  districts.  We  had  a  couple  of 
problems,  like  the  one  that  ran  from  Santa  Monica  down  the  coast. 
It  was  a  long  stringy  district.   And  we  had  to  slop  into  Ventura 
County  for  a  district,  and  we  had  to  slop  into  Orange  County  for 
half  of  another  district.   But  basically,  we  just  set  down  the 
rule  that  a  district  in  general  had  to  be  compact.   It  had  to 
preserve  the  nearest  possible  county  boundaries;  if  it  couldn't 
preserve  county  boundaries,  it  had  to  respect  city  boundaries. 
We  only  got  one  place  where  we  divided  a  city  right  down  the 
middle,  and  that  was  Exeter,  or  Lemon  Grove,  or  one  of  those  little 
towns  in  Tulare  County.  We  simply  didn't  have  a  good  enough 
description  of  the  city  to  make  it  come  out  right.   So  we  went 
right  down  the  middle  of  Main  Street. 

Rowland:   There  were  Republicans  on  your  thirteen-member  committee,  weren't 
there?  . 

Teale:    Sure  there  were. 

Rowland:  What  was  the  Republican  reaction?  Senate  Republican  reaction? 


Teale:    Same  as  the  Democrats. 

Rowland:   They  supported  the  district  elections  in  L.A.  County,  even  though 
that  was  Unruh's  little — 

Teale:    Yes.   Because  no  matter  what  Unruh  did,  he  could  only  do  about  so 
much  to  the  Republicans,  and  in  doing  it  to  the  Republicans,  he 
turned  around  and  did  it  to  some  of  his  Democrats,  too.   You 
know, — 

Rowland :   One  theory  holds  that  Unruh  was  a  man  who  wasn ' t  really  a  party 
politician,  but  was  one  who  played  with  both  parties,  basically. 

Teale:    Yes,  I  think  he  did.   If  he  had  a  key  Republican,  he  preserved 

him,  if  the  guy  worked  for  him.   Assemblyman  Milton  Marks  is  one 
of  the  great  examples.   Miltie  was  always  a  good  vote  for  Unruh, 
so  Unruh  protected  him.   But,  when  we  got  right  down  to  it,  the 
assembly  voted  for  reapportionment  of  the  senate  because  there 
wasn't  much  they  could  do  about  it. 

Rowland:  This  question  backtracks  to  that  '64  Democratic  national  conven 
tion  held  in  Atlantic  City.  We  have  a  note  in  our  office  that 
CDC  people  were  prominent  in  the  convention  and  were  pushing  LBJ 
to  back  reapportionment  as  a  presidential  candidate.   Do  you  recall 

Teale:    I  was  too  damn  busy. 

Rowland:  There  seems  to  be  a  division  here,  a  division  in  the  Democratic 
party  overlapping  to  reapportionment.  Not  to  mention  that  you 
and  other  Democrats  from  California  were  pushing  for  the 
constitutional  amendment  at  the  Democratic  convention. 

Teale:    No.  And  actually,  you  had  the  legislators,  who  were  almost 
isolated,  pushing  for  a  federal  constitutional  amendment  to 
preserve  our  right  to  have  a  federal  type  representation.   And 
then  you  had  the  people,  particularly  the  people  around  the  Bay 
Area  and  Los  Angeles,  who  figured — 

Rowland:   And  people  involved  in  CDC? 

Teale:    Involved  in  CDC,  who  felt  that  reapportionment  was  the  only  answer 
to  their  political  woes.   Well,  hell,  reapportionment  didn't  solve 
any  of  them,  but  they  thought  they  were  going  to  solve  all  their 
political  problems. 

Rowland:   Do  you  see  this  as  a  further  widening  of  the  CDC  from  the  Democratic 
central  committee? 



Rowland : 





Rowland : 




Right  at  the  moment  it  was,  but  as  soon  as  we  got  reapportionment, 
that  disappeared,  because  the  central  commttte  then  became 
synonymous  with  the  new  districts.   See,  they  were  selected  by 
districts.   For  a  little  period  of  time,  there  was  a  little  trouble 
there,  yes. 

So  now  we  come  to  your  bill,  which  was  senate  bill  6. 
the  whole  package  that  came  out  of  your  committee? 

Was  that 

That's  all  that  came  out  of  the  committee,  and  that  really  wasn't 
the  work  of  the  committee:   the  committee  would  come  in  once  in 
a  whle  when  I  called  meetings,  and  the  committee  members  would 
say,  "How  are  you  doing?"  I'd  say,  "Well,  we're  doing  so  and  so," 
and  they'd  say,  "Don't  bother  us  with  the  details.   Just  keep 
going.",  you  know.   The  committee  in  general  left  it  up  to  me. 
And  so  I  got  a  bunch  of  maps  and  overlays,  and  I  got  all  the 
census  material,  and  a  couple  of  men,  and  we  sat  down  and  re- 
districted  the  state  together. 

Now,  why  did  the  assembly  reject  SB6?  Why  did  Unruh  and  Allen 
reject  it? 

Well,  they  eventually  took  it. 

They  eventually  took  it? 


After  the  California  Supreme  Court  stepped  in? 


Didn't  Unruh  and  Allen,  Allen  particularly,  reject  Tom  Rees  stepping 
in  and  amending  your  bill  to  have  at  large  elections  in  L.A. 
County  versus  district  elections? 

Yes,  Senator  Rees  wanted  to  have  at  o.arge  elections  and  Unruh 
wanted  to  have  district  elections.   I  guess  maybe  they  did  reject 
it  once.  But  we  put  it  back  together.   I'd  have  to  look  at  the 
legislative  history;  it's  been  so  long.   But  Unruh  and  Allen 
eventually — [Rowland  turns  off  tape  recorder] 

We  couldn't  come  to  any  conclusion  in  the  senate  about  what 
to  do  with  L.A.   So,  we  put  together  an  at  large  election,  for 
just  fifteen  or  sixteen  senators  in  L.A.  County,  and  sent  the  bill 
over  to  the  assembly. 


Rowland:  What  was  the  position  of  the  oil  lobbyists  on  reapportionment? 
Teale:    I  don't  remember  any  lobbyist  ever  expressing  an  opinion  on  it. 

Rowland:  We  have  a  note  in  our  office  that  George  Miller  disapproved  of 
reapportionment  because  he  had  the  backing  of  the  Standard  Oil 
lobby  in  Contra  Costa  County.  Standard  Oil  displayed  billboards 
in  every  Chevron  station,  which  called  for  the  voter  to  defeat 
the  Bonelli  initiative,  therby  rejecting  senate  reapportionment. 

Teale:    Well,  I  think  George  was  in  the  same  position  as  everybody  else. 
None  of  us  like  the  Bonelli  initiative.  When  you  took  a  body  of 
forty  men  and  presented  them  a  bill  that  got  rid  of  twenty-two 
of  them,  you  wouldn't  get  a  hell  of  a  lot  of  support  for  it. 
George  didn't  like  it;  I  didn't  like  it.   I  felt  reapportionment 
was  going  to  be  the  ruination  of  the  senate,  because  it  was  going 
to  change  the  character  of  people  who  served  there.   And  time 
proved  that  reapportionment  did  change  the  character  a  great  deal. 

But  I  don't  think  that — I  think  it  was  the  other  way  around. 
I  think  George  Miller  prevailed  upon  the  lobbyist  for  Standard 
Oil,  who  he  had  known  since  he  was  six  or  seven  years  old,  to 
swing  their  weight  behind  opposition  to  the  Bonelli  amendment. 
I  don't  think  that  the  oil  companies  cared  one  way  or  another  on 
reapportionment.  We  worked  on  the  lobbyists  more  than  the 
lobbyists  worked  on  us,  to  try  to  get  people  to  maintain  the 
status  quo.   The  lobbyists  were  just  like  anybody  else;  they  were 
comfortable  with  what  they  had  gotten.  When  they  had  learned  to 
live  with  something,  and  they  were  very  comfortable  with  it.   They 
didn't  like  to  see  anybody  change  it. 

Rowland:  Well,  going  back  to  Senator  Vern  Sturgeon's  bill — 

Teale:    Well,  Vern  Sturgeon  wanted  to  amend  the  bill  so  that  he  would  have 
a  safe  district.   He  was  going  to  be  in  competition  with  Senators 
Fred  Farr  and  Don  Grunsky  under  reapportionment. 

Rowland:   Sturgeon  was  from  San  Luis  Obispo? 

Teale:    San  Luis  Obispo  County,  Paso  Robles.   The  only  way  he  could  amend 
that  bill  was  to  screw  up  my  district. 

So,  the  night  before,  I  saw  him  in  the  hall,  and  I  said, 
"Vern,  how  would  you  like  a  nice  home-cooked  meal?"  "Great!" 
he  said.   I  said,  "I'll  spring  for  it."  I  put  him  in  my  car,  and 
I  drove  up  here.   We  had  dinner  here  at  home,  a  nice  home- cooked 
meal.   I  said,   "You're  going  to  have  to  share  my  bed  with  me." 
(I  wasn't  married  at  the  time.)   I  had  a  king-size  bed,  so  he  shared 


Rowland : 
Teale : 


one  half  of  it,  and  I  shared  the  other  half.   The  next  morning 
I  took  him  to  Sacramento  and  when  we  arrived  he  didn't  have  any 
time  to  work  on  his  amendments.   1  called  the  vote  on  it,  and  his 
amendments  lost.   He  says,  "Boy,  talk  about  being  screwed  by  a 
politician!"  He  says,  "I've  had  it!"   [Rowland  laughs]  He  says, 
"I'll  never  take  another  invitation  for  a  home-cooked  meal  again." 

Boy,  you  were  sly  in  those  days! 

Oh,  I've  been  devious  all  my  life.   [Rowland  laughs] 
have  much  difficulty  with  that  bill. 

We  didn't 

If  you  read  about  it  in  the  newspapers,  you'd  think  there 
was  a  lot  more  going  on  than  there  actually  was.   I  guess  it  was 
because  nobody  was  talking.  I  wouldn't  talk.  The  minute  I  started 
talking  about  anything,  why  then,  I'd  alert  some  districts  who 
didn't  like  what  they  were  going  to  get,  and  they'd  get  a  lot  of 
pressure  on  their  man,  and  that  just  caused  more  troubles  for  most 
of  the  representatives  in  that  district,  and  for  myself.  The  other 
legislators  weren't  talking;  Brown  didn't  know  anything  on 
reapportionment  to  talk  about.   Unruh,  all  he  knew  was  L.A.  County, 
and  he  didn't  want  to  start  any  trouble.   So  there  was  no  talking 
going  on,  and  the  newspaper  guys  had  to  have  some  copy  all  the  time. 

California  Supreme  Court  Decision:  A  Two-Way  Street 

Rowland:  Wasn't  there  kind  of  a  strange  twist  of  events  when  the  California 
Supreme  Court  stepped  in  and  they  ordered  senate  and  assembly 
reapportionment,  which  forced  kind  of  a  two-way  street  agreement 
between  Burns  and  Unruh? 

Teale:    Yes,  yes.   The  assembly  had  reapportioned  in  1960,  I  think,  and 
they  were  out  of  line,  numerically.   That's  when  the  California 
Supreme  Court  told  them  they  had  to  do  it.   So,  that  got  them  off 
our  backs.   And  other  than  letting  Unruh  draw  the  broad  boundaries 
of  the  senate  districts,  which  nobody  in  the  senate  even  knew  how 
to  do — even  Rees  didn't  know  how  to  do  that — he  became  consumed 
with  trying  to  reapportion  his  own  districts. 

Rowland:  How  was  that  agreement  reached?  Were  you  privy  to  that? 

Teale:    Oh,  Burns  and  Unruh  sat  down  in  Burns'  office  and  talked  about 

it.  We  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Unruh  had  enough  to  do  to  take 
care  of  his  problems,  and  we  had  enough  to  do  to  take  care  of  our 
problems.   It  was  as  simple  as  that,  yes. 


Rowland:   And  if  you  don't  pass  ours,  we  won't  pass  yours — 
Teale:    Well,  we  knew  we  had  to  pass  them. 
Rowland :  Yes . 

Teale:    And  after  we  got  the  work  done,  and  I  have  to  say  that  the  maps 
that  we  worked  out  in  August  on  that  trip  that  0' Sullivan  and  I 
worked  out,  were  very,  very  close  to  what  we  finally  came  up  with. 
It  was  a  very  simple  thing.  There  just  isn't  any  way  to  jiggle 
districts  around  to  satisfy  any  one  individual,  particularly 
when  he  lives  in  the  middle.  You  have  to  start  at  the  edge;  you 
have  to  start  at  the  edges  and  the  corners,  and  work  in,  like  that. 
And  you  simply  take  the  total  population  and  divide  it  by  forty, 
and  that  told  you  how  many  you  had  to  have. 

You'd  build  a  district  here  that  had  that  many,  and  eventually 
you  got  down  to  where  you  had  your  big  population  centers,  and  then 
you  could  divide  them  up  equally.   That's  how  it  worked  out.   It 
took  us  two  or  three  months  to  really  come  to  that  conclusion  that 
that  was  the  way  you  had  to  work.   Because  we'd  start  here,  we'd 
start  someplace  else,  we'd  start  doing  exercises  saying  that  we 
had  to  save  Burns,  or  we  had  to  save  the  guy  in  Bakers field,  or 
we  had  to  save  the  guy  in  El  Centre . 

And  soon  you  came  to  the  conclusion:  you  can't  do  it.   And 
you  can't  influence — you  really  couldn't  influence  the  party  split, 
either.   It  just  came  out  that  your  party  split  would  remain 
almost  the  same.  You'd  just  have  different  faces.   Once  we  worked 
that  out,  there  were  very  few  changes  in  that  bill,  except  there's 
a  little  minor  adjustment  to  the  corner  of  the  line  to  take  care 
of  population  shifts  that  hadn't  shown  in  the  '60  census,  that 
showed  up  on  later  censuses,  the  special  censuses.   Once  we  got 
them  worked  out,  we  just  simply  put  the  thing  on  ice,  and  sat 
there,  month  after  month  after  month,  until  the  guys  adjusted 
themselves  to  the  idea  that  they  were  going  to  have  to  vote  for 
it.   Those  senators  who  were  going  to  run  for  cover  someplace 
made  their  little  deals  with  the  governor  or  with  whoever, 
wherever  they  were  going  to  run  to.   I  didn't  know  until  about 
two  days  before  we  called  a  vote  that  we  were  going  to  call  a  vote. 

Rowland:   Now,  if  a  researcher  was  going  to  go  back  and  study  turning  points, 
major  turning  points  within  the  reapportionment  battle,  what  would 
you  see  as  some  of  the  major  turning  points? 

Teale:    I  guess  one  of  the  major  turning  points  was  that  summer  of  '64, 
when  we  began  to  get  all  the  federal  decisions.   That  was  when 
the  legislators  finally  began  to  understand  they  were  going  to 
have  to  do  it. 


Teale:    Another  major  turning  point  came  in  the  summer  of  '65,  when  we 
finally  figured  out  what  to  do  with  the  Bay,  San  Francisco  area, 
and  when  we  reached  an  agreement  what  to  do  with  L.A. 

Rowland:  This  was  the  summer  of  '65,  after  the  California  Supreme  Court 

Teale:    I'm  not  sure;  I  can't  remember.   But  it  was  in  the — 

Rowland:  You  did  meet  that  deadline  for  July  of  '65,  but  you  had  an  exten 
sion  of  that  deadline  by  the  L.A.  District  Court.  And  then  the 
California  Supreme  Court  stepped  in,  and  made  the  assembly  and 
senate  reapportion.   Is  that  another  turning  point  that  you  can 

Teale:    Oh,  it's  possible.   I  can't  remember.   I've  got  a  very  unfortunate 
habit;  when  a  job's  finished,  I  just  put  it  out  of  my  mind.   I 
throw  all  the  papers  away,  and  reports,  and  forget  about  it. 

Rowland:   So,  now  we  come  up  to  Brown's  signature  of,  well  I  guess  it 
became  AB1,  which  was  the  senate  and  the  assembly  bills  put 

Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:  Brown  signs  it  in  October  of  '65.  And  now  you're  facing  a  new 
senatorial  district  which  had — how  many — seven  counties? 

Teale:    Twelve. 

Rowland:  What  were  your  relationships  with  Governor  Brown's  staff,  and 
your  relationship  with  Governor  Brown  personally? 

Teale:    Oh,  happy.   I  was  able  to  call  him  a  fink  periodically  without 
him  getting  too  mad.   I  called  him  a  fink  one  time  when  we  were 
fighting  about  the  water  plan.   I  went  down  there,  and  I  got  him — 
I  was  chairman  of  the  water  committee  then,  and  I  got  him  to  agree 
on  a  solution  to  one  of  the  real  knotty  problems. 

And  before  I  got  back  upstairs,  he'd  issued  a  press  release 
that  he  had  reversed  his  field,  reversed  his  promise  to  me.  And 
I  says,  "That  God-damn  fink!"  One  of  the  reporters  says,  "What's 
your  definition  of  a  fink?"  And  I  said,  "It's  a  son  of  a  bitch 
that  double-crosses  his  friends!"  They  printed  it.   Brown  got 
pushed  out  of  shape  something  awful.   He  says,  "I  didn't  suspect 
you'd  ever  call  me  that,  Steve!"  He  says,  "That's  uncalled  for!" 
I  says,  "The  hell  it  is."  I  said,  "You're  a  fink."  And  we 
settled  at  that,  and  in  about  three  days,  we  were  back  friendly 
again.   So,  it  was  kind  of  a  strong  relationship,  but  always  friendly. 


Teale:    Those  were  the  years  when  three  or  four  of  us  senators  used  to 

meet  with  him  for  breakfast  once  a  week  to  give  him  advice:   Miller. 
Burns,  myself  and  sometimes  one  or  another  guy  impressed  with  him. 
He  was  a  funny  guy;  he'd  ask  our  advice,  and  then  he'd  end  up 
saying,  "Well,  why  are  you  fellows  mad  at  me?  Why  are  you  always 
against  me?"  You  know  we  weren't;  we  were  just  trying  to  tell 
him  what  we  thought  was  the  best  solution  to  his  problems.   So, 
I  never  did  really  have  much  trouble  with  Pat  Brown;  it  was  a 
friendly  but  adversarial  relationship.   I  think  we  had  a  lot  of 
mutual  respect  for  each  other.  We  always  had. 

The  relationship  between  him  and  Unruh  wasn't  as  friendly. 
It  was  a  bitter  relationship,  most  of  the  time,  because  Unruh 
wanted  to  run  everything,  including  the  governor's  office.   The 
senate  had  a  different  attitude  toward  it.  We  figured  the 
governor's  office  was  his  responsibility,  and  ours  was  upstairs 
in  the  senate  offices.   If  he  asked  for  advice,  we'd  give  it, 
and  if  he  took  it,  fine,  and  if  he  didn't,  that  was  fine,  too. 

Rowland:  Did  you  support  Pat  Brown's  campaign  in  1966? 

Teale:    Yes.   But  I'd  supported  every  Democratic  candidate  for  governor. 
Richard  Graves;  he  was  the  first  one  I  supported.   I  supported 
Brown,  and — 

Rowland:   So  you  didn't  feel  particularly  threatened  by  the  reapportionment 

Teale:    Well,  I  started  campaigning  in  this  mountain  area  as  far  south  as 
Madera  and  eastern  Fresno  County  in  late  1964. 

Rowland:   In  kind  of  second-hand  knowledge  that  you  knew  that  reapportion 
ment — 

Teale:    I  knew  it  was  going  to  happen  and  I  knew  it  was  going  to  happen  in 
this  general  area.   So  I  started  working  on  it  real  early,  and 
carried  some  key  legislation  in  '64  and  '65  and  early  '66  that 
at  least  gave  me  a  good  name  recognition  throughout  the  whole 
of  northern  California.   So,  I  was  threatened  by  reapportionment, 
sure.   Hell,  I  only  won  that  first — that  '66  election  by  about 
three  or  four  thousand  votes  out  of  almost  half  a  million  voters, 
half  a  million  people;  I  don't  remember  the  total  votes.   It  was 
a  tight  election.   I  won  it  by  one  per  cent. 

Rowland:  This  was  against  Begovich? 

Teale:    No,  no.   I  had  to  beat  Begovich  in  the  primary.   I  beat  him  about 
two  to  one.  But  it  was  against  a  guy  named  Dick  Lyng,  out  of 
Modesto,  and  he  was  an  excellent  candidate. 


Rowland:   So  your  campign  with  Begovich  was  in  the  primary  and  you  got  away 
with  that  pretty  well  in  good  shape. 

Teale:  Yes. 

Rowland:  And  that  was  probably  due  to  your  support  of  Pat  Brown. 

Teale :  No . 

Rowland:  Your  reapportionment — 

Teale:    No,  I  think  it  was  more  on  the  basis  of  other  legislation  that 
I'd  carried  for  the  district.   Although  I  supported  Pat  Brown, 
I  never  tried  to  ride  on  anybody's  coat  tails.  Another  guy's 
coattails  get  damn  short,  and  you're  apt  to  slip  off.  And  I 
never  had  the  feeling  that  I  was  able  to  do  them  much  good,  either. 
You  do  the  campaign  workers  more  good  than  you  do  the  candidate. 
Every  campaign  worker  seems  to  feel  that  he  has  to  have  somebody 
supporting  him.   I  guess  it's  a  sense  of  insecurity  they  have. 
I  always  ran  a  real  tight  campaign;  I  ran  it  with  one  or  two  people, 
did  most  of  it  myself,  did  an  awful  lot  of  traveling,  and  personal 

Rowland:   So  you  mada  visits  to  clubs  and  organizations  to  small  Democratic 
groups — any  group  you  "could. 

Teale:    Oh,  yes.   Yes.   Anybody.   And  I  married  Shirley  in '66 — 

Rowland:   Up  here  in  the  foothill  counties,  I  kind  of  see  the  Abe  Lincoln 
type  of  stumping  as  effective. 

Teale:    Shirley  and  I  got  married  in  July  of  '66.   I'd  just  gotten  over 
winning  the  primary.   I  had  run  up  and  down  the  God  damned  state 
on  that.   After  that,  Shirley  and  I  took  off  and  spent  about, 
almost  three  months,  just  traveling.   I  found  out  when  every 
Lion's  Club,  every  Rotary  Club,  every  Kiwanis  Club,  and  all  the 
community  clubs  met;  hell,  if  there  were  ten  people  in  a  group, 
I  made  it  a  point  to  go  to  the  meeting  and  take  her  with  me.  At 
that  time,  not  very  many  women  ever  went  to  a  Lion's,  Kiwanis, 
or  Rotary  Club  meeting.   I'd  go  to  a  place  like  Royalton,  and  I'd 
tell  the  president,  "I've  got  my  wife  with  me  and  I  don't  intend 
to  send  her  down  the  street  to  a  dirty  spoon  to  eat.   Do  you  mind 
if  I  bring  her  with  me?"  That  did  two  things:  it  kept  the 
meetings  cleaned  up  without  so  much  ribald  humor  and  it  kept  them 
occupied  looking  at  her  while  I  was  talking.  The/ didn't  pay  a 
hell  of  a  lot  of  attention  to  what  I  was  saying,  out  the  total 
impression  was  satisfactory. 


Rowland:  Who  was  your  opposition,  again,  in  November  of  '66? 

Teale:    Lyng.   Dick  [Richard  E. ]  Lyng.   L-y-n-g.   He  later  became 

Assistant  Secretary  of  Agriculture  of  the  United  States.   He  was 
out  of  Modesto.  He  was  out  director  of  agriculture  here  in  the 
state  for  about  a  year  and  a  half  under  Reagan.   He  was  extremely 
intelligent,  presented  himself  well,  but  forgot  the  campaign  in 
his  own  neighborhood.   That's  where  I  beat  him. 

Rowland:   So  then,  the  Pat  Brown  connection  wasn't  really  important  to  your 
November  campaign. 

Teale:    It  wasn't  important  to  me,  no.   It  was  the  campaign  that  we  ran. 

Although  some  guys,  some  of  the  legislators,  stayed  pretty 
well  clear  .of  Pat.   They  had  a  fear  that  being  mixed  up  in  another 
man's  campaign  gives  you  nothing  but  trouble.   While  I  never 
figured  it  did  me  any  harm,  at  the  same  time,  it  didn't   do  me 
much  good.   So  I  never  depended  on  the  other  man's  campaign  to 
carry  me.   But  I  didn't  shun  other  campaigns  because  of  the  fact 
that  it  wasn't  my  campaign. 

Rowland:   So  you  went  right  in  the  legislature  and  you  finished  up  in  what — 

f  • 

Teale:    I  finished  in  January  of  '73,  yes. 

Rowland:  You  resigned? 

Teale:    Quit.   Didn't  run.   Retired.   I  got  tired  and  retired. 

Rowland:   [laughs]  Oh,  when  you  said  retired,  I  just  recalled,  there  was 
another  big  question. 

Retirement  Benefits  and  Reapportionment 

Teale:    Yes.   What  the  hell  happened  to  Don  Allen  and  his  retirement  bene 

*See  Don  Allen  interview  in  this  volume,  containing  further 
views  on  Assemblyman  Allen's  retirement  benefits  amendment. 


Rowland:   Yes.   How  did  that  happen  anyway? 

Teale:    The  senate  wanted  me  to  put  a  very  juicy  retirement  provision  in 
the  [reapportionment]  bill.   I  actually  prepared  it  but  I  didn't 
ever  even  need  to  run  it  because  Don  Allen  picked  up  the  provisions 
and  amended  them  into  AB  1  [the  final  reapportionment  bill]  which 
was  the  vehicle  we  were  using.   He  was  chairman  of  the  reapportion 
ment  committee  in  the  assembly.  He  picked  it  up  and  put  it  in  the— 

Rowland:   Getting  back  now:  now  why  did  senators  that  were  obviously  going 
to  lose  their  seats,  because  of  reapportionment,  want  bigger 
retirement  benefits? 

Teale:    To  get  retirement  benefits  of  any  kind  at  that  time,  you  had  to 
serve  fifteen  years.   According  to  retirement  provision  if  you'd 
served  twenty  years,  you  could  retire  at  any  age  and  start  drawing 
benefits.   That  was  a  fact  of  life  and  it's  still  a  fact  of  life. 
It's  the  provision  I  retired  under.   But,  for  that  one  election, 
we  put  a  provision  in  that  anybody  who  lost  their  seat  because  of 
reapportionment  could  draw  their  pro-rated  share  of  retirement, 
starting  right  then.   So  you  had  some  guys  with  four  and  six  and 
eight  years  who  were  able  to  draw  up  to  forty  or  fifty  percent  of 
their  salary,  which  wasn't  very  big,  then.   Hell,  the  salary  was 
only  five  hundred  a  month.  You  take  a  guy  with  eight  years  of 
experience;  he  drew  forty  percent  of  that  salary.   Don  Allen  put 
that  provision  as  an  amendment  in  the  reapportionment  bill. 
Somebody  got  on  Pat  Brown,  and  he  vetoed  it,  the  entire  bill. 

Rowland:  How  did  Allen  get  involved  in  that? 

Teale:    Well,  he  was  simply  chairman  of  the  Assembly  Elections  and 

Reapportionment  Committee,  and  some  of  the  guys  asked  him  to  put 
it  in,  and  he'd  got  lots  of  gall,  and  he  simply  stuck  the 
amendment  in  on  the  assembly  side,  and  voted  it  through. 

Rowland:  But  he  wouldn't  gain  anything,  would  he? 

Teale:    He  could  have,  yes.   Because  it  applied  to  any  member  of  the 

legislature  who  lost,  see.   Lost  at  a  reapportionment  election. 

Rowland:  What  district  is  Allen  from? 

Teale:    Oh,  Don  was  from  L.A.,  someplace.   Brown  vetoed  it  and  then  even 
tually  we  got  it  through.   I  don't  remember  all  the  maneuvering 
that  went — I  think  it  went! — through  on  a  reapportionment  cleanup 
bill.   But  anyway,  Don  Allen  took  the  blame  for  it. 

I  was  the  guy  that  originally  worked  it  out.   I  couldn't  get 


Teale:    my  committee  to  approve  it,  so  I  just  left  it  out.   And  Don  stuck 
it  in  over  on  the  assembly  side. 

Rowland:   And  did  he  assume  that  Brown  was  going  to  okay  it? 

Teale:    Yes.   Pat  Brown  told  him  he  would  okay  it,  and  then  he  didn't. 
As  I  remember  it.   You'd  have  to  talk  to  Don  to  be  sure,  but  as 
I  remember  it,  Brown  agreed  to  pass  it,  and  then  the  heat  came  on. 

Rowland:  Heat  from  where? 

Teale:    Oh,  press,  and  a  few  public-spirited  citizens,  like  the  League  of 

Women  Voters  and  so  forth.   I  can't  remember  all  who  were  involved. 
But  there  was  a  lot  of  heat  about  it,  a  lot  of  editorializing. 
Pat  vetoed  it.   And  then  eventually,  it  went  through.   I  don't 
think  quite  as  rich  as  Don  would  have  liked  it,  but — 
[turns  off  tape  recorder] 

You've  got  a  total  of  ten  men  who  are  currently  drawing 
pensions  that  they  got  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the 
reapportionment  bill.   Do  you  want  the  names  of  them? 

Rowland:  Okay. 

Teale:    [Stanley]  Arnold,  iJohnJ  Begovich,  [Paul]  Cunardi, [Virgil] 0' Sullivan, 
Stan  Pittman,  Ed  Regan,  Harold  [T. }  Sedgwick,  Jack  Slattery, 
Bill  Symons   [Jr.],  and  Al  [Alvin]  Weingand.   He  was  from  Santa 

Rowland:  These  are  all  the  senators  who  lost  their  seats? 

Teale:    Yes.   There  was  one  assemblyman  who  lost  his  seat  that  year,  who 
draws  a  pension,  Gordon  Winton.   He  was  reapportioned  out  by 
Unruh,  out  of  the  assembly,  because  he  was  a  free-thinker.   Pretty 
bright  guy,  too. 

Rowland:   Gordon  Winton  was  a  free-  thinking  Demo  who  didn't  support  — 

Teale:    In  fact,  he  ran  against  Unruh  for  Speaker,  one  year.  And  that  kind 
of  put  him  on  the  outs. 

Rowland:   Anything  else  that  you  think  we  should  have  talked  about  that  we 


didn't  cover? 

No,  I  don't  think  so. 


Teale:    I  think  the  most  important  thing  to  consider  is  that  reapportion- 
ment  wasn't  nearly  as  traumatic  as  the  press  made  it  out  to  be. 
It  was  a  traumatic  experience,  but  most  of  the  guys  survived  it 
pretty  well.   There  was  a  certain  number  that  just  had  to  accept 
the  fact  they  weren't  going  to  be  in  the  legislature  anymore. 
Some  of  them  never  did  accept  in  very  well.   The  odd  thing:  a 
guy  who  comes  and  gets  into  the  legislature,  seems  to  feel  that 
he  has  a  vested  interest  in  it.   But  it  was  just  a  process;  we 
put  it  together  and  then  just  sat  until  the  guys  were  ready.   That 
took  about  eighteen  months  to  get  reapportionment  worked  out  to 
where  they — enough  people  voted  for  it  to  get  it  passed. 

Rowland:  Now  how  about  the  relations  with  the  houses,  between  both  houses 

and  the  governor's  office  after  reapportionment?  Did  that  change? 

Teale:    Yes.   The  first  thing  that  changed,  it  seemed  to  me,  was  that 

about  eighteen  of  the  twenty- two  new  members  of  the  senate  were 
ex-assemblymen.  Naturally,  a  bunch  of  them  were  hand-picked  to 
run  for  the  senate. 

And  it  even  had  a  different  atmosphere  in  the  senate,  after 
these  guys  came  from  the  assembly.   Prior  to  reapportionment,  the 
senate  was 'a  pretty  independent  body,  and  they  did  their  own  work, 
you  know.   They  didn't  have  a  whole  lot  of  hired  help.   The  guys 
liked  to  do  the  work  themselves,  and  they  didn't  want  a  bunch  of 
bright  young  men  around  telling  them  what  to  do.   They  were  more 
the  elder  statesmen  type  that  acted  as  a  leveling  influence  on 
i     the  trash  that  used  to  come  to  us  from  the  assembly. 

The  minute  the  assemblymen  came  over,  you  began  to  see  a 
broadening  of  the  personal  services.   It  was  after  reapportionment, 
it  was  the  first  time  we  ever  had  anybody  that  came  in  and 
demanded  a  sergeant-at-arms  take  their  damn  laundry  up  to  the 
corner  and  then  go  get  it  again.   The  car  situation  came  in  after 

Rowland:   The  state  car. 

Teale:    Yes,  the  state  car.   They  demanded  a  lot  of  personal  services. 
They  demanded  a  lot  of  hired  help  that  never  existed  before  in 
the  senate.  It  was  a  great  thing  to  get  a  committee  and  then  have 
two  or  three  hired  help,  who,  in  actuality,  were  nothing  but 
personal  flunkies.   They  tend  to  hire  some  kid  and  pay  him  twice 
what  the  senator  got  paid.  Maybe  they're  bright  enough,  but 
there's  an  awful  lot  of  them  didn't  have  any  political  background. 
They  didn't  have  any  understanding  of  the  political  process. 

The  assembly  had  a  different  attitude  toward  presentation 
of  bills.   They  used  to  send  their  hired  help  to  present  bills, 


Teale:    and  if  you  asked  one  of  the  assemblymen  to  present  it,  the 

assemblymen  would  chew  off  and  didn't  even  know  what  they  were 
trying  to  present.   Prior  to  the  reapportionment ,  I'd  never 
seen  a  staff  man  try  to  present  a  senate  bill  before  a  committee. 
Members  did  it.   I  think  it  detracts  a  great  deal,  detracted  a 
great  deal  from  the  quality  of  work  that  the  men  did.   They  began 
to  get  sloppier,  they  didn't  inform  themselves  as  much.   They  did 
poorer  work. 

Rowland:  Wouldn't  there  be  a  closer  communication  between  senate  and  assembly 
after  reapportionment? 

Teale:    Yes.   The  minute  former  assemblymen  got  over  to  the  senate,  they 
developed  a  personality  all  their  own.   They  wanted  to  develop  a 
second  assembly.   They  didn't  want  to  work  with  the  people  who 
were  left  on  the  assembly  side.   They  wanted  to  convert  the 
senate  into  the  same  kind  of  a  house,  but  independent  of  the 

Rowland:   So  the  result  of  reapportionment  in  regarding  the  relations  between 
houses — 

Teale:    Didn't  help  any.   Or  didn't  change  the  relationship  a  great  deal. 
It  was  more  of  an  internal  change  in  the  senate  that  those  of  us 
who  had  been  there  before  noticed.   And  I  must  say  that  the  older 
members  that  survivied  the  reapportionment,  were  not  very,  happy 
about  the  way  the  thing  worked  out.   They  were  very  disgusted  and 
disappointed  with  some  of  the  things  that  some  of  the  newer  members 
had  done.   It  may  have  been  that  those  changes  would  have  taken 
place  in  any  event,  whether  there  had  been  a  reapportionment  or 
not.   I  don't  know. 

But  prior  to  that,  we'd  worked  on  a  basis  of  seniority,  the 
theory  being  that .you  had  to  learn  something  by  being  there.   It 
had  to  improve  your  ability,  just  by  living  and  being  in  the  atmo 

Rowland:   So  the  seniority  system  changed  because  of  the  reapportionment? 

Teale:    Sure.   The  first  one  changed  was  that  the  Senate  Finance  Committee 
no  longer  was  based  strictly  on  seniority.   It  took  me  about  nine 
years  to  get  on  the  finance  committee.   I  went  on  the  finance 
committee  in  '60  or  '61.   I  had  to  stay  there  until  I  got  in  line. 
Once  I  got  in  line,  I  had  my  choice.   I  could  go  on  it,  or  I  could 
stay  off  of  it.   But  I  had  to  wait  until  my  number  rose  up  high 
enough  so  that  I  qualified  from  a  seniority  standpoint.   Immediately 
after  reapportionment,  we  put  freshman  on  it,  new  legislators  on 
it,  simply  because  they  were  from  southern  California. 


Rowland:  What  about  relations  between  the  governor's  office  and  the  senate? 
Teale:    I  don't  think  they  were  changed. 
Rowland:  Well,  this  was  a  new  governor,  too. 

Teale:    Well,  the  actor  changed.   Brown  had  basically  Democrats  with  a 

scattering  of  Republican  senators  advising  him,  with  free  access 
to  the  governor's  office  downstairs  from  the  senate.   The 
Republicans  were  those  who  were  chairmen  of  important  committees. 

Rowland:   Like  Jack  McCarthy. 

Teale:    Yes,  Jack,  and  Dolwig,  and  some  of  the  others.  When  Reagan  went 

in,  it  strictly  became  a  Republican  operation.   The  only  Democrat 
that  could  go  down  there  was  Hugh  Burns ,  and  he  wasn' t  very 
popular  with  Reagan. 

Rowland:  With  Reagan.   I  assumed  that  Burns  and  Reagan  got  along  well 
because  Reagan  finally  turned  around  and  fired  Clark  Kerr  as 
President  of  the  University  of  California.   That  was  Burns' 
ambition  for  quite  awhile. 

Teale:    Well,  Reagan  and  Burns  had  a  lot  of  the  same  philosophies.  You 
see,  Reagan  was  a  Democrat  back  in  the  thirties,  about  the  same 
time  that  Burns  got  started.   So,  they  had  basically  the  same 

Rowland:   I  think  Reagan  was  a  socialist  Democrat  in  those  days. 

Teale:    Yes,  and  he  lived  long  enough  to  become  a  very  conservative 

Rowland:   Yes.   Not  a  radical  conservative. 

Teale:    No,  he's  conservative  conservative.   I  guess  he's — well,  I  won't 
say  it. 

Rowland:  You  can  turn  it  off  and  say  it.  [he  laughs] 

So  the  effects  of  reapportionment ,  although  they  caused  some 
in-house  changes,  were  not  all  the  dramatic  to  relations  between 
both  houses. 

Teale:    No.   The  relationship  between  the  houses  and  the  relationship 

between  the  two  houses  and  governor's  office,  continues  on  about 
the  same — there  were  some  minor  changes. 


Teale:    I  would  say  the  basic  change  that  came  from  reapportionment  was 
the  internal  change  in  the  senate.   It  became  more  like  the 
assembly.   Prior  to  that  time,  it  had  been  a  two  house  operation 
in  which  there  was  a  very  distinct  difference  between  the  houses. 
That  difference  paled  out  a  lot  in  the  first  two  or  three  years 
after  reapportionment.  You  didn't  have  as  effective  a  leadership 
in  the  senate  after  reapportionment. .  You  got  more  partisanship, 
you  got  a  development  of  a  Democratic  caucus,  which  you'd  never 
seen  before. 

Rowland:  After  reapportionment. 

Teale:    After  reapportionment,  yes.   When  the  assemblymen  came  over,  they 
insisted  on  having  a  party  caucus.   The  general  view  in  the  senate 
was,  that  the  caucus  might  be  satisfactory,  but  it  really  didn't 
serve  much  purpose  except  to  give  the  caucus  chairman  some  dog 
robbers,  and  I  still  feel  that  way  about  it.   Hell,  the  general 
rank  and  file  Democrat  in  the  senate  never  saw  anything  come  out 
of  the  caucus  that  helped  him  any. 

Rowland :  Yes . 

Teale:    There  was  a  little  stuff  went  out  to  the  press,  but  it  didn't 
necessarily  represent  what  the  Democrats  as  a  whole  were  doing. 

Rowland;  And  there  was  the  eventual  challenge  of  Hugh  Burns'  position 

when  he  retired.   Was  there  a  challenge  to  Hugh  Burns  as  pro  tern? 

Teale:    Oh,  yes. 

Rowland:  He  had  to  renew  it  every  two  years,  right? 

Teale:    Yes,  he  had  to  renew  it  every  two  years.   Finally,  he  lost  enough 
friends  that — well,  we  lost  Democrats.   He  finally  lost  when  we 
got  down  below  twenty  Democrats. 

Rowland:   In  the  '68  election? 

Teale:    It  must  have  been  '68.   It  was  when  Reagan  came  in,  and  that's 
when  Howard  Way  took  over  as  senate  pro  tern. 

Rowland:  Yes.  Way  took  over  in  '70,  when  Hugh  retired. 

Teale:    No,  Hugh  didn't  retire  until — Hughie  was  out  prior  to  the  time  he 
retired  as  pro  tern.   We  got  Way,  and  then  we  turned  around  and 
put  Schrade  in.   And  then  Hugh  retired  the  next  election.   I  guess 
he  retired  at  the  '70  election.   It  must  have  been  about  '68, 
when  Reagan  came  in.   When  did  Reagan  come  in?   '66? 


Rowland:  He  won  the  '66  election.   He  entered  office  in  January  of  '67. 

Teale:    '67.  Well,  it  was  about  mid-year  that  Way  took  over.   He  only 
lasted  about  six  months.   Then  they  put  Schrade  in,  and  after 
Schrade  it  was  Jim  Mills,  I  guess. 

Rowland:   There's  something  peculiar  about  Hugh  as  a  Democratic  leader  in 
the  senate,  and  Unruh  as  the  Democratic  leader  in  the  assembly, 
with  Pat  Brown  as  the  Democratic  governor.   It  appears,  maybe, 
that  there  was  a  general  agreement  between  Hugh  and  Pat  Brown  on 
Democratic  policy,  but  that  Unruh  played  the  odd  man  out. 

Teale:    Well,  Hughie  could  always  be  depended  upon  to  support  the 

Democratic  position,  when  the  thing  got  right  down  to  the  final 

Brown  was  very  smart  when  he  maneuvered  and  got  Hughie  to 
run  the  water  bill,  finally,  for  him. 

The  senate  water  committee,  in  general,  put  together  the 
provision  of  the  water  bill.   Desmond  was  chairman  of  it,  and  then 
I  took  over  after  Desmond  left.   But  neither  one  of  us  carried  a 
bill.   Burns  carried  the  bill  for  Brown,  and  we  kept  amending  it, 
and  finally  got  it  into  shape  so  that  it  would  pass.   But  Burns 
put  his  name  and  Assemblyman  Porter's  name  on  the  bill,  which  was 
called  the  Burns-Porter  Act.   Generally,  something  that  Brown 
wanted  that  wasn't  out  of  line  or  didn't  conflict  with  Burns' 
un-american  activities  quirk,  you  could  depend  on  him  to  help 
push  it  through  the  senate. 

But  Unruh  was  a  spoiler. 

Rowland:  Both  Burns  and  Unruh  stood  up  against  the  FSM  activities  at 

Berkeley  in  1964.   They  called  for  a  joint  legislative  committee 
to  investigate  the  university's  state  constitutional  autonomy. 
Was  Unruh  just  politically  outraged  by  this,  or  was  there  some 

Teale:    No,  hell  no.   Unruh  wanted  to  get  the  autonomy  away  from  the 
University  of  California. 

Rowland:  He  just  wanted  the  autonomy  gone? 

Teale:    Yes.   He  wanted  to  be  able  to  dictate  the  policies  of  the 

university.   See,  Unruh  was  an  ex  oficio  regent  of  the  university. 
But  Burns  never  was.   Burns  was  outraged  by  the  Free  Speech 
Movement.   I  don't  think  that  Unruh  cared  one  whit  one  way  or  the 
other  whether  the  free  speech  was  a  factor  or  not.   He'd  like  to 


Teale:    get  his  fingers  into  the  administration  of  the  university.   Or  at 
least  that's  the  way  it  looked  to  me. 

Rowland:  Whatever  became  of  that?  Was  there  ever  a  joint  legislative 
committee  to  investigate  UC  autonomy? 

Telae:    Hell;  I  don't  know  whether  it  came  out  of  that  particular  thing  or 
not.   But  somebody  was  always  investigating  the  university.   I 
really  couldn't  be  bothered  with  that.   There  were  a  lot  more 
important  things  going  on. 

Rowland:   Going  back  to  the  un-american  activities  committee,  you  didn't  sign 
the  committee's  '65  report,  and  we  went  all  through  that  in  a 
previous  interview.   But  you  signed  that  '66  supplementary  report 
of  the  committee,  and  you  said  that  you  had  cleaned  up  the  pages, 
and  did  a  whole  bunch  or  rewriting  of  Combs'  drafts  and  all  of 

Telae:    That  was  probably  a  mistake  to  sign  that,  too. 

Rowland:  Yes.   In  talking  to  Kerr,  he  said  that  you  later  regretted  signing 
that  one,  too. 

Teale:    Because  after  we  got  through  rewriting  it,  they  shuffled  all  the 
original  stuff  back  in. 

Rowland:  They  did.   Combs  did? 
Teale :    Yes . 

Rowland:  You  weren't  aware  of  any  other  staff  members  working  under  like 
Rena  Vale,  or  another  one  named  Piet  van  Rijn,  or  whatever. 

Teale:    Oh,  I  knew  he  had  some  hired  help,  but  I  didn't  know  who  they  were. 
We  never  saw  them. 

Rowland:  Mary  Ellen  Leary  had  an  interview  with  Mr.  Combs  at  his  cabin  in 
Three  Rivers,  California.   She  spent  three  days  up  there  having 
dinner  with  his  family,  and  interviewing  him  extensively.   She 
discovered  that  he  has  this  kind  of  almost  FBI-type  operation 
out  of  his  cabin  with  agents  all  over  the  state  sending  him  coded 
letters  through  secret  mail  droppings . 

Teale:    Oh,  yes.   A  very  odd  thing.   You  know,  members  of  the  committee 
couldn't  get  into  the  files.   I  never  could. 

Rowland:   You  told  me  that,  yes. 


Teale:    But  my  wife's  first  cousin,  who  lives  in  Stockton,  was  an 

immigration  agent.  He  had  freedom  of  those  files  any  day  he 
wanted.  He'd  go  down  to  Fresno,  and  get  into  them,  and  pull 
material  out  of  them. 

Rowland:  There's  a  little  interesting  kind  of  footnote  to  the  file  material. 
Perhaps  you  recall  in  1962  when  Stanley  Mosk  seized  the  files  of 
what  was  called  the  San  Diego  Research  Library,  on  claims  that 
both  Earl  Warren,  Goodwin  Knight,  and  Pat  Brown  were  using  the 
files  to  check  the  backgrounds  of  potential  appointees,  and  that 
the  private  files  from  this "San  Diego  Research  Library"  were 
actually  state  material.   Allegedly,  the  Attorney  General's 
office  had  sent  state  trucks  down  late  at  night,  dumped  the  files 
into  the  state  truck  and  brought  them  up  to  Sacramento.   The  San 
Diego  group  threatened  a  lawsuit ,  and  Moss  gave  up  and  gave  them 
back  to  San  Diego  Research  Library,  where  they  were  thrown  into 
a  vault.   Do  you  recall  any  background  to  that?  I  haven't  been 
able  to  dig  up  any  more  information  on  that. 

Teale:  No,  1  really  don't. 

Rowland:  Was  Hugo  Fisher  involved  in  that  whole  thing? 

Teale:  Yes.   Hugo  was  in  those  files. 

Rowland:  His  name  was  on  those  files? 

Teale:  In  fact,  everybody  was  in  those  damn  files. 

Rowland:  Well,  those  files  were  originally  the  product  of  a  Ralph  Van  Dieman, 
who  was  the  founder  of  U.S.  military  intelligence  at  the  beginning 
of  World  War  I.   He  retired  from  the  Army  in  1929  and  started 
working  on  those  files  in  his  home  in  San  Diego.  By  1952,  when 
he  died,  he  had  accumulated  about  two  hundred  fifty  thousand  names 
of  alleged  subversives  on  a  personal  name  card  index.  When  he 
died,  a  group  of  members  of  the  California  National  Guard  were 
benefactors  of  the  files  and  formed  the  "San  Diego  Research  Library" 
which  offered  the  files  to  state  agencies.  According  to  the 
New  York  Times ,  Earl  Warren,  Goodwin  Knight,  and  Pat  Brown  had 
access  to  those  files  to  check  the  background  of  appointees.  You 
don't  know  any  more  information? 

Teale:    No.  No,  all  I  know  is  that  I  wasn't  supposed  to  be  in  it. 
Towland:  You  had  a  good  record. 

Teale:    I  always  played  pretty  close  to  my  chest  and  never  did  much 

talking.   George  Miller  was  in  them,  and  Bert  Coffey.   And  then, 


Teale:    Hughie  finally  decided  in — oh,  '65  or  '66  that  the  files  ought 

to  be  closed.   He  transferred  all  his  un-american  activities  files 
over  to  the  state  archives  and  locked  them  up. 

Rowland:   In  '65- '66. 

Teale:    Somewhere  back  in  there,  yes. 

Rowland:  After  the  whole  controversy  of  the  free  speech  reports  of  '65- '66? 

Teale:    Yes.   Hughie  decided  that  maybe  they  weren't  so  valuable  after  all. 
He  kind  of  got  caught  with  old  man  Combs ,  and  he  had  him  on  the 
payroll  for  so  long,  he  didn't  know  quite  what  to  do  with  him. 
But  by  the  time  Hughie  left  the  senate,  he'd  thoroughly  lost  his 
enthusiasm  for  the  un-american  activities  committee.   He  just 
didn't  want  anybody  to  bother  him  with  it. 

Rowland:   Yes.   It  seems  that  maybe  we  should  turn  this  off. 
[Interview  II:  27  September,  1978]## 

Teale:    — there  were  three  or  four  guys  including  [George]  Miller.   I  can't 
remember  the  others;  they  interviewed  us  back  in  1953.   George  told 
me  later,  he  says,  "You  know,"  he  says,  "I  was  really  for  that 
sheepherder.."  But  he  said,  "The  other  guys  liked  you,"  he  says, 
"so  they  wanted  you."  Well,  the  sheepherder  was  John  Garamandi's 
father.   Ray  Garamandi.   He  didn't  run,  but  he  was  in  the  running 
for  the  nomination — he  wanted  to  run.   And  then  he  decided  to  back 
off  when  he  didn't  get  the  support  of  the  official  [Democratic] 

Rowland:  Why  was  Clyde  Sherwood  so  popular  in  that  special  senatorial  race 
back  in  1953  in  the  twenty-sixth  district? 

Teale:    He  wasn't. 

Rowland:   He  had  the  support  of  the  Calaveras  Prospect ;  he  had  a  radio  spot 
during  the  election — 

Teale:    I  know.   He  had  been  chairman  of  the  Alameda  County  central 

committee  at  one  time,  andhe  spent  a  lot  of  money.   He  had  a  lot 
of  money,  and  he  spent  a  lot  of  money  to  become  known. 

Rowland:   Prior  to  the  race  he  kind  of  worked  his  way  around  with  contacts? 

Teale:    Yes,  he  was  organizing.   He  was  pretty  well  known  in  the  county; 
I_  was  pretty  well  known.   I  was  a  county  supervisor.   So,  we  just 
slugged  it  out. 


Rowland:  What  other  papers  endorsed  you?  The  only  one  I  was  able  to  find 
was  the  Calaveras  Prospect.  We  looked  in  San  Andreas — 

Teale:    That's  the  only  paper  that  was  here:   the  Prospect.   The  Tuolomne 
paper  endorsed  Rue,  and  the  Mariposa  paper  endorsed  Bob  Curran. 

Rowland:  You  mentioned  that  you  had  Pierre  Salinger  up  here  working  on  the 

Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:  This  was  after  Miller,  Bradley,  Kent — 

Teale:    Yes.   Miller  and  Kent  made  the  decision — 

Rowland:  Made  the  decision  about  wanting  to  put  their  money  in  support  for 

Teale :    Yes . 

Rowland:  Do  you  think  you  would  have  won  that  election  if  they  hadn't 
supported  you? 

Teale:    Sure,  I  got  seventeen  hundred  votes  out  of  this  supervisorial 
district.   And  I  only  had  to  pick  up  four  hundred  around  the 
rest  of  the  district,  of  three  counties.   I  did  a  couple  of  things 
that  the  other  guys  forgot  about:   I  worked  the  absentees,  and  I 
worked  the  county  hospitals.   And  that  was  good  for  one  hundred, 
or  one  hundred  and  fifty  votes.   On  election  day,  Vern  Rue  should 
have  won  that  election.   But  he  forgot  about  hauling  people  into 
the  polls,  and  he  didn't  do  a  darn  thing  except  sit  on  his  dead 
duff  over  there,  and  wait  for  the  returns,  and  I  had  people  in 
every  place  I  knew  that  I  had  a  little  bit  of  strength.   I  gave 
somebody  five  gallons  of  gas,  and  got  them  to  haul  people  to  the 
polls,  go  out  and  get  them.   And  of  course,  they  went  to  get  my 
friends.   Hell,  I  only  had  forty-nine  good  votes,  when  the  day 
was  over. 

Rowland:  When  you  win  like  that,  you  really  need  all  the  pull  and  push  you 
can  get!   [he  laughs] 

Teale:    Yes.   But  it  was  paying  attention  to  the  little  tiny  detail  that 
made  the  election  possible. 

Rowland:  Who  ran  out  and  got  your  endorsements  for  that  election? 

Teale:    I  did. 

Rowland:  Did  anyone  go  out  and  try  to  get  you  newspaper  support? 


Teale:    No,  we  just — I  just  kind  of  played  it  by  ear.   I  had  one  worker; 
she  was  treasurer  and  chairman  and  the  whole  works,  an  unpaid 
worker.  And  other  than  that,  I  just  picked  up  a  little  support 
here  and  a  little  support  there — 

Rowland:  Do  you  recall  her  name? 

Teale:    Yes.   Her  name  was  Peggy  Campbell. 

Rowland :   Campbell . 

Teale:  Yes.  She  lives  over  in  Sacramento  now.  She'd  worked  for  me  in 
the  office  as  a  secretary,  and  I  just  got  her  to  handle  all  the 
money  and  pay  the  bills,  keep  books. 

Rowland:  Did  she  work  for  you  when  you  were  supervisor  for  the  county? 

Teale:    No.   She  was  the  first  secretary  that  I  had  when  I  went  up  to  the 
county  as  a  doctor. 

Rowland:  Oh,  I  see;  during  your  practice.   Did  you  see  Sherwood  as  your 
principal  opponent  in  that  campaign? 

Teale:    No.   Vern  Rue.   Sherwood  was  the  only  other  person' — besides  myself- 
/   who  put  on  a  campaign.   It  only  .lasted  six  weeks,  and  he  worked 
day  and  night.   He  was  travelling  all  over  the  district,  and  in 
those  days,  you  had  to  travel  forty  miles  to  find  a  voter. 

I  used  to  work  the  office  until  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  and  then  start  out.   If  I  worked  until  three,  I  could  make 
it  to  Mariposa  in  time  for  an  evening  meeting,  and  then  travel 
all  night  to  get  back.  But  I  had  to  work  the  office,  because  the 
word  was  out  that  if  I  got  elected,  I'd  shut  the  office  up,  the 
doctor's  office  in  West  Point.   So,  it  was  necessary  to  keep 
that  office  open. 

Rowland:   Right.   I  remember  you  said  that  in  your  campaign  advertisement, 
the  day  before  the  election,  in  the  Calaveras  Prospect.   You 
mentioned  that  you  would  be  a  part  time  senator.  And  you  would 
be  continuing  your  practice  in  West  Point.   What  kind  of  financing 
did  you  have?  Did  you  get  money  from  the  San  Francisco  office  of 
Bradley,  Kent,  and  Van  Dempsey? 

Teale:    No,  I  got  some  advice  from  Salinger  and  from  Bradley,  and  Bradley 
got  me  in  almost  as  much  hot  water  as  he  gave  me  advice. 

Rowland:   How  come? 



Rowland : 


Rowland ; 

Teale : 



He  went  down  to  Mariposa  and  arranged  for  a  mailing.   He  arranged 
it  with  the  chairman  of  the  central  committee  down  there,  forgot 
to  clear  it  with  the  rest  of  the  members,  and  then  he  put  out  a 
postcard  saying  the  central  committee  endorsed  me.   And  he  dropped 
it  in  the  mail  Sunday  night,  it  hit  the  mail  Monday  morning,  and 
Monday  night  the  other  members  of  the  central  committee  were 
yelling  "foul."  They  were  all  supporting  Vern  Rue,  the  Republican. 
So  after  the  election,  Bradley  had  to  go  down  there  and  cool  them 
off.   They  finally  decided  what  the  hell,  they  were  in  the 
business  to  support  Democrats,  and  the  Democrat  got  elected.   They 
didn't  have  any  beef,  so  they  all  went  home.   [he  laughs]  But  it 
almost  got  me  into  trouble  with  the  damn  unauthorized  postcard. 
Instead  of  signing  it  with  the  guy's  name  as  chairman  of  the 
commitee,  he  signed  it  just,  "Democratic  central  committee"  and 
the  chairman  had  never  cleared  it  with  the  rest  of  the  committee. 

Oh,  I  see.   So  you  didn't  get  any  financial  assistance.   The  CDC 
just  sent  Pierre  Salinger,  who  you  had  never  met  before? 

I  never  met  him  before.   I  maybe  got  two  or  three  hundred  dollars 
from  them.   I  did  the  whole  thing  on  about  three  thousand  dollars, 
and  about  twenty-five  hundred  of  it,  as  I  remember,  was  my  own 
money . 

Now,  did  they  alter  this  district  prior  to  that  election? 
there  some  reapportionment  of  the  district  in  1951? 


No,  no.   The  old  districts  hadn't  been  messed  with  since  '38. 
So  I  had  just  a  three  county  district:  Mariposa,  Tuolomne,  and 
Calaveras  County.   But  it  must  have  been  maybe  forty  thousand 
people  in  there,  total  population. 

Now,  another  thing  I  was  going  to  ask  about  Rue: 
Rue  as  your  principal  opponent? 

why  did  you  see 

Well,  Rue  had  been  a  shadow  of  Jesse  Mayo.   Mayo  had  been  a 
Republican- — this  district  had  traditionally  had  Republicans  for 
twenty  or  thirty  years  in  the  senate.   It  was  the  old  non- 
partisan  myth  that  really  prevailed  up  here,  it  was  "Be  non- 
partisan:  just  vote  for  the  Republicans." 

Rowland:   "Vote  for  the  man,  not  the  party." 

Teale:    Yes.   "Vote  for  the  man,  not  the  party,  but  be  sure  you  vote  for 
the  Republican,"  and  they  never  mentioned  the  fact  they  were 
Republican.   I  think  in  that  '53  election,  I  came  out  as  strictly 
a  Democrat,  and  then  Avery  More  and  Sherwood  followed  me,  and 
declared  as  Democrats.   Rue  never  did  declare  himself  for  what  he 


Teale:    was,  but  I  felt  that — he  was  well-known  in  the  district;  he  had 

been  the  liquor  control  officer  up  here  for  fiteen  years.   Worked 
with  the  board  of  equalization.   So  he  was  well-known. 

Rowland:  Now,  in  Romaggi's  campaign  he  was  always  saying,  that  he  was  not 
supported  by  special  interests  or  political  organizations.  Was 
he  referring  to  you,  in  a  sense?  Was  he  pointing  that  you  were 
supported  by  the  Democratic  central  committee? 

Teale:    No.   That,  I  guess,  is  still  part  of  the  myth  that  candidates  try 
to  promote  when  they're  not  in. 

Rowland:   Or  was  he  kind  of  speaking  about  Rue  or  Mayo? 

Teale:    Well,  Mayo  was  supported  financially  by  the  Pacific  Telephone 
Company.   He  had  a  little  ten  cents  print  shop  down  in  Angel's 
Camp,  and  he  used  to  print  telephone  directories  by  the  million. 
I  don't  say  that  there  was  anything  wrong  with  it.   I'd  say  that 
he  generated  business  that  normally  a  smalltown  print  shop  wouldn't 
generate.   And  he  was  in  an  ideal  situation  to  go  out  and  get 
that  business:  he  had  the  contacts.   But  I  suspect  Romaggi  referred 
as  much  to  Vern  Rue  as  he  did  to  anybody  else. 

Rowland:  Why  Rue? 

Teale:    Well,  because  Rue  was  the  liquor  control  officer. 

Rowland:   And  Rue — he  felt  Rue  was  financed  or  was  being  supported  by — 

Teale:    By  bars,  and — yes.   But  I'm  not  sure  he  was;  I  don't  think  anybody 
was  financing  anybody  very  much  in  that  campaign. 

Rowland:   Had  Mayo's  financial  campaign  support  shifted  to  Rue's  campaign? 

Teale:    I  think  so.  I  can't  say  for  sure,  but  I  think  it  probably  did. 
None  of  the  rest  of  us  had  much  in  the  way  of  support.   There 
certainly  wasn't  much  in  the  way  of  outside  support  coming  into 
the  district  that  I  can  see.   It  certainly  didn't  come  into  my 
campaign  very  heavily.   I  think  I  got  a  hundred  dollars  from 
one  union,  and  I  can't  remember  who  it  was.   It  may  have  been  the 
Machinists  or  Auto  Workers,  or  somebody — 

Rowland:   I  believe  1953  was  the  year  of  McCarthyism  and  ant i- communism  and 
all — did  that  ever  come  up  in  your  campaign  at  all? 

Teale:    No.   No.   Not  at  all. 

Rowland:   There  was  no  talk  of  national  politics  or  anything  of  that — 


Teale:    No,  no.   Not  up  here;  hell,  it's  a  cluster  of  little  tiny  counties. 
We  had  two  or  three  major  interests:   one  was  parks  and  recreation, 
one  was  fish  and  game,  which  didn't  amount  to  a  hoot  in  hell,  and 
the  other  was  mining.   They  had  a  bunch  of  old  miners  who  were 
starving  to  death  on  thirty-two  dollar  gold.   They  wanted  a 
state  subsidy  for  gold  mining.   And  you  couldn't  do  much  for  them 
except  be  sympathetic. 



Impressions  of  Caspar  Weinberger 

Rowland:  Well,  I  guess  maybe  we  could  switch  over  to  that  liquor  control 

topic.   I  sent  you  some  clippings  from  a  1954  master's  thesis  from 
UC  Berkeley  on  liquor  control  by  Robert  Whalen,  I  believe.  He 
talks  in  there  about  Paul  [R. ]  Leake,  Warren  Olney  [III],  and  the 
Weinberger  committee.   I  think  I  sent  you  some  questions  on  the 
Weinberger  committee. 

Teale:    I  came  in  right  at  the  tail  end  £»f  the  session.   I  came  in  on  the 
last  day  of  the  session,  so  I  don't  know  anything  about  the  for 
mation.   I  watched  the  committee  in  action,  and  I  watched  it  all 
the  next  year  very  carefully.   I  was  trying  to  learn;  I  spent 
a  lot  of  time  sitting  in  committees  that  I  wasn't  a  member  of, 
and  one  of  them  that  I  did  watch  was  Weinberger's  and  this 
liquor  control  thing.   So  I  don't  know — 

Rowland:  What  were  your  personal  observations  about  Weinberger? 

Teale:    I  thought  he  was  pretty  brash  and  pretty  naive.   Coming  down  to 
one  of  your  questions  here  about  why  weren't  all  of  his 
recommendations  passed,  there  were  a  couple  of  things  that  were 
evident  to  me;  one  of  them  was  that  the  committee  didn't  belong 
to  Weinberger.   It  belonged  to  Jim  Silliman.   He  was  the  assembly 
Speaker.   Whenever  they  had  Weinberger's  committee  hearing,  Jim 
would  come  in,  make  his  point,  and  then  leave,  and  then  Weinberger 
would  spend  the  rest  of  the  time  developing  the  points  that 
Silliman  wanted  to  have  worked  on.   Silliman  lost  out  to 
Butch  Powers  in  '54  when  they  ran  for  lieutenant  governor. 

The  other  thing  that  was  evident  was  that  Weinberger  was 
just  as  inflexible  when  he  was  a  kid  as  he  was  when  he  grew  up. 
You  know,  he  was  a  first  or  second  term  assemblyman;  he  was  just 
real  fresh  on  the  scene.   He  did  very  well  in  the  assembly  with 


Teale:    his  recommendations.   But  when  his  recommendations  got  to  the 

senate,  he  came  up  against  a  bunch  of  guys  who  knew  what  the  score 
was,  and  who  had  been  there  a  long,  long  time,   He  came  up  against 
Harry  Parkman,  who  was  chairman  of  the  governmental  organization 
committee  that  handled  the  bill,  it  came  up  against  guys  like 
Hugh  Burns,  Randy  Collier,  Clarence  Ward,  and  Ben  Hulse.  These 
guys  all  had  fifteen  or  more  years  experience  apiece,  then,  with 
the  exception  of  George  Miller;  Miller  had  about  ten  or  twelve 
years  in  the  legislature, 

I  remember  very  vividly;  I  was  sitting  on  the  governmental 
organization  committee  when  Weinberger  came  up  and  presented  the 
bill,  and  Parkman  suggested  to  him  that  there  might  be  some 
amendments  that  would  be  well-taken.  And  Weinberger's  comment 
was,  "This  bill  needs  no  amendment.   I  wrote  the  bill,"  Well, 
that  was  the  beginning  of  the  end,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned. 
When  he  got  through  with  that  bill,  he  didn't  recognize  it,   This 
bunch  of  old  gray  hairs  really  took  him  apart.   They  amended  the 

Role  of  the  Liquor  Lobby 

Rowland:   The  kind  of  natural  question  for  someone  who's  studying  this 

would  be,  what  was  the  role  of  the  legislative  advocates,  that 
is,  the  liquor  lobby  in  this  affair?  Did  they  convince  Burns, 
Parkman,  etc.  to  put  these  amendments  on  a  liquor  control  bill? 

Teale:    I  have  to  assume  that  they  did.   If  you  go  back  to  that  period  in 
time,  lobbyists  did  most  of  their  work  outside  of  the  committee 
room.   They  worked  the  individual  members  of  the  committee;  they 
went  to  their  offices,  and  they  convinced  them  that  something  was 
wrong  with  the  bill,  and  it  ought  to  be  changed.   So,  my  memory 
of  it,  there  was  very  few  appearances  by  the  liquor  lobbyists 
themselves,  and  by  such  fellows  as  Judge  Garibaldi,  the  pre-r- 
decessor  to  Dan  Creedon,  the  beer  people.   They  made  very  few-rr 

Rowland:   Samish  was  in  prison  at  that  time. 

Teale:    Samish  was  in  prison;  Porky  Flynn  wasn't  doing  much  at  that  time, 

But  they  didn't  make  much  appearances  at  the  committee 
hearings,  and  of  course,  there's  no  record  of  the  committee 
hearings.   There's  no  way  to  check  and  see  who  did  what,   But 
my  memory  is  that  the  liquor  lobbyists  made  very  few  appearances 
and  made  very  few  points.   But  the  legislators  didn't  get  their 


Teale:    amendments  out  of  fresh  air.  They  got  them  from  somebody,  and  I 
have  to  assume  that  some  of  them  came  from  the  liquor  people. 
I  suppose  many  of  them  came  from  the  bar  owners  and  the  liquor 
store  owners  rather  than  the  people  who  represented  the 
distilleries  and  the  breweries,  and  there  is  quite  a  difference 
between  the  point  of  view  of  those  two  factions.   Momma  and  Poppa 
liquor  stores  were  against  the  big  liquor  stores  and  the  big 
liquor  stores  were  against  supermarket  chains. 

Rowland:   Right.   That  was  an  issue  later  on  in  Pat  Brown's  administration. 

Teale:    Yes.   But  any  way,  Weinberger's  bill  got  pretty  badly  amended,  and 
I'm  not  sure  that  it  was  all  bad,  because  they  were  able  to  get 
a  liquor  control  thing  passed  that  moved  the  control  away  from  the 
Board  of  Equalization  into  alcohol  beverage  control  commission. 
I  don't  think  anybody  really  objected  to  that. 

Rowland:  Was  that  due  to  Paul  Leake  and  Warren  Olney's  investigations  of 
corruption  in  liquor  licensing? 

Teale:    No,  I  don't  think  so.   I  think  probably  Olney  and  Leake  rode  the 
wave  of  popular  opinion.   They  espoused  the  popular  cause.   I 
think  it  was  just  a  general  feeling  that  you  had  to  change  the 
setting  somewhat  and  that  was  the  easiest  way  to  set  it,  to 
change  it,  was  to  change  the  liquor  control  agency  at  the  top. 
They  felt  that  the  Board  of  Equalization  had  enough  to  do  to 
worry  with  taxes  and  assessments  without  having  to  be  a  control 
agency  over  liquor. 

Rowland:   Did  you  vote  for  the  amendments  that  Parkman  and  these  older 
senators  introduced? 

Teale:    I  must  have.   I  wasn't  on  the  committee,  but  I  sat  on  the 

committee  and  watched  this.   Then  I  had  to  vote  on  the  bill  when 
it  came  before  the  senate. 

Rowland:   I'm  interested  in  the  committee,  too,  in  the  sense  of  support, 
in  the  sense  of  party  support.   That's  why  I  asked  the  question 
did  the  committee  have  whole  bipartisan  support? 

Teale:    Well,  the  committee  was  Republican  at  that  time.   The  legislature 
was  Republican.   It  was  almost  three  to  one  Republican  when  I  went 
there,  in  both  houses.   So  it  wasn't  a  necessity  to  have  bipartisan 
support,  because  as  far  as  I  can  remember,  there  really  wasn't 
much  argument  about  specific  things  in  the  bill.   I  can't 
remember  now  all  the  arguments  or  all  the  items  that  were 
controversial.   But  I  can  remember  that  there  were  arguments,  and 
that  proponents  or  opponents  weren't  confined  to  one  party.   It 
was  a  mixture. 


Rowland : 


Rowland : 

So  we  have  the  initiative,  then,   in  1954.   What  was  the  breakdown 
in  the  legislature  over  that?  Were  most  legislators,  younger 
legislators  perhaps,  in  favor  of  it,  older  legislators  opposed? 

I  can't  remember.   It's  a  total  blank  to  me. 
anything  about  the  initiative. 

I  can't  even  remember 

That  was  the  initiative,  like  we  said,  which  changed  liquor  licen 
sing  from  the  Board  of  Equalization  to  the  alcohol  beverage  control 

Teale:    Yes.   But  it  must  have  had  a  good  majority  support  to  get  on  the 
ballot.   It  had  to  have  twenty-seven  votes  in  the  senate. 

Rowland:   Isn't  that  a  referendum,  then,  when  it  goes  to  the  people? 

Teale:    Yes.  When  there's  a  legislative  initiative,  as  opposed  to  a 

popular  initiative,  it  takes  twenty-seven  votes  to  get  it  on  the 
ballot.   There  are  a  few  things  that  require  twenty-one,  and  I'd 
have  to  look  up  on  Mason's  Manual  of  Legislative  Procedure  to  tell 
you  what  they  are.   But  not  very  many  things  got  on  the  ballot 
without  a  twenty-seven  majority. 

Rowland:  Were  Parkman  and  Burns,  Collier,  Ward  considered  the  old  guard  in 
the  senate? 

Teale:    Hell,  they  were  all  old  guard  then.   [Rowland  laughs]  Miller  and 
I  were  the  new  guard,  and  really,  I  guess  Burns  was  considered 
a  rank  newcomer  at  that  time.  And  he'd  been  there  for  fifteen 
years  then. 

Rowland:  But  do  you  remember  any  split  among  that  group  of  old  guard 

Teale:    No,  I  really  don't.  No. 

Rowland:   Now  what  about  the  liquor  lobby?  Were  they  running  around  senate 
halls  trying  to  build  up  a  groundswell  of  opposition  to  the  liquor 
control  initiative? 

The  Issue  of  Fair  Trade 

Teale:    No,  I  really  don't  think  so,  because  through  the  years,  I  remember 
that  liquor  lobby.   They  were  more  interested  in  price  control, 
they  were  more  interested  in  limiting  competition  and  fair  trade 


Teale:    and  that  sort  of  thing.   And  the  liquor  establishments  were 

interested,  of  course,  in  limiting  the  number  of  offsale  and  onsale 
establishments  and  maintaining  the  price  of  the  liquor  license, 
keeping  the  license  way  up  there,  so  it  was  a  thing  of  value.   As 
I  remember,  the  Weinberger  thing,  although  it  made  some  recom 
mendations,  it  didn't  do  anything  about  the  number  of  licenses. 
It  didn't  liberalize  the  number  of  licenses  or  put  it  on  an  open 
market,  free  competition  basis. 

Rowland:   I  think  that  was  the  point  that  I  was  mentioning  in  that  thesis 

by  Whalen,  that  there  were  some  major  faults  with  the  recommenda 
tions  themselves,  and  they  really  didn't  hit  on  some  key  issues, 
such  as  the  massive  proliferation  of  licenses  during  1954.   I 
remember  Paul  Leake  said  at  one  point  there  were  thirty  thousand 
licenses  for  liquor  stores,  and  only  ten  thousand  licenses  for 
pharmacies  or  grocery  stores.   There  was  just  a  massive 
proliferation  of  liquor  licenses  and  there  was  some  corruption 
that  went  along  with  issuing  those  licenses. 

Teale:    Yes.   Well,  we  set  a  firm  number  of  licenses  per  population.   I 
think  that  came  along  with  Brown's  administration.   That  was 
quite  a  brawl,  too.   The  major  thing  was  that  with  limitation  the 
intrinsic  value  of  a  liquor  license  would  grow  immensely.   I 
believe  it  was  around  1965  that  Pat  Brown  lifted  the  Fair  Trade 
Act,  which  touched  off  a  battle  between  the  small  retailers  and 
supermarkets.   It  lifted  the  price  ceiling  on  liquor  which  would 
benefit  the  supermarkets  but  would  allegedly  hurt  the  small 
retailers.   I  can't  remember  much  about  that  battle — 

Rowland:   You  don't  recall  that? 

Teale:    — except  that  the  Momma  and  Poppa  stores  came  in  on  the  side  of 
fair  trade.   And  the  other  guys  wanted  to  get  in  the  cut  rate 
business.   If  you  take  the  fair  trade  off,  that  gives  the 
supermarkets  a  free  marketplace,  and  Momma  and  Poppa  stores  dry 

Rowland:   So  then  there  was  the  third  house  activity  for  the  small  retailers? 
Teale:    Yes,  yes.   There  is  a  retailers'  association — 

Rowland:  — retailers'  association  trying  to  pressure  Brown,  and  pressure 
some  probably  key  legislators  to  maintain  that  small  fair  trade 

Teale:    Yes.   And  they  did. 

Rowland:   I  recall  that  Brown  lifted  the  Fair  Trade  Act. 


Teale:    I  think  he  wanted  to.   But  I  don't  remember  it's  ever  being  actually 
lifted.   Because  hell,  that's  what  this  recent  California  Supreme 
Court  decision  was  all  about,  saying  that  the  Fair  Trade  Act  was 

I  only  remember  one  thing:   I  was  sitting  in  the  governmental 
organization  committee  one  time,  and  Judge  Garibaldi  came  in.   He 
represented  the  distillers,  and  he  was  maintaining  that  it  [Fair 
Trade  Act]  didn't  make  any  difference: 


Teale:    his  example,  White  Bear  Gin.  He  proved  that  by  listing  the  price 
of  the  label,  and  the  labor  that  goes  to  putting  the  label  on  the 
bottle,  and  the  price  of  the  bottle,  and  the  price  of  the  cap,  and 
the  transportation,  it  came  down  to  where  you  had  three  cents  worth 
of  gin  in  the  bottle,  and  the  total  price  was  two  dollars  and 
eighty-three  cents.   So  I've  spent  the  rest  of  my  years  looking  for 
White  Bear  Gin,   and  I  now  use  it  to  clean  my  glasses  with.  [Rowland 

Rowland:   Talking  about  lobbyists,  that's  a  subject  that  we're  trying  to  get 
a  little  bit  more  information  on.   I  don't  know  if  you  get  the 
California  Journal  which  comes  out  monthly.   The  last  issue  had 
an  article  in  which  the  legislators  rated  lobbyists  in  this  period. 

Teale:  I  didn't  see  that. 

Rowland:  How  would  you  rate  lobbyists  during  your  period  in  the  legislature? 

Teale:  During  my  period? 

Rowland:  In  terms  of  their  qualifications. 

Teale:    Most  of  the  lobbyists  were,  I  think,  excellent.  When  I  first  went 
there,  only  the  more  affluent  groups,  or  the  larger  groups,  had 
lobbyists.  We  had  about  two  hundred  and  fifty,  in  1953 — I  think 
about  that  many.   They  had  around  six  hundred  when  I  left.   There 
was  a  sort  of  a  unwritten  understanding  between  the  legislature  and 
the  lobbyists,  that  the  lobbyist  knew  that  if  he  ever  was  caught 
lying,  or  misrepresenting  something,  he  was  done  as  a  lobbyist. 
The  word  soon  got  around  that  he  was  unreliable. 

So  my  feeling  was  that  the  lobbyists  themselves  were  an  ex 
cellent  source  of  information,  provided  you  took  that  information 
with  the  understanding  that  it  was  slanted  toward  the  guy's  point 
of  view.   He  may  not  lie  to  you,  but  his  defense  was  that  if  you 
didn't  ask  the  question  right,  he  didn't  have  to  answer  it  in  its 
entirety.   So  unless  I  understood  what  I  was  trying  to  find  out, 


Teale:    I  might  get  an  erroneous  impression  from  a  lobbyist,  and  he  would 
be  perfectly  honest  with  me,  in  answering  the  question  that  I 
asked.   I  hadn't  asked  the  proper  question.   But  my  experience 
with  these  fellows  was  that  I  don't  think  I  was  ever  handed  a — 
what  you  would  call  a  mouldy  fig,  in  all  the  years  that  I  dealt 
with  the  lobbyists;  I  used  them  a  great  deal  as  a  source  of 
information.   But  I  used  them  by  using  all  of  them.   If  there 
were  three  lobbyists  on  three  different  sides  of  a  question,  or 
represented  three  different  opinions  of  the  same  question,  I  was 
very  careful  to  try  to  talk  to  all  three,  and  then  form  an  opinion. 

Rowland:  Which  lobbyists  would  you  rate  as — who  were  particularly  effective? 
What  interests  did  they  represent? 

Teale:    Well,  one  of  the  guys  who  was  extremely  effective  was  Garibaldi. 
Rowland:   And  he  was  representing  liquor? 

Teale:    Liquor  and  racetracks.   Yes.   Pacific  Telephone  and  Telegraph  had 

good  lobbyists,  all  the  time.   P.G.  and  E.  had  excellent  lobbyists. 
Francis  Carr  was  their  lobbyist.   I  can't  recall  them  all  now. 
Some  of  the  labor  lobbyists  were  excellent.   Yes.   Probably  the 
most  effective  and  one  of  the  most  ruthless  was  the  guy  who 
represented  the  California  Teacher's  Association. 

Rowland:   Do  you  recall  his  name? 

Teale:    Sure,  I  recall  his  name,  but  I'm  not  going  to  tell  you.  You  can 
find  out.   But  he  was  ruthless  in  his  approach.   It  was  "You  do 
as  we  want  you  to  do,  or  we'll  tell  all  your  teachers,  and  get 
them  to  vote  against  you."  He  wielded  quite  a  power  there,  for 
a  long  time.   In  fact,  that  was  the  only  lobbyist  that  ever 
threatened  me. 

Rowland:  How  did  the  lobbyist  or  advocate  get  you  to  support  an  interest 
which  conflicted  with  your  own  campaign  funds  and  various  other 
sources  of  support? 

Teale:    Well,  to  begin  with,  I  never  let  my  campaign  funds  influence  my 

vote.   If  you  assume  that  campaign  funds  come  to  you  because  you're 
doing  a  generally  good  job,  you  try  to  keep  on  doing  that  same 
kind  of  job  regardless  of  who  the  campaign  funds  come  from.   And 
then  if  a  contributor  isn't  happy  with  you,  he  doesn't  contribute 
next  time.   So  I  never  did  try  to  reconcile  my  actions  against 
campaign  contributions.   And  I  don't  think  very  many  others  did 
in  those  days.   I  think  all  lobbyists  asked  of  you  was  an  open 
mind  and  an  opportunity  to  talk  to  you. 

Rowland:  .  I'm  sure  there  were  different  styles  of  lobbyists. 


Teale:    Yes, 

Rowland:  To  you  personally,  what  would  be  the  most  effective  style  of  a 

Teale:    I  think  the  most  effective  lobbyists  were  the  guys  who  took  the 
effort  to  become  well-acquainted,  personally  acquainted  with 
individual  members.   The  did  it  in  a  lot  of  ways.   They  were  in 
evidence  practically  twenty-four  hours  a  day  around  the  capital. 

In  those  days  of  shorter  sessions,  Sacramento  was  a  pretty 
lonsesome  place,  and  it  was  nice  to  have  somebody  to  eat  lunch 
with,  eat  dinner  with,  maybe  play  a  game  of  golf  with.   The  good 
lobbyist  never  lobbied  you  in  a  social  or  a  play  setting.   It  was 
a  matter  of  becoming  personally  acquainted  with  you,  knowing  what 
your  interests  were  and  whether  you  had  like  interests,  or  common 
interests.   If  they  had  something  to  talk  to  you  about,  they  came 
to  your  office  to  talk  to  you  about  if.   That  was  my  experience. 
If  you  made  yourself  available  in  your  office  and  were  willing  to 
talk  with  them,  you  could  get  a  lot  out  of  these  people.   In  the 
years  I  was  in  office,  I  didn't  have  half  a  dozen  guys  abuse  that 
privilege,  abuse  the  right  to  talk  to  you  and  be  friends  with  you. 
But  they  didn't  encroach  on  your  leisure  time.  You  didn't  have 
very  much  leisure  time  to  begin  with.   They  didn't  encroach  on 
your  leisure  time  with  business.   And  I  used  to  do  a  lot  of  business 
walking  from  my  office  to  where  I  was  going  to  go:   committees, 
the  floor  or  any  other  place.   If  I  had  two  or  three  lobbyists 
sitting  in  the  office,  I'd  try  to  get  those  out  of  the  way  that  I 
could,  and  if  I  couldn't  get  to  them  before  I  was  due  somplace, 
I  would  say  "Well,  all  right,  you  come  walk  with  me,  and  we'll 
talk  about  it  as  we  go,  because  I've  got  to  go  someplace,  to  a 
committee  meeting,  or  got  to  go  to  the  floor,  or  do  something  of 
that  nature." 

Rowland:   I'm  interested  in  the  horse  racing  lobby.   It  seems  peculiar  that 

and  horse  racing  would  be  a  particularly  strong  lobby  in  Sacramento, 
rather  than  oil  interests — 

Teale:    Oil  was  a  big  lobby,  too,  but  there  was  a  tremendous  amount  of 
money  in  horse  racing  for  the  track.  You  see,  they  get  a  split 
of  the  income  right  off  the  top,  of  parimutuel  betting.   And 
occasionally,  they're  looking  for  a  change  in  that  split.  They 
don't  get  it  very  much  and  very  often,  and  the  change  is  rather 
minute  percentage  wise,  but  when  they  get  a  change,  it  means  a 
lot  of  bucks  to  them.  And  also,  by  the  same  token,  because  there 
are  a  lot  of  bucks  in  that  parimutuel  pool,  there  are  a  lot  of 
people  looking  at  it  for  a  source  of  funding.   Horse  track  people 
don't  want  the  crippled  children,  or  somebody  else  coming  in  to 
get  a  chunk  of  that  money.   They  can  have  somebody  else's  part  of 


Teale : 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Rowland ; 


the  money,  but  they  don't  want  them  to  have  the  track  stake  of 
the  parimutuel  pool.   And  through  the  years,  the  horse  lobbyists 
didn't  have  much  business  to  take  care  of.   Maybe  their  only 
legislative  interests  would  last  for  about  a  week.   But  because 
it  was  so  big  an  interest,  they  kept  somebody  in  Sacramento  every 
day  that  the  legislature  was  in  session,  and  that  guy  was  around, 
moving  around,  and  he  was  busy  being  friendly,  dropping  in  on 
legislators'  offices. 

What  kind  of  legislation  were  they  trying  to  push? 

They  weren't  trying  to  push  any.   They  were  trying  to  keep  somebody 
from  getting  their  share  of  the  parimutuel  money.   And  there  was 
one  or  two  places  you   get  it:   you  get  it  in  approriation  bills, 
and  you  get  it  in  the  budget.   If  they  waited  to  snoop  around 
until  budget  time,  they  were  apt  to  wake  up  and  find  that  the 
budget  had  been  amended  to  take  some  money  out  of  the  horse  track's 
share  of  parimutuel  money,  and  given  to  somebody  else:   education, 
or  county  fairs. 

County  fairs  is  also  a  source  for  horse  racing,  too,  is  it  not? 

It's  a  source  for  horse  racing,  but  county  fairs  live  on  horse 
race  money.   That's  the  way  they  got  started.   The  district 
agricultural  associations  justified  the  parimutuel  betting  on 
the  fact  that  they  were  going  to  .have  a  cerain  amount  set  aside 
for  county  fairs,  and  a  certain  amount  for  education.   And  that^s 
how  they  pushed  the  initiative  past  the  election.   People  voted 
on  it  on  the  basis  that  parimutuel  betting  would  fund  county  fairs 
in  every  county.  Prior  to  that,  they  only  had  about  a  half  a  dozen 
fairs.   You  had  the  Citrus  Fair  in  Mendocino  County  and  the  Citrus 
Fair  in  San  Bernardino  County,  and  Pomona,  and  a  few  other  little 
fairs  that  didn't  amount  to  anything. 

Now,  when  senate  reapportionment  came,  did  it  also  change  the 
style  of  the  lobbyists? 

No,  I  don't  think  so.   As  the  lobbyists  dropped  out,  and  they  were 
replaced — you  know,  there's  a  continual  turnover  in  the  lobby  group. 
I  think  people  who  replaced  them  replaced  the  guys  who  worked  on 
the  senate  side  with  fellows  who  were  used  to  the  assembly  type 
operation.   And  there's  a  difference  the  way  the  assembly  works 
with  lobbyists  and  the  way  the  senate  works  with  lobbyists. 

Which  had  party  affiliation  rather  than — party  caucus  rather  than 
seniority  and — 

Well,  yes,  in  the  assembly  generally,  is  where  you  can  get  a  new 
idea  introduced.   Basically,  because  you've  got  younger  men  all 


Teale:    the  time,  and  the  men  of  the  longer  tenure,  and  more  conservative 
attitudes  as  men  get  older,  the  lobbyists  used  it  as  a  stopping 
field.   They  would  initiate  stuff  in  the  assembly,  and  they  would 
stop  stuff  in  the  senate.   So, the  two  styles  were  different,  You 
had  some  men  who  could  work  either  side  very  well,  and  you  had 
some  men  that  couldn't  work  both  sides. 

Rowland:   So  you  had  these  kind  of  specialized  lobbyists  who  only  worked 

for  the  assembly,  and  other  specialized  lobbyists  who  worked  with 
the  senate. 

Teale:    That's  right.   Well,  what  you  found  was,  that  certain  lobbyists 

worked  the  assembly  side  about  eighty  percent  of  the  time,  and  you 
only  saw  them  occasionally  on  the  senate  side,  and  vice-versa. 
You  had  some  men  who  almost  exclusively  worked  the  senate.   Now, 
the  city  of  San  Francisco  almost — 

Rowland:   Is  this  still  true  today,  do  you  think? 
Teale:    I  don't  this  it's  as  true  as  it  was. 
Rowland:   Before  reapportionment? 

Teale:    Before  reapportionment,  yes.   The  city  and  county  of  San  Francisco 
lobbyist  for  years  never  -went  to  the  assembly  side.   He  worked 
the  senate  exclusively,  because  that  was  the  type  of  operation 
he  was  interested  in.   He  was  interested  in  stopping  things  to 
maintain  a  status  quo.   And  I  think  to  the  same  extent,  to  some 
extent,  the  University  of  California  lobbyist,  Jim  Corley,  had 
that  sort  of  an  operation  going.  He  was  much  more  friendly  with 
the  senators  than  he  was  with  assemblymen.   Of  course,  there  were 
fewer  senators  to  know,  but  he  knew  a  greater  percentage  of  senators 
than  he  did — 

Rowland:  What  legislation  was  Corley  trying  to  stop? 

Teale:    He  was  trying  to  stop  any  competition  that  encroached  on  the 

perogatives  of  the  university  and  trying  to  stop  any  lessening  of 
the  autonomy  that  the  university  enjoys;  he  was  trying  to  stop 
any  attack  on  their  funding. 

Rowland:  [tape  recorder  turned  off,  then  turned  back  on]  Weren't  there 
legislators  that  became  lobbyists  after  they  were  defeated  for 

Teale:    Yes.   And  some  resign  to  become  lobbyists, 
Rowland:   Some  resign  to  become  lobbyists? 


Teale:    Dan  Creedon  was  one  that  did  that.   He  resigned  as  an  assemblyman 
to  become  a  lobbyist  for  the  beer  industry. 

Rowland:   Garibaldi  was  also  an  assemblyman,  wasn't  he? 

Teale:    Yes.   And  Tom  Craig  was  an  assemblyman  and  then  he  became  a 

lobbyist  for  Orange  County.   Davy  Oliver,  who  came  off  of  the 
assembly  desk  to  become  a  lobbyist  for  the  insurance  industry. 
They  guy  who  represented  the  wine  industry,  Jeff  [Jeff erson  E.  ]Peyser, 
who  had  been  an  assemblyman,  and  then  went  to  the  lobby. 

Rowland:  "Is  it  because,  which  seems  natural  to  me,  that  these  legislators 
knew  how  the  senate  and  assembly  worked? 

Teale:    Without  exception  they  were  men  who  understood  the  workings  of 
the  house. 

Rowland:   Gordon  Garland  also  got  into  lobbying,  didn't  he? 

Teale:  Gordon  Garland  was  an  assemblyman;  he  had  been  Speaker  of  the 
assembly,  in  fact,  and  then  left  the  assembly  and  lobbied  for 
water  interests.  And  he  was  an  excellent  lobbyist. 

Rowland:   And  they  already  have  the  contacts,  and  they  know  many  of  the  men 
in  there. 

Teale:.    But  more  than  the  contacts — you  see,  the  contacts  change.   Within 
five  years  of  the  time  you're  out  of  office  there's  hardly  anybody 
left  that  you  worked  with.   Heck,  I  was  second  or  third  in 
seniority  when  I  left  the  senate,  aid  five  years  later,  there  were 
maybe  one  or  two  people  that  I  had  worked  with  left  in  the  house. 
But  more  than  the  contacts,  it's  a  legislator's  knowledge  of  the 
mechanics  fo  the  legislature  that  is  very,  very  important  to  the 
people  they  represent.   How  do  you  get  things  done?  When  do  you 
get  things  done?  Who  do  you  see?  Who's  important? 

Rowland:   After  reapportionment,  was  there  a  change  in  which  many  of  the 
former  lobbyists  who  worked  only  with  the  assembly  now  came  to 
the  senate  to  work  with  those  former  assemblymen  who  now  took 
senate  seats? 

Teale:    Yes,  yes.   That  was  the  impression  I  had. 

Rowland:   The  recent  California  Journal  article  on  lobbyists  showed  that  the 
legislature  rated  Gillies  as  the  most  effective  lobbyist.   It 
described  him  as  one  who  came  in  with  hard  facts  and  wasn't  overly 
friendly,  but  presented  a  very  straight  argument. 


Teale:    Doug  Gillies  was  the  first  committee  consultant  that  we  had.  And 
he  wasn't  paid  by  the  senate.   He  was  paid  for  by  Luther  Gibson, 
the  senator  from  Vallejo.   He  was  Luther  Gibson's  assistant.   After 
he'd  been  active  as  consultant  for  about  a  year,  as  I  remember, 
then  he  became  a  paid  consultant  by  the  senate.   The  senate 
picked  him  up,  because  we  began  to  use  committee  consultants 
then,  because  he  worked  out  so  well  in  the  old  governmental 
organization  committee.   The  governmental  efficiency  committee, 
for  many,  many  years,  had  had  what  we  liked  to  call  work  sessions, 
which  the  press  liked  to  call  secret  session,  which  the  fate  of 
bills  were  decided.  We  usually  got  together  the  day  or  the 
night  before,  and  went  over  the  bills,  and  when  one  of  those  work 
sessions  was  ended,  every  member  of  the  committee  understood 
thoroughly  what  the  bill  purported  to  do,  whether  it  did  what 
it  was  supposed  to  do  or  not,  and  what  changes  you  had  to  make  in- 
the  bill  to  make  it  do  what  the  author  wanted  it  to  do.   The  result 
was  the  committee  got  a  very  bad  name.   The  chairman  was  very 
blunt  about  it;  he'd  say  to  the  author,  "We  have  a  few  minor 
technical  amendments,  here  for  you  to  accept."  Well,  the  author 
usually  accepted  them,  or  you  didn't  have  any  bill,  and  the 
freshmen  would  want  to  know  what  did  the  amendments  do,  and  the 
chairman  would  generally  say,  "It  makes  a  good  bill  out  of  it." 
No  more  explanation  than  that.   So  the  author  had  to  take  the 
amendments  on  faith,  and  then  try  to  figure  out  what  they  did 
later.   The  process  had  a  lot  to  be  said  for  it.   I  think  that 
committee,  above  any  other  at  that  time,  understood  and  knew, 
what  was  in  the  bills,  understood  what  they  were  doing. 

Rowland:  Would  you  rate  Doug  Gillies  as  an  effective — 


Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Doug  Gillies  had  to  be  one  of  the  most  competent  men  that  we  ever 
had  working  for  the  senate  at  that  time.   Undoubtedly  there  are 
some  men  now  who  are  just  as  competent.   But  he  was  a  part  time 
law  student;  I  don't  know  if  he  ever  got  his  degree  or  not.   But 
at  that  time,  he  was  a  part  time  law  student,  and  he  had  a  kind 
of  a  methodical  way  about  him — 

But  he  was  different  than  Garibaldi's  style. 

Oh,  yes,  yes.   Gillies  was  absolutely  cold  and  impersonal, 
a  lot  on  himself. 


Not  like  Garibaldi  and  the  Jim  Corley  good  old  boy  type  of  lobbyist 

Gillies  wasn't  particularly  friendly.   I  always  got  along  well  with 
Doug  because  I  had  a  lot  of  respect  for  his  brain  power.  But  he 
had — we  used  to  refer  to  him  as  Senator  Gillies,  because  he  did 
the  thinking  for  Gibson.   But  he  was  excellent;  he  was  an  excellent 
staff  man.  He  had  a  lot  of  ability — 


Rowland:   Was  Gillies  kind  of  the  wave  of  the  future  of  the  new  lobbyists? 

Teale:    No,  I  wouldn't  say  that.   There  were  a  lot  of  people  who  would  have 
liked  to  have  emulated  him,  but  they  never  made  it.   Gillies  had  a 
style  all  his  own,  and  he  had  an  ability  to  take  facts  and 
information  and  put  it  together  in  an  attractive  package.   It  may 
not  have  been  a  good  package,  but  it  was  attractive,  because  it 
was — he  made  it  simple  to  understand.   He  was  able  to  cut  all  the 
extraneous  material,  and  say,  "Here's  the  guts  of  the  matter  right 
here.   This  is  what  it  does,  one,  two,  three."  He  wouldn't  have  a 
bill  analysis;  he'd  take  a  forty  page  bill  and  he'd  dig  into  it, 
and  he'd  find  out  exactly  what  it  did.   And  usually  it  was  only 
one  or  two  things  that  you  accomplished  in  a  bill.   But  he  could 
go  right  to  the  heart  of  the  matter  and  tell  who  benefitted  and 
who  lost. 

Rowland:   We  cut  off  the  last  tape  when  we  talked  about  reapportionment  just 
when  I  was  asking  you  the  question  about  Tom  Rees  and  his  attempt 
to  get  at  large  elections  in  Los  Angeles,  rather  than  district 
elections  for  the  new  senate  posts  that  emerged  out  of  reapportion 
ment.   [tape  recorder  turned  off] 

Teale:    We're  talking  about  the  battle  between  Rees  and  Unruh  over  the 
at  large  elections  for  new  senatorial  districts  in  Los  Angeles? 

Rowland:  Yes,  at  large  versus  district  battle  in  Los  Angeles. 

Teale:    Of  course,  Unruh's  interest  was  to  create  districts  that  his  friends 
in  the  assembly  could  win,  and  I  imagine  in  the  back  of  his  head 
somewhere  was  the  idea  the  he  could  gain  control  of  the  senate  as 
well  as  the  assembly.   Because  of  that  fact  that  you  couldn't  get 
a  senate  reapportionment  bill  through  the  assembly  that  didn't 
have  definite  senate  districts,  individual  districts  in  Los 
Angeles,  sort  of  dictated  the  defeat  of  Rees'  desire  to  have  an 
at  large  election  in  L.A.  County.   It  just  wasn't  practical. 

I  don't  remember  that  there  was  much  more  than  a  lot  of  smoke 
about  that  one.   We  finally  came  to  the  conclusion  that  you  had  to 
have  definite  individual  districts,  and  that's  all  there  was  to  it. 
Assembly  Speaker  Unruh  followed  our  principle  that  you  divided  as 
few  cities  or  as  few  political  subdivisions  as  possible  in  the 
process  of  creating  the  fourteen  and  a  half  districts  in  L.A.  County. 

Rowland:   We  have  a  few  other  questions  here.   Let  my  just  briefly  go  through 
them  on  reapportionment.   I  think  I  sent  you  the  question  on  the 
debate  between  the  1966  general  election  supporters  versus  the 
special  election  supporters  in  the  senate  and  assembly. 



Rowland ; 

Rowland : 


Rowland : 




I  think  probably  the  genesis  of  that  was  that  some  of  the  senators 
felt  that  a  special  election  would  give  the  assemblymen  a  free  ride 
against  them.   The  issue  kind  of  took  care  of  itself  as — 

Is  that,  again,  the  battle  with  Speaker  Unruh  and  Senator  Rees? 

No,  that  was  an  individual  feeling  among  the  senators  who  rep 
resented — they  knew  that  in  the  new  districts,  they  would  not  only 
have  to  face  newcomers,  but  if  there  was  a  special,  they'd  have 
to  face  the  assemblyman  who  wanted  to  change  houses. 

And  who  would  not  be  sacrificing  their  own  seat  if  they  lost  the 
senatorial  election. 

That's  right,  and  there's  always  been  a  great  desire  by  the 
assemblymen  to  become  senators,  and  I  think  it's  the  difference  in 
the  two  houses  that  makes  that  desirable  to  these  guys;  they  want 
to  get  out  from  underneath  the  dictatorship  of  the  Speaker. 

So  that  didn't 
Speaker  Unruh. 

signal  any  battle  between  pro  tern  Hugh  Burns  and 

No,  I  don't  think  so.   The  issue  took  care  of  itself  as  we  kept 
dragging  along  and  dragging  along,  it  finally  got  to  the  point 
where  the  practical  election  was — the  general  election;  just  follow 
the  routine  normal  election  process.   If  we'd  done  this  in  1964, 
and  been  faced  with  a  two  year  wait  for  a  general  election,  then  a 
special  election  would  have  been  rather  attractive.  We  didn't  get 
it  done  until  way  over  into  sixty — well,  at  the  end  of  '64 — 
October  or  November  or  December,  sometime  along  in  there  before  we 
finally  got  it  worked  out,  just  in  time  for  the  filing  dates  for 
the  primary.   So  the  issue  took  care  of  itself;  the  special  election 
argument  disappeared. 

Now  about  that  Dolwig  movement  to  divide  the  state  in  half:  how 
serious  was  that?  The  Sacramento  Newsletter  seemed  to  indicate 
that  it  was  pretty  serious  and  it  had  quite  a  bit  of  support  from 
various  county  supervisor  groups  in  the  state. 

Yes,  particularly  from  those  county  supervisor  associations  who 
were  in  the  north.  And  the  reason  was  that  the  north  lost  over — 
they  lost  an  awful  lot  of  senate  representation.   I  can't  remember 
the  exact  figures,  but  we  moved  thirteen  and  a  half  seats  into  Los 
Angeles,  and  seven  seats  into  Orange  and  San  Diego  counties.   Those 
seats  had  to  come  from  someplace,  and  they  came  from  the  rural  areas. 
They  came  from  Inyo  County  north,  up  the  whole  chain  where  you  had 
not  more  than  three  counties  to  a  man,  and  you  now  had,  in  one 
instance,  twelve  counties  to  a  man.   So  there  was  a  lot  of  support 


Teale:    in  northern  California.   One  of  the  major  problems  was  that  nobody 
wanted  to  be  included  in  southern  California  except  Los  Angeles. 
Even  Imperial  and  Riverside  County  would  have  liked  to  be  included 
in  Northern  California. 

Third  house  support — I'm  not  sure  there  was  any  third  house 
opinion  on  it,  except  that — 

Rowland:   Except  for  those  county  supervisors. 

Teale:    Except  for  the  county  supervisors,  yes.   The  other  lobbyists  kind 
of  gave  lip  service  to  their  old  friends  and,  you  know,  said,  "Go 
get  them,  boy.   We're  with  you."  But  they  could  care  less.   What 
the  hell  does  a  liquor  man  or  a  transportation  guy  or  a  guy  who 
represents  labor,  care  about  where  the  representatives  come  from? 
All  he  wants  is  a  chance  to  talk  to  him.   They  had  lived  with  what 
they  had,  and  they  could  live  with  what  they  were  going  to  get,  no 
matter  what — 

Rowland:   But  for  those  senate  lobbyists,  who  wanted  to  maintain  the  status 
quo,  it  upset  the  balance  in  the  senate. 

Teale:    Yes.   They  were  concerned  about  it. 

Rowland:   It  in  a  sense  put  them  out  of  a  job  if  they  weren't  familiar  with 
the  assembly  operation. 

Teale:    Yes.   They  were  rightfully  concerned  about  it,  but  I  think  they 

were  all  pretty  philosophical  about  it,  and  that  they  figured  they 
could  live  with  it  no  matter  what  happens.  The  third  house  wasn't 
nearly  as  concerned  about  reapportionment  as  the  senate  was. 


Rowland:   — anything  else  in  here  on  reapportionment  that  you  find  particularly 
important,  any  other  questions  that  you  might  want  to  expand  on? 

Teale:    No,  I  don't  think  so. 



Chessman  Case 

Rowland:   I'm  wondering  about  the  impact,  particularly  of  the  Chessman  case 
on  the  relationship  with  Governor  Pat  Brown,  and  public  reaction 
to  the  Chessman  case  and  its  effect  on  the  legislature. 

Teale:    Well,  I  think  if  you  hadn't  had  newspapers,  the  Chessman  case 
wouldn't  have  had  any  effect  whatsoever.   Chessman  provided  a 
great  sounding  board  for  both  sides  to  talk  about  pros  and  cons  of 
the  death  penalty.   The  death  penalty  had  been  an  issue  a  long,  long 
time;  it  was  an  issue  when  I  went  to  the  senate,  and  gradually — 
I  think  it's  a  liberal  position  and  in  several  respects  a  Democratic 
position  to  be  against  the  death  penalty — and  when  we  got  the  Demo 
cratic  majority  up,  where  it  was  a  majority,  then  you  began  to  see 
some  very  serious  attempts  against  the  death  penalty.  You  had 
certain  Democrats  who  always  believed  in  the  death  penalty;  there 
wasn't  anything  you  could  do  to  change  them,  and  by  the  same  token 
you  had  some  Republicans  who  didn't  believe  in  it,  and  you  couldn't 
change  them. 

Rowland:  Was  it  primarily  conservative  Republicans  who  were  the  block  to 
abolishing  the  death  penalty? 

Teale:    I  guess  they  were  conservative — no,  I  don't  think  conservatism  has 
anything  to  do  with  it. 

Rowland:   The  Friends  Committee  on  Legislation  pointed  out  that  it  was  always 
conservative  Republicans  on  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  that 
killed  most  of  the  senate  bills  that  called  for  a  moratorium  on 
the  death  penalty  or  a  complete  abolition  of  it. 

Teale:    The  only  kind  of  Republicans  you  had  in  the  senate  in  those  days 

were  conservatives.   So  I  don't  think  that  really  had  much  to  do  with 
it.   Some  of  the  real  conservative  men,  I  think,  were  against  it. 


Teale:    But  it  was  the  advent  of  senators  like  Joe  Rattigan, 

Virgil  O'Sullivan,  and  Stan  Arnold.   I  think  was  about  fifty-fifty 
split  vote  one  way  or  the  other.   I  think  your  best  source  of 
information  is  two  people:   Joe  Rattigan,  who's  over  at  Santa  Rosa, 
and  Ed  Regan,  from  Weaverville.   He's  on  the  Third  Court  of  Appeals 
in  Sacramento.   He's  accessible;  he  was  chairman  of  the  judiciary 
committee  throughout  those  critical  hearings .   He  was  the  one  who 
insisted  that  they  be  televised  in  their  entirety.   And  I  guess, 
probably  he  did  more  to  educate  the  state  on  the  death  penalty  than 
anybody  that  had  anything  to  do  with  it.   Because  he  insisted  that 
every  word  be  televised.   Unfortunately  the  Channel  9  in  San 
Francisco  only  had  about  three  video  tapes  available  at  the  time, 
so  they'd  run  a  tape  up  in  Sacramento,  record  it,  run  it  back  to 
San  Francisco,  broadcast  it,  and  then  turn  right  around  and  send  it 
right  back  to  Sacramento  and  they  they'd  tape  right  over  it.   So 
there's  no  record.   There's  no  permanent  record.   It  was  a  marvelous 
hearing.   It  lasted  two  or  three  days,  and  they  recorded  every  bit 
of  it,  but  kept  erasing  it  to  use  the  same  tape  over  and  over. 
The  didn't  have  enough  money  to  save  the  tapes.   What  a  blow  for 
the  historian! 

Rowland:  Yes,  right.   But  recreating  the  Chessman  case,  as  I  recall,  it  was 
Pat  Brown  who  threw  the  decision  into  the  legislature's  lap,  and 
he  gave  Chessman  a  sixty  day  reprieve  and  told  the  legislators  to 
do  something  about  the  death  penalty.   Did  that  create  some  friction 
between  senators  and  Brown's  office? 

Teale:    Well,  that  way,  we  figured  he  was  a  fink;  he  took  the  easy  way  out 
and  put  the  blame  on  us  instead  of  on  him.   I'm  not  sure  he  had  any 
blame  coming,  but  the  press  was  sure  on  him.   On  both  sides.   And 
he  was  kind  of  the  goat  for  a  long  time  there  in  that  Chessman 

Rowland:   Because  he  refused  to  take  a  position,  where  Governor  Knight  had 
taken  a  position. 

Teale:    Yes.   Of  course,  Pat's  inclination  has  been  always  toward  abolition. 
And  he  couldn't  leave  the  decision  of  the  courts  to  execute  Chessman 
remain;  he  kept  putting  it  off  and  putting  it  off.   Everytime  he 
gave  Chessman  a  reprieve  for  sixty  days,  that  made  it  worse.   I 
think  if  I'd  been  in  Pat  Brown's  shoes,  I  would  have  commuted  the 
sentence  to  life  imprisonment.   And  then  he'd  have  been  through 
with  it.   But  he  didn't.   He  kept  putting  the  decision  off. 

Rowland:  And  now  we  have  it  in  the  legislature's  lap,  and  I  guess  we're 
focusing  on  that  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  meeting,  Regan  was 
chairman  of  that. 


Legislating  the  Death  Penalty 

Teale:    Yes. 

Rowland:   It  was  [Senator]  Fred  Farr's  bill,  was  it  not,  that  they  were 
deciding  on? 

Teale:    I  think  so.   I  think  so. 

Rowland:   Fred  Farr  called  for  a  three  year  moratorium  of  the  death  penalty, 
not  an  abolition,  but  a  moratorium.   Do  you  recall  the  senate 
alignment  on  that  bill,  what  the  positions  were,  and  the  issues? 

Teale:    I  guess  the  alignment  in  the  house  was  those  who  were  against  the 

death  penalty,  were  in  favor  of  Farr's  bill.  And  those  who  weren't, 
were  against  it.  As  I  remember,  Farr  was  trying  to  take  the  easy 
way  out;  he  was  trying  to  get  something  on  a  temporary  basis  that 
we  couldn't  get  on  a  permanent  basis. 

Rowland:   Now,  did  Cecil  Poole  or  anyone  else — well,  Frank  Mesple  wasn't 

around,  but  maybe  Alexander  Pope,  who,  I  guess,  was  around  those 
days.   Did  the  governor's  legislative  secretaries  come  down  to  the 
legislature  and  talk  on  behalf  of  Pat  Brown  in  favor  of  Farr's 

Teale:    I  can't  remember.   Fred  Farr  could  tell  you.   He's  available.   He's 
in  Carmel  now.   In  fact,  I  had  dinner  with  him  the  other  day.  He's 
just  as  alert  as  he  was  fifteen  years  ago.   I'm  sure  he  could 
remember.   I  can't  remember  so  much  about  that,  because  well,  I  had 
other  responsibilities  and  other  worries  at  the  moment.   I  wasn't 
paying  as  much  attention  to  that.  Hell,  I've  always  had  a  very 
definite  opinion  on  the  death  penalty;  I've  been  against  it,  and 
you  couldn't  change  me. 

Rowland:   One  peculiar  move  that  occurred  at  the  same  time  of  the  Chessman 
case,  was  a  move  for  judicial  reform,  which  even 
Attorney  General  Stanley  Mosk  supported.   One  theory  states  that 
the  move  toward  judicial  reform  was  a  smoke  screen  for  maintaining 
the  death  penalty,  in  that  it  would  limit  the  appeal  procedure  in 
the  courts.   Do  you  recall  that  in  any  way? 

Teale:    No,  no. 

Rowland:  Did  you  work  for  judicial  reform  or  recall  that  argument? 

Teale:    No,  I  really  don't.   I  monitored  the  judiciary  committee  for  years, 
trying  to  learn  something  about  various  issues  in  that  committee. 


Teale:    Not  being  a  lawyer,  I  missed  a  lot  of  it,  and  didn't  understand  a 
lot  more  of  it.   The  only  reform  that  I  can  remember  was  when  we 
reformed  the  salary  structure  for  the  judges  in  the  state.   It 
used  to  be  based  upon  the  population  within  the  judicial  district, 
and  we  finally  decided  that  a  judge  was  a  judge  no  matter  where 
he  was;  so  we  established  a  uniform  salary.   That  was  the  limit  of 
my  interest  in  it. 

Rowland:  Now  you  said  again  that  you  voted  against  the  death  penalty. 

Teale:  Yes. 

Rowland:  What  was  your  constituent  reaction  to  that? 

Teale:  Oh,  they  were  about  eighty  percent  the  other  way. 

Rowland:  Really? 

Teale:    Yes.   I  was  questioned  on  it  many  times,  and  I  told  them,  I  said, 
"Everybody's  entitled  to  be  crazy  on  one  issue,  and  this  is  my 
issue.   And  I'm  going  to  vote  that  way,"  and  nobody  ever  held  it 
against  me. 

Rowland:   So  did  you  have  some  stiff  competition  the  next  election? 

Teale:    Not  based  on  that,  no.  Nobody  "in  the  district  ever  made  it  an 
issue.   I  just  explained  that  it  was  my  personal  conviction  and 
I  was  entitled  to  vote  at  least  one  issue  on  my  own,  and  that's 
the  way  I  felt  about  it,  and  everybody  respected  it.   I  didn't  know 
any  other  way  to  meet  the  issue.  You  know,  you  couldn't  talk  with 
somebody  on  the  merits  of  the  issue,  because  it  was  so  emotional. 

Pressure  on  a  Lame  Duck  Governor 

Rowland:   Right.   Yes,   Especially  at  that  time,  the  time  of  the  Chessman 
case,  it  was  a  time  of  emotion.   But  one  other  question  dealing 
with  the  death  penalty:   in  the  last  month  of  Pat  Brown's 
administration,  when  he  was  a  lame  duck  governor,  there  was  a 
tremendous  movement,  primarily  coming  from  the  clergy,  for  Pat  Brown 
to  commute  the  sentences  of  the  sixty-four  men  on  death  row  in 
San  Quentin.   Certain  legislators  joined  in  that  movement;  were  you 
a  part  of  that  movement?  Did  you  go  to  Brown's  office,  or — 


No.   No. 


Rowland:   Do  you  recall  that  movement? 
Teale:    Vaguely,  yes. 

Rowland:  You  don't  recall  what  senators  got  involved  in  it,  or  opposed  it, 
or — 

Teale:    Oh,  no.   I  guess  maybe — well,  it  wasn't  Farr,  because  Farr  wasn't 
there.   I  can't  really  remember  any  of  them.   I  just  remember 
vaguely  that  it  was  an  issue. 

Rowland:   It  seemed  to  be  gaining  front  page  headlines  in  the  press,  par 
ticularly  in  San  Francisco.   The  Catholic  archbishop,  and  an 
Episcopal  church  in  Marin  County  were  leaders  of  that  movement. 
It  must  have  made  Pat  Brown  very  uncomfortable! 

Teale:    Yes.   I  guess  what  they  were  really  trying  to  do — they  were  trying 
to  make  Pat  do  by  fiat  what  they  couldn't  accomplish  by  legislation. 
And  I  guess  by  that  time,  Brown  had  decided  that  people  didn't 
want  to — 

Rowland:  Did  you  ever  communicate  with  Brown  on  that  issue?  Did  you  ever 

talk  to  him,  and  find  out  why  he  didn't  commute  the  Chessman  case — 

Teale:    No,  no. 

Rowland:  — why  he  kind  of  tiptoed  around  the  death  penalty  issue,  while  he  had 
always  been  against  when  he  was  attorney  general — 

Teale:    I  guess  he  didn't  commute  Chessman's  case  because  when  he  gave  him 
that  final  sixty  day  reprieve  and  kicked  it  back  to  the  legislature, 
he  sort  of  made  a  commitment  that  he  would  do  whatever  the 
legislature  decided.   If  they  decided  not  to  abolish  the  death 
penalty,  Chessman  go  ahead  and  take  the  judgement. 

Rowland:  That  was  the  will  of  the — 

Teale:    Yes.   He  considered  it  the  will  of  the  people.   He  wasn't  very 
happy  about  it.   In  fact,  I  guess  that's  probably  the  hardest 
thing  that  Pat  Brown  did  in  all  his  years,  was  handle  the  Chessman 
case.   Because  the  outcome  was  against  his  own  personal  principles. 

Rowland:   Right.   The  last  question  I  have  deals  with  the  Bracero  program. 
What  do  you  know  about  the  Bracero  program? 

Teale:    Almost  nothing. 

Rowland:   Is  that  one  of  your  strong  areas — 


Teale:  No. 

Rowland:  — or  is  that  one  of  your  weak  areas? 

Teale:  No.   That's  one  of  my  very  weak  areas. 

Rowland:  Oh.   [he  laughs] 

Teale:    I  know  something  about  tideland  oil,  but  I  don't  know  much  about 
the  braceros. 

Rowland:   Did  you  run  over  that  article  I  sent  you  from  the  assembly — it  was 
an  assembly  committee  staff  article — 

Teale:    And  it  really  didn't  make  too  much  sense  to  me,  because  I  couldn't 
put  it  together. 

Rowland:   You  couldn't  recall  that  compromise  that  Pat  Brown  offered  to 
Willard  Wirtz? 

Teale:    No.  No.   No,  I  couldn't. 

Rowland:   And  the  flak  he  got  from  the  agribusiness  and  labor  forces  on 


Teale:    No.   All  I  know  is  this  was  in  '65,  and  I  was  so  busy  trying  to  get 
myself  re-elected  at  that  time — 

Rowland:  During  reapportionment. 

Teale:    Yes.   And  trying  to  work  up  all  the  details  of  reapportionment  and 
the  effects  of  it — 

Rowland:  Well,  your  district  would  include  quite  a  few  farming  areas — 

Teale:    Yes.  We  had — well,  not  really.   The  major  one,  the  only  one  af 
fected  by  the  bracero  program  was  Stanislaus  County.   It  wasn't 
that  much  in  my  district.   I  can't  for  the  life  of  me  recall  what 
was  brought  up.   I  know  the  agribusiness  people  were  concerned 
about  it,  and  I  can't  recall  what  was  brought  up  or  what  the 
answers  to  it  were.   How  I  handled  it,  no,  I  can't  remember. 

Rowland:   You  don't  remember  having  to  answer  any  hard  questions  during 
your  campaign? 

Teale:    No.   I  met  with  the  agribusiness  people  four  or  five  times  during 
that  campaign  and  I  ended  up — 


Rowland ; 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 
Rowland : 


Do  you  recall  what  particular  agribusiness?  The  Russell  Griffin 
farm,  or  the — 

No ,  no . 

— Southern  Pacific  Land  Company  or  Kern  County  Land  Company? 

The  Agribusiness  Association  of  Stanislaus  County  was  made  up  of — 
oh,  seed  and  feed  yards,  fertilizer  guys,  farm  guys,  big  growers, 
big  dairy  people — 

Do  you  recall  any  particular  big  growers? 

I  can't  recall  their  names,  no.  No.   But  really,  we  didn't  have 
any  real  big  growers  in  that  area.   We  had  the  frozen  food  industry 
out  at  Patterson,  and  then  the  bean  growers,  but  you  know,  they're 
nothing  like  Griffin  or  Southern  Pacific  or  Tenneco,  or  those 
people  on  the  west  side  of  the  Valley.   They're  all  tiny  little 
farmers  in  Stanislaus  County  compared  to  those  guys. 

But  there  was  at  that  time  a  very  active  agribusiness 
association  down  there  made  up  of  growers,  suppliers,  shippers, 
and  food  processors  that  used  to  meet  at  least  once  a  week.   I 
can  remember  meeting  with  them,  and  we'd  discuss  the  issue,  and 
apparently  whatever  attitude  I  had  on  it,  at  that  time  seemed  to 
satisfy  them,  because  I  had  some  good  support  from  that  group. 

Pat  Brown  mentioned  that  he  was  developing  a  master  plan  for  migrant 
workers.   Do  you  recall  what  happened  to  that  plan? 

As  I  recall,  it  never  amounted  to  much.   It  never  got  off  the 
ground . 

How  come? 

I  don't  remember.   Can't  remember. 

Lack  of  federal  funding? 
for  that  master  plan. 

He  was  hoping  to  get  some  federal  funding 

Rowland ; 

I  guess  maybe  the  lack  of  funding,  and  it  may  have  been  lack  of 
support  among  the  legislature;  I  don't  know.   Because  any  time  you 
get  federal  funding  or  any  kind  of  funding,  it  has  to  go  through 
the  budget.  And  that's  sometimes  a  little  difficult. 

So  you  don't  recall  any  of  Pat  Brown's  staff  members,  like 

Frank  Mesple,  for  instance,  coming  around  in  the  legislature  doing 

the  groundwork  for  Brown's  compromise. 


Teale:    Oh,  I'm  sure  they  did;   I'm  sure  they  did.   But  I  don't  recall  it. 
Rowland:  Who  should  we  talk  to  on  that? 

Teale:    I'd  talk  to  Frank  Mesple.   He's  got  an  excellent  memory  for  what 
happened  during  those  years. 

Rowland:  Anyone  else  who,  let's  say,  supported  agribusiness  in  the  legisla 
ture;  any  strong  agribusiness  senators  that  maybe  we  should  talk  to. 

Teale:  You  might  talk  to  Howard  Way  if  you're  around  Sacramento.  Yes. 
Howard  is  head  of  the  adult  authority  now,  and  he's  Republican, 
but  he  was  very  prominent  in  all  the  ag  operations. 

Rowland:  Now  he  became  the  pro  tern,  right? 

Teale:  Yes.  For  a  short  time.  I  think  he'd  give  you  an  honest  answer 
to  it,  too. 

Rowland:   Any  individuals  who  lobbied  for  religious  or  citizen  interest 

groups,   that  we  should  talk  to  who  opposed  the  bracero  program 
and  agribusiness  back  in  the  early  sixties? 

Teale:    Oh,  I  guess,  the  Friends  Committee  on  Legislation — those  two — 
that  man  and  wife  team. 

Rowland:  Trevor  Thomas? 

Teale:    No.   They're  foreigners;  they're  German  people.   He  was  very  active 
in  the  child  care  programs  for  the  migrant  workers,  and  migrant 
health  programs,  and  I  can't  recall  their  name  offhand.   But  they're 
still  around  Sacramento.   I  see  them  occasionally. 



Comparing  Citizen  and  Special  Interest  Lobbies 

Rowland:  How  effective  were  the  citizen  lobbies?  They  certainly  didn't  have 
the  financing  that  Southern  Pacific,  Pacific  Telephone,  or  oil 
companies  had.   But  they  had  the  moral  argument  in  their  favor. 

Teale:  Yes.  And  I  think  they  were  fairly  effective.  You're  talking 
about  people  like  the  Friends  and  those  people. 

Rowland:  Yes.  And  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union? 

Teale:    The  ACLU?  Yes.   I  think  one  of  the  things  you  have  to  realize 

about  Sacramento  is  that  everybody  has  access  to  the  legislators. 
If  they're  sincere  and  honest  in  their  efforts  and  have  a  piece 
of  business  to  conduct,  most  doors  are  open  to  them.  And  if 
they've  got  a  good  reasonable  argument,  and  somebody  hasn't  got 
there  way  ahead  of  them  and  made  a  man  fixed  in  his  mind  about  a 
certain  issue,  I  think  they  had  their  influence. 

Rowland:  How  come  the  more  heavily  financed  advocates  appear  to  be  the  most 

Teale:    Well,  I  guess  because  they're  more  restricted  in  their  activity. 
Instead  of  having  a  chunk  of  pie  this  big  [gesturing  with  his 
hands]  to  work  with,  they  had  a  little  piece  of  pie  to  work  with. 
They're  much  narrower  in  their  interests. 

Rowland:   The  high  finance  lobbyists. 

Teale:  Yes.  The  highly  financed  lobbyists,  like  the  oil  lobbies,  for 
instance, — the  oil  business  isn't  a  very  big  segment  of  our — 
it's  a  big  money  segment,  but  as  far  as  the  breadth  of  scope, 
it's  not  very  big.  Whereas,  the  ACLU,  the  whole  field  of  civil 


Teale:    rights,  is  a  great  big  chunk  of  the  whole  pie.   Or  the  Friends — 
they're  interested  in  many,  many  things — they're  interested  in 
the  death  penalty,  and  child  care,  migrant  health  programs, 
housing,  prisons;  just  a  whole  host  of  things.   So  they  had  a  wide 
grouped  thing  to  attack,  and  you're  only  successful  on  a  certain 
number  of  things,  you  know. 

Changing  the  Style  of  Lobbying 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Rowland : 

Did  reapportionment  increase  the  kind  of  representation — 
It  increased  the  number  of  lobbyists. 

But  I  think  it  happened  for  another  reason  than  reapportionment, 
I  think  it  happened  because  about  that  time  we  switched  from  a  part 
time  legislature  to  a  full  time  legislature.   And  you  didn't  have 
the  opportunity  for  individual  groups  of  people,  small  organiza 
tions,  churches,  and  schools  to  get  their  man  off  in  the  corner 
when  he  was  home.   So  they  had  to  resort  to  sending  somebody  to 
Sacramento  to  try  to  talk  to  him  during  that  session.   It  hadn't 
worked  very  good,  in  my  mind.   It  looks  to  me  like — in  the  early 
part  of  the  session,  the  bills  aren't  before  you,  so  there's 
nothing  to  talk  about.   There's  nothing  doing  on  the  floor.   The 
authors  are  just  sitting  there;  the  authors  tend  to  be 
procrastinating.   The  legislators  don't  get  legislation  in  action 
very  soon.   So  there's  nothing  really  to  talk  about.   By  the  time 
they  get  to  the  point  where  they  have  to  take  action  on  the  bill, 
there's  so  damn  much  legislation  going  on  that  it's  impossible  for 
the  legislator  to  cope  with  it  all.   So  he  becomes  a  specialist 
in  a  few  bills,  and  he  tries  to  push  his  pets.   And  if  he's 
successful  fine,  and  if  he  isn't,  he  loses  them. 

Did  it  increase  the  number 

Well,  let's  put  the  question  this  way. 
of  citizen  lobbyists? 


Along  with  the  special  interest  lobbyists? 

Yes.  And  I  think  the  reason  was  not  reapportionment  per  se,  but 
it  was  the  changing  character  of  the  session,  because  your  citizen 
used  to  have  access  to  the  legislator  between  sessions.   He  no 
longer  had  that  access,  and  that  change  came  about  in  1964,  and 
I  think  that's  when  we  began  to  see  a  big  influx  of  new  lobbyists 
representing  a  lot  of  little  minor  citizen  interests.   And  you 
couple  that  with  the  fact  that  you  had  more  people  trained  to  be 


Teale:    lobbyists,  more  people  with  internship  programs, and  a  lot  of  other 
programs  that  exposed  people  to  the  legislative  process.   And 
these  people  began  to  go  out  and  look  for  jobs.   So  they  in 
turn,  because  there  was  limited  access  to  the  legislature,  went 
out  and  sold  themselves  to  individual  groups,  convinced  the  group 
they  had  to  have  a  lobbyist  to  be  successful. 

Comparing  Legislative  Secretaries  for  Governor  Brown 

Rowland:   Getting  back  to  a  question  that's  been  flagging  me  down  here 
regarding  Pat  Brown's  legislative  secretaries,  did  you  find 
Alexander  Pope,  Paul  Ward,  or  Frank  Mesple  easier  to  work  with? 

Teale:    I  found  the  easiest  one  to  work  with  was  Paul  Ward. 
Rowland:   Why? 

Teale:    Well,  he  was  closer  to  Pat  for  a  long  time.   To  begin  with,  I 
knew  Paul;  he'd  worked  for  the  senate.   He  had  worked  for 
Stan  Arnold,  or  George  Miller  [,Jr.].   I  guess  he  worked  for 
George  Miller  as  a  consultant  to  a  special  committee  on  education. 
Then  he  went  downstairs  to  the  governor's  office  and  worked  for 
Pat.   He  knew  the  legislature.  You  could  talk  to  him.  And  he 
was  also  the  guy  who  reviewed  the  bills  for  Pat.   So  he  was 
more  knowledgeable.   Frank  was  the  easiest  to  talk  to,  because  of 
his  manner.   And  he  also  was  very  knowledgeable.  My  impression  of 
Alexander  Pope  was  that  he  was  kind  of  cold  and  stand-offish. 
Maybe  it  was  shyness;  I  don't  know.   But  there  was  something  about 
him  that — I  didn't  ever  think  that  he  was  very  successful,  and  I 
gathered  that  the  other  guys  had  the  same  impression;  he  really 
didn't  understand  the  legislature  or  its  workings.   Frank  Mesple 
seemed  to  pick  it  up — Frank  didn't  understand  the  legislature 
either  when  he  came  up  there.  But  he  learned  real  fast.  He  was 
able  to  learn  because  it  was  his  manner.   It's  just  his  personality. 
He  made  friends  in  the  legislature  first,  and  then  found  out  how 
it  ticked.   I  guess  Alexander  Pope  never  did  quite  learn  how  the 
legislature  worked. 

Rowland:   It  appeared  that  Pat  Brown  selected  mostly  legislators  as  delegates 
to  the  Democratic  national  conventions  in  '60  and  '64.  Why  was 
that?  Why  did  he  select  mostly  legislators  to  be  delegates? 

Teale:    I  don't  know.   I  guess  it  was  because  we  had  more  Democratic 

legislators  than  we'd  ever  had  before.  We'd  never  had  as  many 
as  we  had  in  '60  and  '64.  We  had  a  big  majority  in  both  houses, 


Rowland : 


Teale:    and  most  of  the  guys  wanted  to  go,  and  I  guess  that  was  the  way 

to  keep  peace  with  your  legislature.   I  would  say  he  selected  more 
legislators  than  had  gone  previously,  and  maybe  more  than  go  at 
the  present.   I  don't  know  what  it  is  the  last  few  years,  but  I 
think  the  reason  was  that  he  had  more  to  select  from  and  more 
pressure  to  take  legislators. 

It  is  customary  for  the  governor  to  select  the  delegates  to  the — 
his  party's  convention? 

It's  customary  for  the  man  who  wins  the  election.   See,  Brown  ran 
and  he  put  up  a  delegate  slate.   And  on  that  slate,  he  got  as 
many  legislators  as  he  could  to  support  him.   And  of  course,  the 
people  select  the  slate,  and  then  the  governor  controls,  or 
whoever  is  the  head  of  the  slate,  controls  the  vacancies. 

Rowland:   Now  this  is  the  slate  of  delegates. 

Teale:  Yes.  On  the  ballot,  you  see  the  governor's  name:  Pat  Brown,  or 
Jerry  Brown  or  whoever  happens  to  be  the  candidate.  But  beyond 
him  is  a  slate  of  delegates  that  he  must  submit. 


Teale:    I  guess  the  reason  there  were  quite  a  few  more  legislators  on  those 
two  delegations  was  because  there  were  more  available  and — 

Rowland:   He  wanted  to  keep  peace  with — 

Teale:  He  wanted  to  keep  peace  with  the  legislature  and  secondly,  he  felt 
that  every  legislator  that  he  appointed  had  a  reservoir  of  support 
that  would  support  him  in  his  bid  to  be  the  chairman  for  the  dele 



Joe  Shell  and  the  Independent  Oil  Companies 

Rowland:   Okay.  Now  turning  to  the  tidelands  thing,  just  a  few  questions  on 
this.  Do  you  recall  the  Tidelands  Act  of  55  to  give  state  right 
to  active  exploration  and  exploitation  of  tideland  oil  fields? 

Teale:    Yes,  that  was  the  Shell  Act. 

Rowland:  Was  Assemblyman  Joe  Shell  primarily  an  oil  interest  legislator? 

Teale:    Joe  Shell  was  oil  interest.  He  was  an  actual  owner,  and  he  was  the 
son-in-law  of  a  fellow  named  Harold  Morton,  who  represented  all  of 
the  independent  oil  interests.   Harold  Morton's  daughter  is,  I 
believe,  Younger's  wife.   Mildred  Younger.   And  Morton  was  the 
lobbyist  for  independent  oil.   And  Joe  Shell  actually  owned  an 
operating  oil  company. 

Rowland:  Was  that  Shell's  purpose  in  that  bill?  What  was  he  trying  to  do? 
Teale:    To  get  a  chunk  of  it  for  independent  oil. 
Rowland:   Independent  oil. 

Teale:    Yes,  for  the  small  companies:   Sinclair — I  can't  remember  all  the 
little  oil  companies — Occidental — 

Rowland:   In  primarily  the  Long  Beach  area? 

Teale:    Primarily  any  place  that  they  had  tidelands  oil.  Yes. 


The  Question  of  Tidelands  Oil  Revenue 

Rowland:   Now,  another  question  here.   What  can  you  add  about  the  tidelands — 
the  severing  of  the  tideland  oil  funds  for  various  projects,  in 
the  Knight-Pat  Brown  years? 

Teale:    Well,  I  lived  with  the  guy  who  was  chairman  of  the  Senate 

Subcommittee  on  the  East  Wilmington  Oilfield:   Virgil  0' Sullivan. 
And  I  was  on  that  committee.   We  simply  were  out  to  recapture  some 
of  that  money.   We  were  sure  that  the  state,  when  they  gave  title 
to  the  tidelands  to  Long  Beach,  didn't  have  any  idea  what  kind  of 
money  there  was.   Long  Beach  was  forever  coming  in  with  special 
legislation  to  allow  them  to  spend  that  tidelands  money  for 
something  other  than  for  trust  purposes.   So  they  wanted  to  build — 

Rowland:   As  I  recall,  they  money  went  in  to  the  general  fund? 

Teale:    No.   The  revenue  prior  to  the  '64  or  '65  act,  whenever  that  was, 
went  to  Long  Beach,  and  they  could  spend  it  for  trust  purposes. 
And  they  took  advantage  of  it.   They  could  spend  it  for  government 
buildings,  for  development  of  the  harbor — 

Rowland:   Park  and  recreation? 

Teale:    Park  and  recreation,  within  the  tidelands  area.   I  can't  remember 
all  the  details  of  what  they  could  spend  it  for,  but  there  were 
special  restrictions.  They  wanted  to  spend  it  for  everything — 
streets,  schools,  they  wanted  to  spend  it  for  a  great  variety  of 
things  thay  you  would  generally  think  was  a  general  fund 
expenditure.   And  it  was  not  a  general  fund;  it  was  a  special  fund. 
And  when  we  took  over  the  tidelands  and  reached  an  agreement  with 
them,  we  took  the  bulk  of  the  revenue  and  most  of  it  went  in  the 
general  fund,  and  part  of  it  went  into  the  California  higher 
education  fund.   That  is,  the  capital  outlay  fund  for  higher 
education.   And  of  course,  that  fund  is  in  real  trouble  right  now — 

Rowland:   That's  the  fund  that  went  towards  building  Stanislaus  State  and 
Sonoma  State,  for  instance? 

Teale:    All  the  the  state  universities. ' 

Rowland:   The  University  of  California,  too,  or  was  that  primarily  a  state 
universities  fund? 

Teale:    State  university  and  University  of  California  and  we  didn't  prohibit 
its  use  from  the  community  colleges.   But  they  never  got  their 
finger  in  the  pot,  because  the  two  senior  higher  education  segments 
kept  the  community  colleges  out  of  it,  by  pretty  skillful  lobbying. 


Rowland:   That's  some  of  James  Corley's  work  as  UC  lobbyist. 

Teale:    And  the  later  guys'  too.   Of  course,  Jim  wasn't  there  too  much 
longer  after  1964. 

We  set  aside — I  think  it  was  ninety  million  a  year  that  had 
to  go  first  to  capital  outlay  for  higher  education.   If  higher 
education  didn't  use  it  for  that,  then  the  legislature  defined  it 
as  unnecessary  and  transferred  the  money  into  the  general  fund, 
for  general  fund  expenditure.  And  that's  what  we  did  year  after 
year  after  year.  We'd  spend  thirty  or  forty,  fifty  million  dollars 
for  capital  outlay,  and  then  transfer  the  balance  into  the  general 
fund,  for  resolution.   Oh,  we  did  it  in  the  budget  language,  which 
had  the  same  effect  as  a  resolution.   It  was  simply  a  revenue 
raising  effort  to  reach  out  and  get  that  money  that  was  piling  up 
there  at  Long  Beach  that  they  couldn't  legally  use  for  purposes 
other  than  trust  purposes.  We  wanted  to  capture  the  money  and  put 
it  back  in  the  general  fund,  and  then  for  the  higher  education 
special  capital  construction  fund.   Strictly  a  strong  arm  holdup. 

If  you  develop  some  need  for  further  discussion  of  this, 
Virgil  resides  in  Williams — he's  in  the  Williams  phone  book — 
Virgil  0' Sullivan. 

Rowland:   He's  willing  to  talk  about  this. 

Teale:  Oh,  yes.  He'd  be  tickled  to  death  to  talk  about  it.  But  you'd 
better  get  it  on  a  cheap  time  of  the  day,  because  he'll  talk  to 
you  about  four  hours. 

Rowland:  Wasn't  there  a  movement  to  take  the  money — wasn't  there  a — I  believe 
at  one  point  most  of  the  revenue  was  supposed  to  be  allocated  for 
Parks  and  Recreation  Department,  and  there  was  a  movement  to  get 
that  money  out  of  parks  and  recreation  allocation  and  to  some 
other  funds. 

Teale:    Well,  everybody  wanted  a  chunk  of  the  money.   Everybody  wanted  a 

chunk  of  the  money.   I  think  we  resolved  it;  you'd  have  to  talk  to 
Virgil  to  be  sure  about  it,  but  we  resolved  it  by  setting  aside  a 
specific  amount,  right  off  the  top  for  education,  and  then  put  the 
rest  in  for  appropriation  by  the  legislature.   Because,  you  know, 
everybody  can  make  a  good  case  for  taking  the  money,  but  a  good 
case  this  year  may  be  a  bad  case  next  year.   So,  as  I  remember  it, 
we  left  it  more  or  less  flexible. 

Rowland:  What  particularly  strong  oil  lobbyists  do  you  recall,  and  how 
effective  were  they? 


Teale:    Well,  the  big  battle  was  not  pro  or  con  taking  the  money.   The 

big  battle  was  who  should  get  a  chance  to  bid  on  the  tidelands  oil 

Rowland:   Now,  that  comes  from  the  State  Lands  Commission,  right? 

Teale:    It  comes  under  the  State  Lands  Commission,  but  we  wrote  the 
provisions  of  it.   We  wrote  the  competitive  bidding  and  the 
divison  of  the  leasing,  right  in  the  bill.  We  specified  the 
percentages  that  oil  companies  had  to  break  their  field  into. 

Rowland:   What  was  that  bill?  Do  you  recall  the — 

Teale:    I  can't  recall  the  number.   But  the  bill  was  very  interesting.   If 
you  go  back  and  get  it,  and  you'll  find  that — 

Rowland:  What  year  was  this? 

Teale:    Christ,  I  can't  even  remember  that.   '62,  -3,  -4;  somewhere  along 
in  there. 

Rowland:  Well,  that  makes  it  mid-sixties  period. 

Teale:    Yes,  the  mid-sixties..  What  we  did;  we  set  up  the  concept  of  a 

field  operator,  so  that  one  company  would  become  the  operator  for 
the  field.   But  we  broke  the  field  into  undivided  interest,  so  that 
you  could  bid  on  a  two  percent,  four  percent,  six  percent,  ten  per 
cent,  and  I  think  nobody  was  able  to  bid  on  more  than  forty.   (It 
either  was  twenty-five  or  forty  percent.)   So  you  had  a  variety 
of  interests.  So  you  had  about  eight  or  ten  different  guys  who 
could  bid. 

Well,  the  leases,  when  they  went  up  for  bid,  came  in  at  around 
a  ninety  percent  bid,  and  when  you  got  down  to  the  two  percent 
interests,  some  of  them  went  for  a  hundred  and  five  percent  of  the 
yield.   And  the  reason  for  that  was  a  state  and  federal  law  on 
imported  oil.  And  in  order  to  get  imported  oil,  you  had  to  have  a 
certain  flow  through  of  domestic  oil  through  your  refinery.   So, 
these  guys  could  afford  to  pay  more  than  the  field  was  worth — more 
than  the  actual  oil  was  worth — in  order  to  get  the  domestic  oil  to 
flow  through  their  refinery  so  they'd  be  qualified  for  more  imported 
oil  that  they'd  get  at  a  cheaper  price. 

The  guy  who  put  us  wise  to  that  was  a  fellow  who  was  in  the 
U.S.  Department  of  Interior,  I  believe.   And  we  paid  him  ten 
thousand  dollars  or  so  to  come  out  here  and  give  us  six  weeks  of  his 
time  and  make  a  report.   Can't  remember  his  name.   Virgil  would 
know  his  name.   He  made  quite  a  report,  and  insisted  that  the 


Teale:    interest  should  be  broken  up.   Prior  to  that  time,  you  put  an 

entire  section  of  tidelands  up  for  lease.   Everybody  bid  on  the 
entire  operation,  and  the  high  bidder  took  it  all. 

But  Long  Beach  was  totally  different.  You  had  a  single 
operator,  and  I  think  there  were  three  companies  that  bid  on  the 
rights  to   operate  the  East  Wilmington  oilfield.  And  I  think  all 
three  companies  had  a  chunk  of  the  major  action. 

But  we  gave  people  like  Ed  Pauley,  Getty,  and  Sinclair  and 
some  other — Texaco — some  small  independent  companies  (in  this 
state) ,  a  chance  to  bid  on  and  get  a  piece  of  the  action,  and 
provide  a  flow-through  oil  for  their  refinery  operation.   That  was 
the  biggest  battle  and  the  biggest  hurdle  to  overcome,  was  how 
to  solve  that  problem  involving  big  versus  little  oil  companies. 
When  we  solved  that  problem,  we  snagged  the  money  for  the  state. 

Rowland:   For  what  fund?  Parks  and  recreation? 

Teale:    No,  no.   The  general  fund,  and  education,  and  we  gave  Long  Beach  a 
maximum  amount  every  year.  We  figured  that  the  East  Wilmington 
oilfield  would  last  about — 

Rowland:   This  was  the  Long  Beach  field. 

Teale:    Yes.  We  figured  that  the  field  had  about  a  thirty  year  life,  and 
we  were  just  about  right  on  it.   It's  just  about  exhausted  now, 
that  particular  field. 

The  other  major  decision  we  had  to  make,  was  how  to  draw  the 
lines  for  the  extent  of  the  field,  and  how  to  draw  the  high  water 
marks — 

Rowland:  Didn't  that  involve  the  federal  government  too? 

Teale:    Not  at  that  time,  no.  No,  the  federal  government  came  in  at  the 

three  mile  limit.   The  federal  government  had  their  line  set.   But 
the  inshore  line,  the  high  water  mark,  had  varied  from  time  to  time 
with  erosion.  And  we  had  to  arbitrarily  set  the  boundaries  for 
that.   Very  interesting.  Dick  Dolwig  was  in  on  that,  I  was  in  on 
it,  Virgil  0' Sullivan,  and  I  think  Stan  Arnold. 

Rowland:   Did  Virgil  0' Sullivan  play  kind  of  the  antagonist  role  to  the  oil 
companies,  or  was  he  more  a  supporter  of  oil  interests? 

Teale:    No,  he  wasn't  a  supporter  of  oil;  he  was  a  supporter  of  the 

pocketbook.   He  wanted  to  get  his  hands  on  the  pocketbook.   Of 
course,  the  big  cartoons  of  the  day  showed  him  standing  on 


Teale:    somebody's  shoulder  reaching  into  the  cookie  jar,  with  Pat  Brown 
in  the  wings  urging  him  on.   Virgil  has  a  copy  of  that  cartoon. 
A  fellow  named  Charlie  [Charles  L. ]  Baldwin  was  committee  secretary. 
And  he's  still  around  the  legislature.   He's  a  consultant,  and  I 
do  believe  he  works  for  Senator  Ralph  [C.]  Dills,  now. 

Rowland:  Now,  what  role  did  he  play  in  this? 

Teale:    He  was  committee  consultant.   He  helped  draft  the  act  and  he — 

Rowland:  You  still  don't  recall  the  name  of  that  US  Department  of  Interior 

Teale:    No.   No.   I  can't  recall  the  name  of  that  guy  that — Virgil  could 
tell  you  in  a  minute.   It  was — a  fairly  well-known  oil  consultant 
at  that  time,  an  economist.  Ken  Cory  got  into  the  act  a  little 
bit  later. 

Rowland:   In  the  Reagan  years? 

Teale:    Well,  after  0' Sullivan  left  the  subcommittee,!  was  chairman  of  the 
tidelands  committee,  and  at  that  time  we  were  more  interested  in 
determining  the  areas  of  the  tidelands,  up  and  down  the  state.   I 
held  it  for  a  year  or  two  and  got  into  some  other  action  and  got 
too  busy  and  Cory  was  a  member  of  the  committee.   It  was  a  joint 
house  committee,  a  two  house  committee  and  he  took  it  over  and  had 
it  until  he  left  the  legislature. 

Rowland:  Well,  actually  we'd  better  wrap  up  here. 

Teale:    Cory's  another  guy  you  might  talk  to  about — but  I'm  sure  he  wouldn't 
know  the  guy's  name  who  came  from  the  federal  department  of  interior. 

Rowland:   Okay.   Good.   That  brings  us  to  a  close.   That  you  for  a  most 
informative  interview. 


Transcriber:  Alison  Nichols 
Final  Typist:  Matthew  Schneider 


TAPE  GUIDE  -  Stephen  P.  Teale 

Interview  1:  July  18,  1978 

tape  1,  side  A  1 

tape  1,  side  B  H 

tape  2,  side  A  21 

tape  2,  side  B  3Q 

Interview  2:   September  27,  1978 

tape  3,  side  A  38 

tape  3,  side  B  49 

tape  4,  side  A  53 

tape  4,  side  B  70 


INDEX  —  Stephen  P.  Teale 

Agribusiness  Association  of  Stanislaus  County,   65.   See  also  agriculture, 

growers . 

growers,   64,  65.   See  also  braceros;  Agribusiness  Association  of  Stanislaus 


Alcohol  Beverage  Control  Commission,   46.   See  also  Equalization,  Board  of. 
Allen,  Don  A.,   21,  28,  29,  30 
anti-communism.   See  California  senate,  un-american  activities  committee; 

San  Diego  Research  Library 
Arnold,  Stanley,   16,  30,  60,  69,  75 

Baldwin,  Charles  L.,   76 

Begovich,  John,   17,  26,  30 

Bell,  Theodore,   2 

Bonelli,  Frank,   14 

bracero  program,   64,  66 

Bradley,  Don,   10,  40 

Brown,  Edmund  G. ,  Sr.  (Pat),   18,  23,  25,  26,  27,  29,  30,  33,  35,  48,  60,  62, 

63,  70 

Burns,  Hugh  M. ,   12,  16,  17,  23,  26,  33,  34,  35,  38 
Burns-Porter  Act,   35 

Calaveras  Prospect,   38,  39,  40 
California  assembly,  29,  32,  33,  35 

assembly  bill  1,   29 

assembly  elections  and  reapportionment  committee,  29 

and  liquor  control,   44 

and  lobbyists,   52 

reapportionment,   30 

speaker  race,   30 
California  Democratic  Council,   9 

factions  in,   9,  10 

founding  of,   9,  10 

local  clubs,   10 

schism  with  Democratic  State  Central  Committee,   11,  20 
California  legislature,   69,  70 

Joint  Committee  on  Tidelands,   76 

Joint  Interim  Committee  on  Governmental  Reorganization,   44 
California  senate,   13,  14,  16,  17,  18,  19,  23,  29,  31 

and  death  penalty,   59,  61 

effects  of  1966  reapportioniaent  on,   31,  32,  34 

finance  committee,   32 

governmental  efficiency  committee,   55 


California  senate,  cont. 

governmental  organization  committee,   45,  46 

judiciary  committee,   60,  61 

and  lobbying,   52,  53 

pro  tern  race,   34,  35 

relations  with  governor's  office,   18,  33 

senate  bill  6,   21 

subcommittee  on  East  Wilmington  Oildfield,   72,  74,  75,  76 

un-american  activities  committee,   36,  38,  41 

water  resources  committee,   35 
Carr,  Francis,   50 
Campbell,  Peggy,   40 
Coffey,  Bert,   37 
Collier.  Randoloh.   14 
Comhs  Richard  E.,   36,  38 
Cor ley,  James  H.,   53 
Cory,  Kenneth,   76 
Cranston,  Alan,   9,  10,  11 
Creedon,  Don,   45,  54 
Cunardi,  Paul,   30 
Curran,  Robert,   5,  39 

death  penalty,   62-63 

Caryl  Chessman  decision  (1960),   59,  60,  61,  62,  63 
Democratic  National  Conventions: 

1960,   69,  70 

1964,   15,  69,  70 
Democratic  party,   6,  8,  20,  23  33,  34,  35,  38,  41,  59 

Calaveras  County  central  committee,  5,  7,  8 

campaign  methods  of,   10 
Dempsey,  Van,   9,  10 
Desmond,  Earl,   35 

Dirksen  Amendment  (federal),   16,  17,  20.   See  also  reapportionment 
Dolwig,  Richard,   33,  75 

elections : 

campaign  financing,   42 

campaign  methods  of,   5,  6,  9,  10,  26,  27,  41,  42 

1912  gubernatorial,   2 

1948  supervisorial  (Calaveras  County) ,   4 

1953  senate  special,   5,  8,  38,  39,  40,  42 

1953  lieutenant  governor,  44 

1958  legislative,   42 

1966  senate,   26-28 
Equalization,  Board  of  (California),   46 


Fair  Trade  Act  (California),   48,  49.   See  also  liquor  control 

Farr,  Fred,   16,  22,  61 

Fisher,  Hugo,   37 

Flynn,  Frank  X.  (Porky),   45 

Free  Speech  Movement,   35 

Friends  Committee  on  Legislation  (Quakers),   66 


Garibaldi,  James  D.,   45,  49,  50,  54 
Garamandi,  Ray,   38 
Gibson,  Luther,   55 
Gillies,  Dugald  (Doug),   55,  56 
governor's  office  (Brown),   18,  33 
and  legislative  secretaries,   69 
Graves,  Richard  P.,   26 
Grunsky,  Donald,   22 

higher  education: 

financing  of,   72,  73 

Jesperson,  Chris,   14 
Johnson,  Arthur,   17 
Johnson,  Hiram,   2 

Kent,  Roger,   10,  39 
Kleps,  Ralph,   14 
Kerr,  Clark,   33,  36 

League  of  Women  Voters,   30 

Leake,  Paul,   46 

liquor  control,   44,  45,  46,  47.   See  also  Weinberger,  Caspar;  Fair  Trade  Act 

lobbying,   49,  50,  51,  52,  53 

comparing  citizen  and  special  interests  styles  of,   67 

effect  of  1966  reapportionment  on,   68,  69 

and  horseracing,   52 

and  liquor  interests,   45,  46,  47,  48 

and  oil  interests,   22,  71 
Long  Beach  (City  of),   73 
Los  Angeles  (County  of) : 

designing  1966  reapportionment  for,   19-21,  56.   See  also  reapportionment, 

Lyng,  Richard  E.,   26,  28 


McCarthy,  Jack,   17,  33 

Marks,  Milton,   20 

Mayo,  Jesse  M. ,   5,  41,  42 


newspapers,   23 
Mesple,  Frank,   66,  69 
Mills,  James,   35 

Miller,  George,  Jr.,   9,  11,  12,  16,  22,  26,  37,  38,  39,  45,  47,  69 
More,  Avery,   5,  41 
Morton,  Harold,   7 

Oliver,  Davy,   54 

Olney,  Warren  III,   46 

O'Sullivan,  Virgil,   15,  16,  18,  30,  60,  73,  75,  76 

Parkman,  Harry,  45 
Peyser,  Jefferson  E.,   54 
Pittman,  Stanley,   30 
Pope,  Alexander  III,   69 
Porter,  Carly,   35 

Rattigan,  Joseph,   17,  60 
reapportionment  (California  legislature) 

assembly  elections  and  reapportionment  committee,   29 

1960  Bonelli  initiative,   13,  22 

1963  Supreme  Court  (U.S.)  decision  affecting,   15,  18 

1966  assembly,   30,  57 

1966  senate,   13,  15,  19,  20,  21,  22,  23,  24,  31,  56,  57,  58 

retirement  benefits  and,   28,  29 

senate  reapportionment  committee,   17,  18,  19,  21 

Wellman  commission,   13,  18.   See  also  lobbying,  Los  Angeles  (County  of) 
Reagan,  Ronald,   33,  34 
Rees,  Thomas  M. ,   21,  23,  56 
Regan,  Edwin,   16,  17,  30,  60 

Republican  party,   5,  8,  19,  20,  33,  41,  46,  59 
Richards,  Richard,   9,  10 
Romaggi,  Robert,   5,  42 
Rue,  Vern,   5,  39,  40,  41,  42 

Salinger,  Pierre,   9,  39,  40,  41 
Samish,  Arthur  H. ,   45 
San  Diego  Research  Library,  37 
Schrade,  Jack,   34,  35 
Sedgwick,  Harold  T.,   30 


Shell  Act  (California) .   See  Tidelands  Act  of  1955 

Shell,  Joseph,   71.   See  also  Tidelands  Act  of  1955 

Sherwood,  Clyde,   5,  38,  40,  41 

Silliman,  James,   44 

Silver,  Phill,   14 

Slattery,  Jack,   30 

Snyder,  Elizabeth,   9,  10,  11 

State  Lands  Commission  (California) ,   74 

Sturgeon,  Vernon,   22-23 

Supreme  Court  (United  States),   18 

reapportionment  decision  of  1964,   15,  18 
Symons,  William,  Jr.,   30 

Tidelands  Act  of  1955  (California),   71.   See  also  tidelands  oil;  Joseph  Shell 
tidelands  oil: 

bidding  on,   74,  75 

revenues  from,   72,  73,  75.   See  also  Tidelands  Act  of  1955;  Joseph  Shell 
Truman,  Harry, 

University  of  California,   35 

Unruh,  Jesse  M. ,   9-12,   23,  24,  30,  35,  56 

Vallejo,  Mariano,   1 
Van  Dieman,  Ralph,   37 

Ward,  Paul,   69 

Warren,  Earl,  15,  16 

Warschaw,  Carmen,   9,  10 

Way,  Howard,   34,  35,  66 

Weinberger,  Caspar,  44-46.   See  also  liquor  control;  California  legislature, 

Joint  Interim  Committee  on  Governmental  Reorganization 
Weinberger  committee.   See  California  legislature,  Joint  Interim  Committee 

on  Governmental  Reorganization 
Weiner,  Rosalind,  11,  12 
Weingard,  Alvin,   30 

Wellman  commission.   See  reapportionment,  Wellman  commission 
Williams,  Robert,   16 
Winton,  Gordon,   30 

Younger,  Mildred,   71 

Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen 

Regional  Oral  History  Office  University  of  Californa 

The  Bancroft  Library  Berkeley,  California 

Governmental  History  Documentation  Project 
Goodwin  Knight /Edmund  Brown,  Sr. ,  Era 

Don  A.  Allen 

An  Interview  Conducted  by 
James  R.  Rowland 
in  1979 

Copyright  flT  1980  by  the  Regents  of  the  University  of  California 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  —  Don  A.  Allen 


Growing  Up  in  the  Midwest  1 
Joining  the  Marine  Corps  5 
Roots  of  Political  Involvement:  Joining  the  Democratic  Party  6 

Struggles  with  the  State  Relief  Administration  9 
The  Un-American  Activities  Committee:  Principal  Personalities  13 
Founding  the  Economy  Block  16 

Background  to  Senate  Reapportionment  23 
Maneuvers  Around  Reapportionment  36 
Pensions  and  Reapportionment  47 

Backing  Ronald  Reagan  62 
Conflicts  with  the  Republican  Assembly                      .  63 
Endorsing  Max  Rafferty  66 

The  Inheritance  Tax  Appraisal  Episode  67 
The  Assembly  Lockup  74 
Interpreting  the  Unruh-Brown  Differences  76 



APPENDIX  I  -  Biography  of  the  Honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  86 

APPENDIX  II  -  Letter  to  Governor  Edmund  G.  Brown,  Sr. ,  from 
Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  November  16,  1965;  with  remarks 

of  George  Bernard  Shaw  to  accompany  letter  88 

APPENDIX  III  -  Copy  of  Commentary  by  Murray  Wesgate  of  Radio 

Station  KPOL,  Sacramento,  January  24,  1966  93 

APPENDIX  IV  -  Letter  from  Vernon  Kilpatrick  to  Don  A.  Allen, 

January  25,  1972  99 

INDEX  105 


Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  was  interviewed  by  the  Regional  Oral 
History  Office  for  the  Goodwin  Knight-Edmund  G.  Brown,  Sr.  segment  of  its 
Governmental  History  Documentation  Project.  His  position  as  chairman  of  the 
Assembly  Elections  and  Reapportionment  Committee  (1963-1966)  during  the 
reapportionment  of  the  state  senate  and  knowledge  of  state  government  as 
author  of  the  Legislative  Sourcebook  combined  to  make  him  an  important 
contributor  to  our  documentation  of  state  government. 

Born  in  the  Midwest  and  tied  to  a  colonial  family  heritage,  Allen  first 
ventured  to  California  to  join  his  uncle's  business  in  Los  Angeles  in  the 
early  1920s.  After  a  tour  of  duty  in  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps  that  took  him  to 
China,  Nicaragua,  and  Haiti,  he  returned  to  Los  Angeles  to  head  a  local 
chapter  of  the  Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars.   In  1938  a  bipartisan  coalition  of 
businessmen  and  party  leaders  persuaded  Allen  to  run  for  the  Sixty-third 
Assembly  District  in  Los  Angeles.  With  the  backing  of  both  parties,  Allen 
won  the  primary  and  general  elections  as  a  Democrat. 

As  a  freshman  assemblyman  he  joined  a  chorus  of  Republican  and  Demo 
cratic  legislators  in  opposition  to  Democratic  Governor  Culbert  Olson  and  his 
State  Relief  Administration,  after  having  a  few  heated  run-ins  with  the 
governor  himself.  A  break  in  his  legislative  career  in  1949  found  him  as  a 
Los  Angeles  city  councilman  until  his  return  to  the  assembly  in  1956,  again 
representing  the  sixty- third  district.  Through  his  allegiance  to  Jesse  Unruh, 
Allen  won  the  chairmanship  to  the  elections  and  reapportionment  committee 
when  Unruh  became  Assembly  Speaker  in  1962.   It  was  in  these  roles  that  Unruh 
and  Allen  fought  with  the  rural  dominated  senate  to  find  an  acceptable  reap 
portionment  plan  to  meet  federal  court  deadlines  for  senate  re-districting. 
To  cap  his  involvement  in  the  reapportionment  struggle,  he  authored,  along 
with  his  staff,  the  Legislative  Sourcebook,  a  valuable  compendium  of  legislator 
records  and  past  reapportionments  up  to  1965.  For  his  contribution  to  legis 
lative  history,  he  was  awarded  the  title  of  California  legislative  historian 
for  life  by  the  senate  and  assembly  in  1966. 

I  arranged  a  one-session  interview  with  Assemblyman  Allen  at  the 
University  of  California's  Governmental  Relations  office  in  Sacramento. 
We  began  with  his  colorful  personal  and  family  history  and  moved  to  his  early 
years  in  the  legislature  during  the  Olson  and  Warren  administrations.   On  the 
Knight-Brown  era,  he  spoke  on  his  struggles  with  senate  reapportionment,  his 
battle  with  Governor  Brown  over  pension  benefits,  his  relations  with  the 
Republican  party,  and  his  reflections  on  Jesse  Unruh  and  the  Unruh-Brown 


After  rough  editing,  the  transcript  was  forwarded  to  Assemblyman  Allen 
for  final  review.   He  took  pains  to  keep  it  in  conversational  style,  although 
he  did  add  annotations  to  chapters  one,  two  and  five.   In  addition,  he  gratu 
itously  re- typed  the  rough  transcript,  the  product  of  which  appears  as  the 
following  memoir. 

This  interview  represents  the  quintessential  Don  Allen:  candid,  color 
ful,  and  spiced  with  raw  criticism  that  reveals  the  give  and  take  of  politics. 
Coming  from  a  hard-working  family  background  in  Iowa,  he  applied  himself 
assiduously  in  politics  as  well  as  in  life,  and  developed  a  style  and  manner 
the  reader  will  distinguish  as  singularly  Don  Allen. 

James  H.  Rowland 

23  January  1980 

Regional  Oral  History  Office 

486  The  Bancroft  Library 

University  of  California  at  Berkeley 


(Interview  I:   January  16,  1979)   *# 

Hon.  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr. 

California  Legislature  -  Retired 

Growing  Up  in  the  Midwest 

Allen:   Okay.   In  regards  to  family  genealogy,  my  mother's  father  came  from 
France.   His  family  name  was  Toulouse  and  he  was  born  in  Toulouse. 
He  was,  however,  raised  in  a  little  town  called  Lily.  Learning  his 
trade,  he  became  a  master  printer.   He  named  my  mother  "Lily"  in 
remembe ranee.   In  1839,  he  and  his  brother  migrated  to  Fotosi, 
Wisconsin  where  he  set  up  a  newspaper  and  printing  shop.   No  doubt 
influenced  to  settle  there  by  his  cousins  who  became  successful 

It  was  here  he  met  and  married  grandmother.   Her  maiden  name  was 
Prlscllla  Wayne,  the  daughter  of  "Mad  Anthony"  Wayne  of  Stony  Point 
fame.  The  name  of  Priscilla  Wayne  was  known  in  the  newspaper  field 
for  111  years.   She  founded  a  column  which  carried  that  name  from 
1845  to  1956  by  succession  of  her  4  daughters  and  one  grand 

My  grandfather  and  his  brother  served  with  the  Wisconsin  Volunteers 
during  the  Civil  War.  They  were  mustered  out  at  the  cessation  of 
hostilities  in  Pennsylvania.   Grandpa's  brother,  led  him  home 
because  he  had  contacted  "Rubella"  (German  Measles).   He  could 
barely  make  out  day  from  night.   His  training  was  so  great  that  he 
would  set  type  with  the  best.   It  still  facinates  me  that  even  as 
blind  as  he  was  how  well  he  carried  out  his  work  and  great  service 
and  training  to  other  sightless  people.   He  also  helped  General 
John  A.  Logan  found  the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  the  greatest 

veteran's  organization  in  this  nation. 

So  then  on  my  father's  side,  some  of  his  family  had  come  from 
the  green  mountains  of  Vermont.  The  patriarch  of  our  family  was 
a  brother  of  Ethan  Allen,  which  caused  my  father,  who  was  later 
a  judge  in  Nebraska,  to  say  that  Ethan  Allen  and  his  brother 
captured  Fort  Ticonderoga  with  an  ax  and  a  pitchfork,  and  our 
Allen  crowd  promptly  threw  the  ax  away  and  kept  the  pitchfork, 
because  we  went  into  politics. 

So  anyway,  his  grandfather  —  or  my  great-grandfather  —  migrated 
West  by  way  of  Kentucky.   He  was  with  the  Daniel  Boone  crowd,  and 
every  time  Boone  made  a  move,  he  followed  West  with  him.  My 
grandfather  was  born  in  West  Virginia  and  came  West  as  a  youngster 
into  Missouri.  My  father  was  born  in  Bethany,  Missouri.   Later 
grandpa  migrated  and  home  steaded  in  Iowa. 

Grandpa  used  to  twit  an  old-maid  aunt  of  mine,  that  was  a  school 
teacher  and  principal,  about  her  looking  up  the  family  tree  for 
five  hundred  bucks,  causing  the  rest  of  the  family  to  pitch  in 
and  spend  twenty  thousand  to  hush  it  up.   I  was  born  half  way 
between  Marne  and  Atlantic,  Iowa.   So  that's  about  the  background. 

I  spent  considerable  of  my  teenage  years  in  the  Midwest,  as  did 
others  of  my  age  ,  working.  Most  of  my  summer  vacations  were 
spent  on  my  grandfathers  f arm  ; that  is,  Grandpa  Don  Allen,  same 
name  as  mine  —  at  Allendale.   However,  it  was  not  all  drudgery 
for  we  had  our  fun.  We  filled  our  time  with  hunting,  trapping  and 
fishing.  We  were  so  busy  that  juvenile  misbehavior  was  nil.  We 
also  made  county  and  state  fair  exhibits.  We  did  not  have  much 

time  to  create  mischief.  The  State  of  Iowa  constructed  a  reformi- 
tory  which  seldom  had  inmates  confined  and  outside  help  was  needed 
for  its  maintenance. 

Rowland:   You  went  to  local  schools? 

Allen:    Oh  yes,  I  went  to  public  elementary  and  high  schools  in  Iowa  and 

Rowland:   What  were  the  schools  like?  Were  they  small,  rural  schools? 

Allen:    Well,  no,  Oak  Street  in  Council  Bluffs  had  first  thru  6th  grades 
and  about  80-85  kids.  My  first  school  was  at  Prairie  Rose  where 
I  entered  the  first  grade  and  attended  summer  school  only.   It 
was  a  one-room  school,  where  we  had  a  teacher  that  taught  all 
grades  up  to  the  eighth  grade.   I  guess  it  had  an  attendance  of 
30  pupils.   Prairie  Rose  is  just  outside  of  Walnut,  Iowa.  As  a 
consequence,  the  small  country  school  that  I  did  go  to  was  one- 

Our  teacher  once  said,  when  she  retired  after  some  fifty  years, 
that  during  trapping  season  we  were  probably  not  the  most  brilliant 
kids  in  the  state,  but  we  sure  were  fragrant.  Because,  you  know, 
you  were  trapping  skunk  and  mink  and  so  forth  and  so  on,  and  there 
was  a  little  aroma  left. 

Rowland:   Were  there  relatives  in  your  family  or  teachers  that  you  were  close 

Allen:    Well,  I  had  that  Aunt  Mary.  She  retired  and  came  to  our  home  to 
live.  She  taught  my  sister,  Grace,  and  myself  to  read  and  write 
by  the  time  we  were  about  four  to  four- and- a- half  years  old.  When 
1  went  to  school  in  Council  Bluffs,  I  was  about  five  and  they 
immediately  elevated  me  two  grades  because  of  my  ability  to  handle 
reading,  writing  and  arithmetic  and  other  measures. 

I  wouldn't  advise  rapid  promotions.   I  became  a  pest  —  probably 
if  there  had  been  a  firecracker  built  big  enough  to  blow  the 
school  house.   i  was  just  blg  enough  a  punk  in  those  days  to 
light  it.   It  made  me  aggressive.   I  had  to  hold  jny  own  with 
peers  that  were  older  than  me,  and  as  a  consequence  I  was  always 
in  a  fight,  or  something.   I  became  just  a  village  brat.  So 
anyway,  that's  later  after  we  moved  into  the  larger  town. 

Rowland:   Were  there  any  childhood  books  in  your  home  that  you  remember 
that  you  read? 

Allen:    Oh,  yes.  One  of  the  first  books  I  remember  reading  was  Quo  Vadls, 
the  old  general  book,  and  the  Bible  was  required  reading  by  us. 

Rowland:   Your  family  was  very  religious. 

Allen:    Yes. 

Rowland:  What  religion? 

Allen:    We're  what  they  call  Campbell ite  Christian  or  Disciples  of  Christ, 
often  referred  to  as  "Sorehead  Baptists."  A  Rev.  Campbell  broke 
away  from  the  main  Baptist  Church.  We  were  also  called  "Feetwashin1 
Baptists,"  or  whatever  they  call  them. 

But  anyhow,  mine  was  the  usual  school  —  a  little  football,  a  little 
of  this,  a  little  of  this,  a  little  of  that. 

Living  next  door  to  us  in  Council  Bluffs,  Iowa,  was  a  Civil  War 
General  and  Chief  Engineer  and  Builder  of  the  Union  Pacific  Rail 
road  —  Major  General  Grenville  Dodge.  He  inspired  me  to  enter 
the  civil  engineering  field.   He  was  a  tremendous  teacher.   He 
taught  me  how  to  handle  various  survey  equipment,  etc.   I  could 
read  a  slide  rule  by  the  time  I  was  10  or  12  years  old. 
His  home  was  a  three  story  house  similar  to  our  old  Governor's 
Mansion.   He  would  spend  hours  on  the  top  deck  watching  the 


enlargement  progress  of  the  Union  Pacific  Bridge  across  the 
Missouri  River.  Council  Bluffs,  Iowa,  is  the  Eastern  terminal 
of  the  Union  Pacific.  On  a  cold  day  in  January  1916,  General 
Dodge  died  -  I  owe  him  much.   I  graduated  from  high  school  at 
the  age  of  15. 

Rowland:   And  this  is  in  the  Midwest  Iowa? 

Allen:    Yes. 

Joining  the  Marine  Corps 

Allen:    Shortly  after  my  graduation  I  decided  that  I  wanted  to  see  a 

little  bit  of  the  world  -  so  I  ran  away  from  home.  Fibbing  on 
my  correct  age,  I  enlisted  in  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps.   I  bounced 
around  the  so  called  Banana  Republics  -  Santa  Domingo,  Haiti  and 
Nicaragua.  '  There  as  a  Constabulary  Officer  on  detached  duty" 
with  the  Marines  I  was  introduced  to  Civil  Government.   It  was 
good  duty.  As  a  member  I  would  draw  my  pay  and  allowances  as 
an  enlisted  Marine  and  full  commissioned  officers  pay  of  the 
country  being  served. 

Here  again,  another  General  officer,  Smedley  D.  Butler,  U.S.M.C. 
observed  my  scholastic  record  and  engineering  experience  and  urged 
me  to  take  further  advanced  courses  in  that  field  -  which  I  did. 
So  my  engineering  —  both  the  structural  and  civil  —  I  received 
out  of  the  Marine  Corps  Institute  or  the  service  schools.  Then 
later,  of  course,  I  took  extended  courses  at  the  University  of 
Southern  California  and  the  California  Institute  of  Technology. 

Rowland:   Now  your  California  experience,  when  did  that  begin? 

Allen:    Well,  it  began  the  first  time  about  1911.   I  came  out  on  a  visit, 
and  being  a  kid  around  the  farm,  could  handle  horses.  My  uncle  by 

marriage  owned  a  restaurant  which  was  called  "The  Five  Mile  House" 
on  what  is  now  the  corner  of  Crenshaw  and  Adams.   In  those  day  it 
was  surrounded  by  hay  fields. 

Rowland:   In  --  ? 

Allen:    In  Los  Angeles.   I  used  to  park  the  horses  and  carriages.  The 
French  waiters  were  scared  to  death  of  the  horses.   They  also 
were  madder  than  hell  at  me  because  I  would  pick  up  better  tips 
than  they.   Because  I  had  a  little  racket  going  there,  I  don't 
mind  telling  you.   I'd  go  out  and  curry  those  horses  down  and 
shine  them  up  for  those  people. 

I  struck  the  fancy  of  Mrs.  Clara  Baldwin  Stocker  -  Lucky  Baldwin's 
oldest  daughter  by  his  first  marriage.  Her  mother  had  passed  away 
crossing  the  plains  to  California.  Mrs.  Stocker  had  a  large 
rambling  ranch  house  up  on  Baldwin  Hills.   She  later  willed  this 
home  to  a  Sister's  Nursing  Order  which  cared  for  terminally  sick 
women.  Actress  Clara  Bow  died  there.   She  used  to  call  me  to 
come  over  and  help  handle  her  driving  horses  because  she  had  ob 
tained   matched  hackney's  from  Allendale  that  my  grandfather  had 
raised  for  her. 

So  anyway,  she  was  quite  a  character,  but  a  good  friend  and  always 
good  for  a  $20  tip. 

Roots  of  Political  Involvement;   Joining  the  Democratic  Party 

Rowland:   Now,  your  political  involvement  in  California,  when  did  that  begin? 

Allen:    Well,  that  began  about  1920,  I  think.  When  I  came  back  here  -  back 
to  California  -  I  came  back  from  Haiti.  See,  I  was  in  the  con 
stabulary  of  Haiti,  on  detached  duty  from  the  Marine  Corps.   So  I 

came  back  and  had  pulled  mail  guard  here  in  '21. 

Rowland:   And  where  was  this?   In  Los  Angeles? 

Allen:    Los  Angeles.  And  then  they  sent  me  over  to  be  the  Assistant 

Provost  Marshal  and  the  Provost  Marshal  got  sick  and  I  was  stuck 
with  his  job  as  well  as  mine.   Los  Angeles  County  had  a  district 
attorney  by  the  name  of  Tom  Woolwine,  probably  one  of  the  most 
fearless  men  that  ever  served  in  that  capacity  in  southern 
California  or  anywhere.   He  asked  me  to  do  a  little  moonlighting 
by  assisting  in  an  investigation.   He  was  having  some  problems 
with  a  noted  comedian  by  the  name  of  Charles  Chaplin.  What 
Woolwine  was  after  was  to  nail  this  guy,  Chaplin,  on  statutory 
rape.   The  girl,  Lita  Grey,  was  only  15  years  old  and  pregnant 
at  that  time.  The  girl's  mother  took  her  over  to  Arizona  and 
Chaplin  married  the  gal.   Some  of  these  "Movie  Mothers"  would 
never  win  a  Mother's  Day  award  from  me. 

Lita  was  the  mother  of  Chaplin's  oldest  sons.  Upon  being  married, 
the  district  attorney  dropped  further  investigation  and  I  had  made 
a  valued  and  lasting  friend  in  Tom  Woolwine. 

But  anyhow,  I  happened  to  be  a  firm  believer  that  good  government 
knows  no  party  lines.   You  have  to  register  some  way  -  Republican, 
Democrat  and  non-partisan,  but  I've  always  fancied  myself  more  of 
a  chosen  disciple  of  Jefferson.  The  basic  philosophy  of  Jefferson, 
that  a  public  servant  is  one  who  serves  the  people  and  does  not 
rule  them.  Another,  of  course,  is  his  "Those  who  are  the  least 
governed  — " 

Rowland:   are  governed  the  best,  you  mean? 

Allen:    That's  right.  Are  governed  best.  A  public  servant  serves  the 
people,  not  rules  them.   So  I  got  appointed  to  the  Democratic 


convention  here  in  '20,  when  you  could  have  held  it  up  here  in 
Sacramento  in  a  telephone  booth. 

Rowland:   Did  your  family  have  a  history  of  association  with  the  Democratic 
party,  or  at  least  voting  Democratic? 

Allen:    Well,  my  mother's  folks  were  all  Republican.  My  dad  was  the  only 
one  out  of  the  family  that  was  a  Democrat.   His  brother,  Henry, 
was  governor  of  Kansas  and  United  States  Senator  -  Republican. 
Wait  a  minute.   I  don't  mean  to  call  him  "Uncle  Henry."  Hell, 
he  was  a  cousin  of  my  father's.  What  am  I  talking  about? 
So  anyway,  now  we're  up  past  1920.  During  that  time,  of  course, 
I  pulled  duty  in  China.   Then  I  got  bounced  down  into  the  second 
Nicaraguan  campaign,  and  I  got  banged  up  a  little  down  there  when 
I  was  in  the  Guardia  Nacional  Constabulary  Service.  We  Marines 
were  assigned  to  training  and  providing  emergency  services  such 
as  fire  and  police,  train  their  militia  and  conduct  the  1930 

And  incidentally,  I  knew  the  grandfather  of  this  President  Somoza 
that's  in  trouble.   I  was  one  of  his  tutors  in  infantry  weapons 
at  the  military  "colegio,"  College  of  Nicaragua. 
I  was  acting  Chief  Surveyor  in  practically  all  of  the  principal 
cities  and  villages  of  that  Republic.   It  was  in  this  country  I 
was  introduced  to  civil  government  again.   I  was  stationed  in 
some  of  these  places  that  you  see  that  the  TV  newscasters  cannot 
pronounce,  like  Estelli.  They  say  Estelly,  but  it's  Estill  Lee. 
During  1934,  the  16  years  veteran  incumbent  of  the  63rd  Assembly 
District,  the  late  Honorable  Willard  F.  Badham  (grand  uncle  of 
the  present  Orange  County  Congressman,  Bob  Badham)  lived  across 
the  street  from  me.   He  said  it  looked  like  he  was  going  to  be 

defeated  because  he  was  a  Republican,  and  the  Democrats,  under 
Roosevelt,  were  riding  high.   So  he  wanted  me  to  run. 

Rowland:   This  ia  in  Los  Angeles. 

Allen:    In  Los  Angeles  in  '34,  and  I  said  no,  I  wouldn't  as  I'd  been 

around  too  much  politics,  and  I  had  seen  all  and  wanted  none  of 

it.   So  I  refused.  At  that  time,  I  was  active  in  the  Veterans 

of  Foreign  Wars  down  there.   I  was  commander  of  a  post  and  so 


A  fellow  by  the  name  of  Ralph  L.  Welsh  did  beat  Badhara,  and  then 

Welsh  almost  got  licked  on  his  next  time  up.   So,  the  business 

people  came  to  me  again,  including  Welsh,  and  it  was  not  the  first  time 

that  the  Republicans  and  Democrats  joined  forces.   In  those  days 

we  had  cross-filing.  As  a  result  I  was  elected  on  both  tickets  , 

and  for  several  terms  thereafter  was  unopposed  . 


Struggles  with  the  State  Relief  Administration 

Allen:    I  came  up  here  (Sacramento)  and  all  hell  broke  loose  between  Culbert 
Olson  and  myself.  Unfortunately,  in  my  opinion,  the  voters  had  put 
a  round  peg  in  a  square  hole  and  a  square  peg  in  a  round  hole  when 
they  elected  Culbert  Olson  as  governor.   He  was  a  senator;  he  was 
more  of  a  legislator.  Moat  of  this  woe  and  grief  was  woven  by  some 
of  the  "Palace  Guards"  he  surrounded  himself  with.  Watergate  was 
not  the  first  bugging  event  that  was  engineered  by  public  officers 
and  employees. 

A  "goon"  that  had  been  trained  in  Germany  was  a  "wire  man"  or 
"bugman."   By  aides  in  Governor  Olson's  office  all  of  us  legislators 

were  bugged  without  regards  to  friend  or  foe  of  the  governor. 

(without  his  knowledge) 
Speaker  Gordon  Garland  had  several  of  them  planted  An  his  hotel  rooms 


and  one  in  a  niost  despicable  manner  in.  his  bedroom. 
Rowland:   Did  he  want  to  act  autonomously  of  the  legislature? 

Allen:    Well,  he  wanted  his  own  way.  That's  all  there  was  to  it.  Of 

course,  he  was  the  first   ^   with  Democratic  registration  in 

forty  four  years,  and  some  of  the  "palace  guards"  that  he  sur 
rounded  himself  with  wanted  power.   He  had  one  person  that  was 
sort  of  a  salvation,  and  that's  Stanley  Mosk,  who's  a  Supreme 
Court  Justice  today,  who  was  Olson's  secretary  and  really  decent. 
But  he  had  other  cats  in  there  that  —  huh!   Oh  boy!  The  repu 
tation  was  that  they  would  steal  Christ  off  the  cross  and  go  back 
and  get  the  nails. 

Rowland:   The  battle  with  Olson  was  primarily  over  the  State  Relief  Admini 
stration,  wasn't  it? 

started  < 

Allen:    It  really  *^  with  Olson's  breakdown.  Almost  a  week  before  the 

day  Olson  was  inaugurated  his  people  had  loaded  him  with  so  many 
details  and  in  order  to  keep  him  going,  various  types  of  drugs 
were  administered  without  proper  medical  supervision.  These  drugs 
were  given  to  him  by  an  attendant  of  the  governor's  oldest  son  and 
his  executive  secretary  -  a  real  wacko.   Olson  required  an  attendant 
around  the  clock.  The  breakdown  took  place  at  the  old  fairgrounds 
during  the  state  police  of ficers' barbecue. 

It  is  well  to  recall  he  inherited  the  State  Relief  Administration  - 
a  real  can  of  worms.  With  it,  tremendous  pressure  by  his  staff 
and  job  seekers  to  continue  its  operation  as  Gov.  Merrian  had  done. 
The  damndest  patronage  bureau  ever  seen  before  or  since  in  this 
state.  To  enlarge  its  scope  they  attempted  to  have  bills  introduced 


to  declare  relief  a  matter  of  right  without  question.   By  doing 
away  with  the  declared  purpose  in  the  law.   "Public  Relief  was 
a  matter  of  public  safety  of  citizens  who  were  in  dire  need  and 
destitution  due  to  unemployment  and  other  circumstances  not  due 
to  their  own  misconduct." 

When  we  hired  Rollin  Vandergrift,  a  noted  economist  and  the 
second  Director  of  Finance  in  the  states  history,  he  found  a 
fantastic  and  disgraceful  cost  out  of  every  dollar  appropriated. 
Due  to  some  of  the  frills  only  38  cents  out  of  the  dollar  reached 
down  to  those  who  needed  it. 

It  is  well  to  remember  the  governor  and  legislature  had  inherited 
•  $36  million  deficit. 

They  had  a  gang  in  there  that  had  these  relief  people  organized, 
and  against  their  wishes  in  the  main  the  organizers  were  even 
taking  the  bread  and  butter  right  off  these  poor  devils'  tables. 
Rowland:   Are  you  referring  to  the  alleged  Communist  union  groups  that  were  -- 
Allen:    Vell,  it  was  a  sort  of  a  group  of  high  binding  fakers  -  leaches. 

Rowland:   Workers'  Alliance? 

Allen:    That's  right/  the  SCMWA  [pronounces  it  "scum-wa"  ],  the  State, 

County  and  Municipal  Workers  of  America  and  so  forth  and  so  on. 
But  those  guys  were  --  hell,  they  weren't  Communists.  Those  guys 
were  freebooters.  As  far  as  I'm  concerned,  I  mean  their  philosophy 
they  may  have  espoused  the  philosophy  of  the  Communists,  but  those 
guys  were  in  there,  you  know,  to  get  what  they  could  get.  They  had 
those  relief  recipients  baking  cakes  with  the  free  flour  and  other 
ingredients  that  was  being  given  to  them.  The  so  called  union 
organizers  which  the  A.F.L.  and  C.I.O.  disowned  were  making  these 
people  come  to  them  in  different  meetings  and  bring  these  cakes, 


and  they'd  sell  them  and  so  on  and  so  on,  and  the  so  called  SCMWA 
leaders  would  pocket  the  money.  They  were  robbing  these  people. 
These  people  were  hungry.  They  wanted  jobs.  Most  of  the  people 
on  relief  were  respectable  people,  and  they  found  it  an  ordeal, 
a  shock  to  their  system.   Hell,  they'd  always  worked  for  a  living 
and  would  love  to  go  ahead  if  work  for  them  could  be  provided. 

Rowland:   Now,  those  early  years  of  the  legislature,  there  were  some  in 
dividuals  in  there  who  became  prominent  later  on  in  the  Goodwin 
Knight  -  Pat  Brown  years,  and  one  of  them  was  Hugh  Burns. 

Allen:    That's  right. 

Rowland:   You  remember  Hugh  Burns? 

Allen:    Yes,  I  do. 

Rowland:   As  a  freshman  assemblyman  he  probably  came  in  the  same  time  as  you. 

Allen:    No,  Hugh  was  in  one  term  before  I  came  in.   He  was  elected  in  1936 
and  I  in  1938. 

Rowland:   1936  I  think  he  came  in. 

Allen:    Or  '36.  Yes,  he  was  here  (Sacramento)  two  ahead  of  me.   He  was  an 

Rowland:  What  do  you  remember  about  Hugh  in  those  early  years?  Was  he  a 
liberal  Democrat,  or 

Allen:    No,  at  that  time  he  was  feeling  his  way  along.  And  he  wasn't  a  guy 
that  liked  to  shake  things  up.   He  was  a  sort  of  wit  and  sort  of 
a  Will  Rogers  type  of  a  guy,  but  he  wasn't  about  ready  to  shake 
things  up.   It  wasn't  until  later  — 

Rowland:   Do  you  remember  him  being  a  particularly  ambitious  freshman  assem 

Allen:    He  would  work,  but  he  wasn't  an  eager  beaver.   He  was  one  of  these 
kind  of  mature  people,  had  been  a  businessman  down  in  Fresno  that 


got  swept  up  in  this  thing  called  politics.   Hugh  was  never  a 
liberal.   He  was  never  an  ultra-conservative  until  later  years. 
He  didn't  get  into  this  un-american  activities  committee  until 
Yorty  had  got  with  it  and  dropped  it.  And  Hugh  —  I  think  that 
many  people,  even  the  liberals,  had  respect  for  Hugh  because  he 
was  honest  and  he  was  fair. 

The  Un-American  Activities  Committee;   Prinicipal  Personalities 

Rowland:   Do  you  remember  the  un-american  activities  committee? 

Allen:    Oh,  do  I.   I  will  never  forget  the  night  that  Sam  Yorty  and  Jack 
Tenney  came  by  my  house  and  asked  for  me  to  intercede  for  them 
with  the  other  assembly  leaders.  They  wanted  to  organize  a  little 
Dies  committee  and  investigate  un-american  activities  in  Calif 
ornia,   as  Sam  and  Jack  had  been  identified  as  ultra  liberals. 
Loading  the  committee  with  conservative  members  they  received 
their  wish.  Most  everyone  of  their  meetings  were  the  funniest 
sessions  ever  held. 

For  instance  -  either  Jack  or  Sam  would  ask  a  witness  if  he  had 
attended  a  meeting  on  a  certain  night  that  could  be  charged  as 
being  Communistic  inclined.  The  witness  would  reply,  "I  remember 
it  well  because  you  were  the  principal  speaker."   I  must  add  those 
two  really  went  to  work  on  that  subject.  A  former  member  of  that 
committee  said,  "I  am  ready  to  believe  a  leopard  can  change  its 
spots."  Once  these  dudes  were  described  as  being  red  as  a  fire 
truck  and  twice  as  loud  about  it. 

Rowland:   Do  you  remember  Richard  E.  Combs? 

Allen:    Yes,  I  remember  Combs  very  well.   Combs  was  an  investigator  and 


you  wouldn't  interfere  with  him.  As  a 

member  of  the  legislature,  you  could  go  to  him  and  he  would  give 
you  limited  information.   But  in  the  meantime,  if  you  had  in 
formation,  you  gave  it  to  Combs.   Now,  Combs  operated  out  of  a 
home  up  here.   I  forget  where  it  was. 

Rowland:   In  Three  Rivers,  California. 

Allen:    And  he  was  a  guy  that  played  them  real  close  up  to  the  vest.   You 
never  knew  what  was  going  to  happen. 

Rowland:   Was  he  a  very  secretive  man?   I've  heard  various  reports  on  that. 
I  mean,  I  never  met  him. 

Allen:    Oh,  yes.   He  was  outgoing  for  various  sundry  things,  but  when  it 
came  to  this  other  business  of  his,  he  was  very  secretive.   He 
once  impressed  me  by  saying,  "Well,  you  know,  you've  got  to  move 
slow  in  a  case  like  this.   The  lives  of  many  people  have  been 
blasted  by  thoughtless  and  unkind  and  untrue  things.   I  don't 
want  to  destroy  any  man  or  woman,  if  in  my  power  to  prevent  it." 
He  told  me  that  one  time,  in  a  sense,  he  could  be  a  tough  cookie.  ;':! 

Rowland:   —  interesting  period.   I  had  done  my  master's  thesis  on  the  Burns 
Committee  and  did  quite  a  bit  of  research  and  had  interviewed  Burns. 
I  wanted  to  interview  Richard  Combs,  Dut  he  didn't  want  to  sit 
down  and  talk  about  it. 

Allen:    No,  he  wouldn't. 

Rowland:   He  wanted  to  put  it  all  behind  him. 

Allen:    But  you  see,  here's  a  funny  thing  how  that  thing  got  started. 

Rowland:   The  Tenney  Committee,  in  1941? 

Allen:    Yorty  started  it,  and  Tenney  too.   Yorty  had  had  some  sort  of  a 

break  with  the  governor,  and  I  don't  wonder,  because  this  governor 
Olson  had  guys  going  around  to  blackmail  you,  or  as  some  believe, 


Sam  got  «ore  at  the  liberal  elements  including  Gov.  Olson  for 
endorsing  another  person  for  Congress  in  the  1940  elections. 
California  had  gained  new  seats  due  to  the  1940  census  and  a 
quick  certification. 

This  was  at  the  time  Russia  and  Germany  were  allies.  The  liberals 
being  anti-British.  Their  slogan  was  "The  Yanks  are  not  coaming. 
One  red  drop  of  a  young  Americans  blood  is  more  valuable  than  all 
of  Europe."  This  appeared  on  their  candidates  bill  boards.  Much 
later  to  be  changed  to  we  demand  a  second  front  now  when  Germany 
gave  Russia  the  shaft. 

So  some  bill  boards  in  the  district  read  "Isolation  has  failed  - 
stop  Hitler  now  -  elect  Sam  Yorty  to  the  House  of  Representatives." 
This  was  the  pro-British  candidates  answer.  When  war  broke  out, 
Sam  answered  the  call. 

Rowland:   Tell  us  more  about  the  bugging  of  Gordon  Garland. 

Allen:    Oh  yes,  yes.  Garland  was  not  the  only  one  bugged.  And  another 

thing.   The  governor's  son,  "Dickie  Babe"  came  to  me  one  time  and 

invited  me  to  the  corner  office.  The  governor  said,  "What  if  your 

wife  would  find  out  from  us  that  you  were  over  here  with  a  — — , 

what  would  she  say  if  she  found  out  you  were  over  here  in  a  motel 

with  a  woman,  having  illicit  relations  with  her?" 

I  said,  "My  wife?  That  little  Dutchman  of  mine  would  probably  say, 

"Oh,  that  poor  thing." 

And  I  said,  "Now,  you  old  son  of  a  bitch,  if  you  think  you're  going 

to  pull  something  on  me  like  you  pulled  on  another  member  of  the 

legislature,  I'm  going  to  make  you  have  to  take  your  — - ." 

Rowland:   This  is  Yorty  you're  talking  to? 

Allen:    I'm  talking  to  the  governor  now! 


I  said,  "I'll  make  you  take  off  your  shirt  to  use  the  bathroom, 
because  I'll  kick  your  ass  clear  up  around  your  ears."  See,  I 
was  just  out  of  the  Marine  Corps  and  out  of  the  engineering  field, 
and  I  didn't  care  about  being  up  here  (Sacramento).  There  was 
nobody  going  to  push  me  around.   I  weighed  245  pounds,  and  I  was 
in  damn  good  health. 

Now,  Hugh  Burns  will  tell  you,  if  you  ever  talk  to  him,  you  might 
ask  him  about  the  little  dissertation  that  I  unloaded  on  the 
governor  one  night  when  he  called  me  a  son  of  a  bitch.   I  just 
curled  his  hair. 

Founding  the  Economy  Block 

Rowland:   Was  Hugh  part  of  that  "economy  block?" 

Allen:    No,  he  wasn't  part  of  the  "economy  block."  He  wasn't  with  it,  and 
he  wasn't  against  us.  The  "economy  block"  was  founded  by  sheer 
accident.   It  should  be  remembered  that  although  the  civil  service 
had  recently  been  placed  into  the  State  Constitution.   Bills  to 
augment  the  measure  had  not  been  passed  by  the  legislature.   Some 
of  the  department  heads  were  seeking  some  gimmick  which  would 
freeze  them  into  their  positions. 

They  came  up  with  the  idea  of  putting  Governor  Olson  on  the  spot 
and  then  siding  with  the  legislature.  Their  method  was  to  help  him 
by  making  up  the  two  year  budget.  They  did  and  he  delivered  a 
budget  that  not  only  had  a  deficit  of  36  million,  but  one  that 
showed  an  85  million  dollar  deficit.  Also,  in  order  to  insure 
their  little  scheme,  they  would  inject  partisan  politics  into  the 
It  must  be  recalled  that  the  state  budget  was  adopted  every  two 


years.  The  turning  point  came  in  1948  when  Gov.  Earl  Warren 

faced  the  prospect  of  a  billion  dollar  budget.   Before  his  term 

ended  in  1950,  he  invented  the  yearly  budget.  This  gave  the 

appearance  of  cutting  state  spending  in  half.   He  got  away  with 


When  Gov.  Hiram  Johnson  gave  the  people  of  the  state  the  vehicle 

for  clean  government  non-partisanships,  the  early  legislators 

adopted  that  premise  in  their  deliberations.  Those  bungling 

bureaucrats  thought/    could  obtain  the  services  of  Assemblyman 

C.  Don  Field  to  set  up  in  a  sub  j-osa  Fashion  such  a  partisan 
move,  because  Don  Field,  through  his  fourteen  years,  was  a  most 
respected  member. 

Rowland:   What  was  he  active  in? 

Allen:    He  was  without  doubt  one  of  the  most  active  members  of  the 
Assembly.   Also  the  most  productive  in  legislative  matters. 

Rowland:   He  was  an  assemblyman? 

Allen:    Yes.  And  some  of  the  Republican  party  bureaucrats  were  putting 
the  pressure  on  him  to  become  'Mr.  Republican'  in  the  assembly, 
in  an  undercover  manner,  and  he  wouldn't  do  it.  Don  Field  was 
never  one  to  break  the  faith. 

Rowland:   Now,  he  was  the  head  of  the  transportation  committee,  you  said? 

Allen:    No,  he  had  a  transportation  firm  of  his  own.   He's  dead  now. 
With  two  exceptions,  the  whole  Field  family  died  young. 
The  late  Assemblywoman  Jeanette  Daley  of  San  Diego,  Assemblyman 
Seth  Millington  of  Gridley,  deceased,  and  myself  were  having  dinner 
at  the  Old  Sacramento  Hotel.  A  young  messenger  brought  a  package 
to  the  table.   It  had  only  one  name  on  it  -  'Don1. 
While  waiting  for  our  food  I  opened  the  package  or  large  envelope 


and  looked  over  the  contents.  They  contained  a  transmittal 
letter  showing  a  part  of  the  conspiracy  to  raise  the  budget  and 
kick  the  governor  in  the  teeth. 

The  late  Judge  Ben  Rosenthal ,  then  assemblyman  from  Los  Angeles, 
and  his  wife  were  setting  at  the  next  table.   He  was  chairman  of 
the  Assembly  Ways  and  Means  Committee.  After  careful  examination 
Ben  said,  "My  God,  this  is  terrible.   I  am  glad  they  mistook  you 

Just  then  Don  Field  and  his  wife  came  in.  We  invited  them  to 
share  the  table  with  us  and  showed  him  the  material.   Just  about 
this  time  the  same  messenger  came  in  handing  me  another  package. 
This  is  the  balance  of  the  material  for  you  Mr.  Field.  We  ate  our 
dinner,  received  permission  to  use  a  conference  room  and  preceded 
to  call  other  legislators.  We  did  not  have  many  as  this  being 
around  eight  p.m.  many  were  in  committee.  After  going  over  the 
documents,  President  pro  tern  of  the  Senate  turned  to  Senator  Tony 
DeLapp,  Chairman,  Senate  Finance  Committee  and  said,  "Why  these 
bastards  have  been  pulling  the  wool  over  our  eyes  all  these  years. 
I  suggest  that  you  registered  Democrats  take  this  over  to  the 
governor  and  tell  him  he  will  have  our  full  cooperation  to  clean 
house  on  these  S.O.B.'s." 

So  we  went  over  to  see  the  governor,  and  I  guess  the  governor 
was  engaged  in  some  of  his  extra-curricular  deals.   He  was  in  a 
foul  mood.  You  know,  they  said  that  one  time  they  took  a  blood 
test  and  they  found  out  he  could've  been  Erroll  Flynn's  father 
and  so  forth  and  so  on.   But  this  guy  likad  his  ladies. 

Rowland:   Olson? 

Allen:    Olson,  yes.  According  to  the  grapevine  around  Sacramento  he  treated 


his  wife  shabbily.  And  of  course,  as  you  know,  he  was  an  avowed 
atheist.   Later  the  public  found  that  out  when  he  appeared  before 
a  committee  against  a  measure  using  in  "God  We  Trust"  introduced 
by  Assemblyman  tfiiliam  Bonelli.  But  I  knew  he  was  an  atheist. 
Senator  King,  from  Utah,  told  me  that  his  cousin  ,  Culbert,  was 
an  atheist.  If  you  go  back  to  the  1939  Assembly  Journal  you'll  find  a 
communication  the  governor  sent  to  a  fellow  Jeff  Kibers  who  was  a 
Olson  hatchet  man.   He  instructed  Kibers  to  clean  out  (Jeff  was 
supposed  to  be  a  Commie)  the  holdovers  in  the  State  Relief 
Administration,  the  experts  like  Lanigan  and  Slattery  and  Jinny 
Reese  and  two  others. 

Rowland:   "Clean  them  out"  in  what  sense? 

Allen:    Oh,  get  them  out  of  the  S.R.A.  because  Olson  said  in  his  letter 
that  these  Catholic  kids,  they  have  their  philosophy  and  they 
won't  stand  for  our  philosophy,  because  of  the  Catholic  Church. 
We  had  a  hell  of  a  time  on  the  floor  on  that  one.  Asserablyman- 
Dr.  Jesse  Randolph  Kellums,  a  great  evangilist  and  high  in  the 
Church  of  Christ  and  a  Republican  and  my  minister  went  to 
Catholic  legislators  like  Eddie  O'Day,  Gallagher,  Maloney  and 
others  and  said,  "Now,  just  cool  it.  We're  going  to  take  care  of 
this  Olson."  And  boy,  we  did. 

Following  Bill  Riche's  suggestion,  Jeanette  Daley,  Ben  Rosenthal , 
Seth  Millington  and  I  went  down  to  the  governor's  office  to  see 
Olson.   He  was  anything  but  cordial.   He  was  arrogant,  belligerent 
and  egotistical  enough  to  believe  his  budget  was  perfect.   He 
called  Jeanette  Daley  a  "meddling  old  menopause  Minnie."  Jeanette 
had  been  around  construction  work  and  could  handle  the  same  kind 
of  profanity,  as  I  did,  very  beautifully.  Then  he  turned  his 


anger  on  me  and  the  two  of  us  started  cussing  him  and  we  really 
told  him  off.  We  told  him  what  we  had  done  so  he  would  not  back 
up  and  he  told  Ben  Rosenthal,  "You're  not  going  to  let  them  change 
a  God  damn  comma  in  that  thing  (the  budget)."  And  the  old  man 
said,  "Did  you  ever  see  anything  in  the  legislative  halls  like 
that?  Where  party  turncoats  would  go  against  their  party  leader?" 
I  said,  "Did  you  ever  see  horseshit  in  a  garage?"  That  was  my 
parting  shot  at  the  governor.  We  went  out  of  there. 
We  were  at  that  time,  by  the  way,  $36  million  in  the  red,  and 

operating  the  state  on  about  $220  million  a  year.   I  had  believed 


Gov.  Olson.   He  asked  me  when  we  ^  running  to  be  the  chairman  of 

a  committee  -  to  obtain  competent  advisors  on  the  budget.   I 
showed  him  the  fiscal  study  by  two  reknown  actuaries  which  was 
given  me.   He  appeared  to  be  pleased  and  greatly  impressed  with  it. 
I  said,  "by  the  way,  Governor,  if  I  were  you,  I  would  open  my  re 
marks,  'Here  is  the  fiscal  fiction  of  the  year,  the  biannual  fiscal 
fiction,  which  is  called  the  governor's  budget,  but  it's  just  a 
compilation  of  figures  by  department  heads,  and  I  would  suggest  you 
legislators  go  into  them  and  dig  them  a  little  bit  deeper'" 
Now,  I  took  that  same  position  with  the  senate,  which  he  did.   He 
said,  "That's  fine.  That's  fine."   But  his  Palace  Guard  (staff) 
got  to  the  old  man,  they  were  giving  him  goof  balls  to  keep  him 
awake,  and  they  were  giving  him  nembutol  at  night  and  boozing  him 
up  to  get  him  to  sleep.  The  old  man  just  wasn't  himself.   I  mean, 
these  guys  were  acting  without  medical  advice.  These  Palace  Guard 
clowns  almost  killed  Gov.  Olson.   This  became  known  when  he 
collapsed  at  the  Peace  Officer's  event. 
Rowland:   Olson,  you  mean. 


Allen:    Oh,  yes.   He  took  a  dive  -  passed  out  -  at  the  state  fair  grounds 
where  the  peace  officers  had  a  traditional  barbecue  up  here 
(Sacramento)  for  fifty  years  or  more  for  the  incoming  governors. 
And  so  the  old  man  took  the  occasion  of  the  Peace  Officers 
Association  party  to  spring  Tom  Mooney  and  Billings. 
And  that  was  about  like  taking  the  East  Side  rapist  out  here 
(Sacramento)  and  introducing  him  to  all  of  his  victims  at  a 
breakfast  in  his  honor.   So  anyway,  that  was  one  of  the  deals. 
So  with  the  governor  being  incapacitated  but  present  in  the 
state  and  the  scuffle  in  the  governor's  office  for  power,  it  was 
opportune   for  bipartisan  members  of  the  legislature  to  get 
together.   Jeanette  Daley,  Seth  Millington,  Gordon  Garland  and 
myself  first  approached  the  41  registered  Democrats  of  the 
assembly.   Six  others  -  Hon.  Clinton  Fulcher,  Chester  Gannon, 
Earl  Desmond,  Clyde  Watson,  Rodney  Turner  and  Ernest  0.  Voigt 
responded.  Gordon  Garland  and  myself  are  the  surviving  two  of 
the  10.  The  36  Itepublicans  joined  with  the  10  Democrats. 
During  the  1939  session,  and  by  holding  out,  we  line  itemed  the 
budget  limiting  expenditures  for  that  year. 

At  the  extraordinary  session,  which  convened  January  29,  1940, 
and  adjourned  sine  die  313  days  later,  the  coalition  of  10 
Democrats  and  thirty  six  Republicans  elected  the  Hon.  Gordon 
Garland  [Tulare  Rancher]  Speaker.  The  Republicans  insisted  the 
10  Democrats  furnish  the  leadership.  We  prevailed  on  them  to 
allow  the  assembly  to  return  to  the  premise  of  the  noa-partisan 
way  --the  same  as  the  senate.  The  Hon.  Gardiner  Johnson  was 
elected  Speaker  pro  temoore . 
The  assembly  rapidly  reorganized  the  54  committees  with  some 


chairmanship  changes.  Task  forces  probed  into  every  department 
and  function  of  state  government.  The  State  Employment  Depart 
ment  was  ordered  to  find  jobs  for  the  employables  on  relief.  The 
direct  dole  was  markedly  cut  down  through  this  method  and  the  people 
were  happier.  Two  minor,  but  historic,  items  bears  retelling  at 
this  point.  There  was  noted  a  item  titled  "misc. "in  the  budget  of 
some  $300,000  yearly.   It  was  an  accumulation  of  interest  on  state 
warrants  issued  by  the  legislature  during  the  first  sessions  in 
1849.  The  original  total  principal  was  in  the  $20,000  range.  Among 
these  warrants  was  one  for  a  Rock  of  California  Granite  -  now  at  the 
200  ft  level  of  the  Washington  Monument.  The  warrants  went  on 
immediate  call  and  were  finally  paid  off  in  1946.  Thus  after  some 
90  years  the  rock  in  the  Washington  Monument  was  paid  for.  The 
total  cost  -  nineteen  thousand  plus.   I  will  pay  $20,000  for  three 
hundred  thousand  anytime. 

The  other  is  an  example  of  squander  by  open  purchase  without  control. 
One  of  our  committees  found  S.R.A.  had  purchased  over  a  quarter  of 
a  million  surplus  blankets  from  an  army  navy  surplus  vendor  for  a 
single  mens  camp  system  that  had  displaced  less  than  100  men  - 
keeping  them  in  rural  out-of-the-way  places  away  from  job  opportunities 
in  private  employment. 

The  committee  found  several  of  such  purchases  in  process,  amounting 
to  well  over  two  million  dollars.   They  were  brought  to  a  screeching 
halt.  Measures  were  taken  to  buy  all  items  through  the  State  Pur 
chasing  Agent. 

It  was  thru  the  diligent  work  of  the  legislative  task  forces  that 
the  deficit  was  eradicated  and  the  budget  showed  a  surplus  on  June 
30,  1941.  That  is  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  economy  bloc  of  1939 
to  1941. 



Background  to  Senate  Reapportionment 

Rowland:   Should  we  return  to  reapportionment? 

Allen:   But  in  getting  back  to  reapportionment,  Jess  Unruh  came  to  me 

and  he  said,  "Look, you  were  back  East  to  the  Conference  of  Mayors 
and  Councilmen.   How  serious  does  this  matter  of  legislative 
representation  look?  When  you  were  city  councilman  I  understand 
that  at  the  1947  convention  of  the  National  League  of  Cities 
there  was  just  a  hell  of  a  lot  of  dissention  and  law  suits 
being  contemplated." 

It  wasn't  just  dissention.   It  was  real  open  rebellion  by  the 
various  state  legislatures  on  account  of  this  limitation  on 
present  apportionment.   But  I  told  him  that  I  thought  Reynolds 
versus  Sims  was  the  one  case  that  alerted  him  and  other  California 
legislators  the  most. 

Rowland:   Now,  when  did  you  first  hear  of  a  move  to  reapportion  the 

state  senate?  Was  that  during  the  Bonelli  initiative  in  1959? 

Allen:   Oh,  no,  no,  no.   The  first  time  I  heard  it  was  in  1941  by 

Mayor  Fletcher  Bowron,  Mayor  of  Los  Angeles.  He  was  red  hot  about  it, 
Where  it  came  up  was  at  the  League  of  Cities  at  Miami,  Florida. 


at  the  national  convention  down  there.   Each  annual  convention 
delegates  brought  that  subject  matter  up  while  I  was  representing 
the  City  of  Los  Angeles.   I  was  chairman  of  the  finance  committee 
for  the  Los  Angeles  City  Council  then.  This  was  1944-45  and  we 
heard  many  speakers  speak  on  that  matter.  There  was  a  drum  fire 
of  discontentment  at  each  league  meeting  thereafter  and  it  was 

Rowland:   In  1945? 

Allen:    Oh,  yes,  and  earlier. 

Rowland:   And  they  were  speaking  about  the  California  Senate  and  other  — 

Allen:    Oh,  the  other  states.   No,  no,  not  only  California,  they  were 

talking  about  the  very  thing  nationwide.   You  see,  Baker  was  not 
a  Californian  (Baker  v.  Carr.  Tennessee)  (Gray  v.  Sanders  and 
Reynold  v.  Sims  -  both  Georgia). 

Rowland:   Right.  They  were  talking  about  the  state  legislatures  being 
reapportioned  by  arbitrary  designations. 

Allen:    Per  se.   Right.   So  I  came  back,  and  of  course  Mayor  Bowron,  he 
was  one  of  the  early  advocates  of  this  as  well  as  Sam  Yorty  of 
Los  Angeles. 

Rowland:   Who  was  he? 

Allen:    Mayor  Bowron,  Fletcher  Bowron  was  mayor  of  the  City  of  Los  Angeles. 
He  used  to  get  into  fights  with  the  power  structure  of  the  senate, 
Ralph  Swing  and  all  of  those  guys.   You  know,  somebody  wrote  a 
song,  "It  don't  mean  a  thing  if  you  ain't  got  that  swing,"  and  that 
really  set  right  with  Ralph  Swing.   He  was  probably  one  of  the  most 
productive  legislators  I've  ever  seen  in  my  life. 

Ralph  Swing,  from  San  Bernardino  was  probably  one  of  the  "gifted  ones. 
You  know,  if  you  went  home  some  night,  and  you  thought  you  had  got 


the  best  of  him,  you  took  off  your  shoes  and  they  were  full  of 
blood,  you  juat  knew  that  old  Ralph  Swing  had  cut  your  throat. 
Well  anyhow,  getting  back  to  this  deal,  Jess  said,  "Now  this  is 
going  to  be  a  rough  hustle,  but  I've  got  to  depend  on  somebody 
that  isn't  going  to  lose  their  head."  And  he  said,  "By  the  way, 
you  just  lost  your  job  down  in  the  Los  Angeles  City  Council  to 
reapportionment."   See,  they  have  to  reapportion  down  there  every 
four  years.  That's  in  the  charter.  So  when  I  first  went  to  the 
city  council  from  the  legislature  in  1947,  we  had  eight  and  a  half 
council  districts  south  of  Washington  Boulevard,  and  then  the 
districts  began  moving.   Four  years  later  (1951)  it  was  found  that 
the  San  Fernando  Valley  was  entitled  to  only  one  district. 
However,  the  startling  rapid  growth  of  the  valley  showed  we  had 
to  move  four  districts  to  the  valley  in  1956,  and  one  of  them 
was  mine,  because  of  cutting  up  my  district  with  the  freeways  -- 
the  Olympic  and  the  Harbor  and  those  other  freeways  —  they  took 
a  hell  of  a  lot  of  people  out  of  my  district.   So  mine  was  the 
lowest,  and  this  is  what  the  court  said  it  had  to  go.   So  okay. 
Due  to  the  resignation  of  the  assemblyman  in  my  district,  I 
returned  to  the  Sacramento  scene  by  being  elected  in  the  special 
election  of  1956.   So  knowing  that,  Jess  said,  "You'll  be  in  there 
as  chairman  of  the  committee." 

Rowland:   Did  you  work  closely  with  Jess  previously?  Were  you  a  Jess  Unruh 

Allen:    Oh,  no,  no,  no,  no.  Not  an  Unruh  supporter  per  se.  I've  been  very 

independent  over  the  years.   I  was  the  guy  that  gave  him,  incidentally, 
that  "Big  Daddy"  name.   But  of  course,  that  was  after  Daddy  Warbucks. 
So  the  press  took  it  like  "The  cat  on  a  hot  tin  roof." 


So  anyway,  in  getting  back  to  this  situation,  we  sort  of  an 
ticipated  —  Bonelli,  (Frank  Bonelli,  not  William  Bonelli) 
had  taken  umbrage  with  some  treatment  that  he  had  received  at 
the  hands  of  the  senate. 

Rowland:   Paricularly  at  the  northern  or  rural  — 

Allen:    Oh  yes.   It  was  northern  senators.  And  of  course,  I  always  get 
a  kick  out  of  this,  that  they  used  to  call  the  northern  senators 
the  "cow  county  senators,"  and  would  you  believe  it?  We  had 
more  cows  in  Los  Angeles  County  at  the  time  than  they  had  in  any 
other  part  of  the  state  or  part  of  the  states  combined.  The 
Artesia,  Downey  section  down  in  Los  Angeles  County  was  the 
biggest  dairy  railkshed  in  the  world. 

But  nevertheless,  they  had  offended  Bonelli,  and  Frank  really  was 
angry.   So  when  he  became  a  member  of  the  board  of  supervisors,  he 
and  Bowron  got  together.  They  went  out,  and,  of  course,  this  Phill 
Silvers  jumped  on  board.   Phil)  —  if  you'll  go  down  and  look  the 
record  over,  he  was  always  filing  citizen  suits  against  the  city 
for  something  or  other.      If  h«  recovered  anything 
the  court  awarded  him  compensation. 

So  then,  in  1964,  that  was  when  Jess  put  me  on  the  committee.  Then 
it  was  the  understanding  --  I  took  that  committee  with  the  under 
standing  that  because  of  its  severity,  we  might  be  under  the  gun 
of  contempt  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  We  would  have  to  walk  a 
chalk  line  with  the  courts  that  there  could  be  no  funny  business 
nor  could  be  no  manipulation  like  there  was  reported  in  1960, 
which  had  its  basis  in  some  who  did  not  get  their  way. 
Now  one  other  thing  that  was  brought  up,  I  have  always  felt  like 
I  was  something  out  of  the  "Godfather."   I  was  a  hit  man  for  the 


U.S.  Supreme  Court.   I  never  enjoyed  the  job  of  reapportionment. 

Rowland:   What  do  you  mean  by  "hit  man?" 

Allen:    That  I  murdered  the  senate  for  a  while.   I  think  you'll  find  in 
here  some  article  about  my  feelings:   the  loss  of  expertise  in 
the  senate.   It  should  have  been  phased  out  over  a  given  period 
of  time. 

Rowland:   You're  talking  about  the  results  of  reapportionment,  in  the  '66 
election,  when  so  many  senators  lost  their  seats? 

Allen:    That's  right.   The  loss  of  expertise  was  tragic. 

Rowland:   Well,  going  back  to  this,  then,  what  was  your  relationship  with 
Earl  Warren?  Did  you  have  a  good  relationship  with  him,  or  was 
there  any  connection  there  between  the  Warren  court  and  the  fact 
that  you  were  accused  of  being  the  "hit  man"  of  the  senate? 

Allen:    I  was  never  accused.   It  was  my  own  thought  of  being  the  "hit  man" 
for  the  Supreme  Court.   "Hit  man"  is  the  designation  of  a  hired 
killer.  Well,  there  isn't  any  more  connection  than  the  fact  that 
when  I  served  up  here  (Sacramento)  with  Earl  Warren,  he  only  had 
one  time  he  got  a  veto,  and  that  was  when  we  needed  sewage  money 
badly.  And  I  went  to  Earl  and  I  said,  "Jesus,  Governor,  I'm  going 
to  have  to  override  your  veto.  We'll  have  to  vote  for  it  coming 
from  Southern  California.   I  can't  get  away  from  it  in  Los  Angeles." 
"Well,"  he  said,  "I  was  going  to  appoint  you  supervisor,  but  if 
you  can't  support  me,  I  can't  support  you."   I  said,  "All  right." 
Then  of  course  he  got  Don  Field.   He  knocked  Don  Field  out  of 
ever  being  lieutenant  governor  because  Field  was  the  author  of  the 
bill  and  led  the  fight  to  override  the  only  veto  Warren  ever  ex 
perienced.   But  I  showed  the  governor  he  had  the  money. 
But  he  was  too  damn  busy  going  around  creating  little  puddles 


around  the  state  where  he  could  chip  money  here  and  chip  money 
there  and  chip  money  into  these  different  areas  and  give  these 
people  assignments  that  a  lot  of  them  are  stuck  with  today  that 
they  shouldn't  have.   Years  later  Warren  would  tell  the  people 
of  Los  Angeles  and  Orange  County  how  he  had  saved  their  beaches 
and  tourist  economy  from  sewage  disposal.  Then  in  the  north 
vetoing  the  "Christmas  Tree  Bill"  as  he  called  it,  thus  pre 
serving  the  state  from  spend  thrift  acts  of  the  legislature. 
•  And  it's  just  like  him  going  from  the  biennial  session  to  the 
annual  session.   You  know  why  that  was? 

Rowland:   No.  When  was  this  done? 

Allen:    1948.  To  avoid  for  the  next  few  period  of  years  --  he  once  had 
this  gigantic  surplus,  or  "rainy  day  fund"  as  he  called  it,  that 
we  guys  had  accumulated  for  him  by  the  action  of  the  economy 
block.   He  didnrt  want  at  any  time  to  be  known  as  the  governor 
that  ushered  in  the  billion  dollar  budget  in  the  State  of 
California.  There's  your  story.   That's  the  secret  of  that  one. 
Now,  we  come  in  with  this  situation  here. 

Rowland:   So  you  didn't  necessarily  have  a  good  working  relationship  with 
Earl  Warren,  but  it  was  -- 

Allen:    I  had  a  good  working  —  I  was  on  the  War  Council  with  him.   I 

was  on  the  governor's  War  Council.  When  the  legislature  took  it 
over  from  Olson,  Warren  was  a  member  of  the  War  Council  as  the 
attorney  general.  And  he  was  caught  in  two  places  here.   He  was 
the  attorney  general,  and  he  was  the  governor's  attorney.  And 
there  were  times  when  he  couldn't  speak  out,  and  I  know  he  should 
have.   And  we  had  set  up  a  deal  to  take  the  heat  off  of  Warren 
and  I  went  back  to  Gordon  Garland, and  Ralph  Swing  went  back  to 


the  senate  and  passed  a  bill  to  accomplish  this.   You  see,  the 
lieutenant  governor  is  expressly  prohibited  from  calling  martial 
law  as  long  as  the  governor  is  in  the  state.   But  we  found  that 
a  member  of  the  legislature  could  do  that  under  a  war  powers  deal. 
So  everyone  that  belonged  to  the  War  Council  —  Jeanette  Daley 
and  myself,  Fred  Weybrett  — 

Tom  Quinn,  Ralph  Swing  --  from  the  senate  side  —  would  go  in  and  -- 
Senator  Tony  DeLap,  chairman  of  the  senate  finance  committee  for 
years,  the  other  senate  members  would  be  available  in  any  cata 
strophic  event  if  communications  with  the  governor  were  broken 
down,  but  anyhow,  we  could  go  in,  in  our  areas  of  legislative 
representation,  to  carry  out  the  requests  of  the  local  sheriff 
and  declare  martial  law  if  needed. 

When  war  broke  out,  by  the  way,  the  FBI  stepped  in  and  picked  up 
about  eight  of  the  guys  that  Olson  had  appointed  on  his  disaster 
council,  which  was  a  forerunner  of  the  war  council.  One  guy  had 
been  close  to  Benito  Mussolini,  Italian  dictator,  "II  Duce"  and 
got  awards  from  him,  and  various  other  things.  An  Olson  cabinet 
member  was  prominent  with  pro-German  views  -  the  German-American 
Bund  and  would-be  storm  troopers.   They  had  conducted  many  meetings 
of  the  Bund  during  1939-40-41.   He  had  been  a  guest  of  Hitler  at 
the  Olympic  Games  and  different  little  things  like  that.  The  FBI 
knew  their  connections.   On  Monday,  December  8,  1941,  in  an  extra 
ordinary  meeting  at  the  state  building  in  Los  Angeles,  Mrs. 

Eleanor  Roosevelt  and  Mayor/       LaGuardia  were  sent  out  by  the 

president  to  offer  any  assistance  California  would  need. 

Before  that  meeting  opened,  2  members  of  the  FBI  slipped  handcuffs 

on  the  turkey  who  had  trained  with  the  gestapo  and  had  planted  the 


dictaphone  on  speaker  Garland  under  the  supervision  of  Philbrick 
and  Charley  Henderson,  Olson  staff  members. 

Anyway,  the  FBI  turned  around  and  turned  this  over  to  —  told 
Earl  Warren  he  was  in  charge  of  all  this  activity  and  took  it 
out  of  the  hands  of  Culbert  Olson.  That  is,  they  thought  the 
attorney  general's  office  could  do  it.  And  I  told  the  FBIJ not 
under  our  state  constitution,  you  can't. 

So  they  gave  the  legislative  committee  members  the  responsibilityi 
which  in  ray  opinion  was  just  as  unconstitutional.   So  anyhow, 
Roosevelt  hated  Olson's  guts  with  a  passion,  because  he  had 
helped  defeat  his  old  buddy  of  WW  I ,  in  the  Woodrow  Wilson 
cabinet,  U.  S.  Senator  William  Gibbs  McAdoo,  who  until  his 
defeat  in  1938  was  one  of  Roosevelt's  senate  floor  leaders. 
And  Olson  had  said  some  things  about  Roosevelt  that  Roosevelt 
hadn't  forgotten.   Bang!   So  the  result  was  that  there  was  an 
issue  of  a  proclamation.   So  we  would  sit  down,  we  would  assume 
such  activities  under  presidential  war  powers,  and  the  governor 
would  try  to  crowd  out  Earl  Warren  and  who  under  state  law  is 
the  governor's  attorney.  And  I'd  speak  up  and  say,  "Look,  you're 
out  of  order.  That  isn't  the  subject  matter  which  we  are  here 
for  today.   You're  not  sticking  with  the  agenda,  Governor." 
And  then  he  and  I  would  get  into  a  fight.  And  he'd  forget  all 
about  needling  Earl  Warren.   He'd  take  it  on  me.   So,  Earl  liked 
me  pretty  well. 

Rowland:   Now,  going  back  to  the  Bonelli  initiatives  of  I960  and  '62,  why 
were  they  defeated? 

Allen:    They  were  defeated  simply  because  the  people  didn't  want  to  break 
the  word.  That's  the  word  that  I  got. 


Rowland:   "Break  the  word?" 

Allen:    Well,  that  they  had  in  1931  —  See,  they  never  had  decennial 
re apportionment  in  1920,  until  Ted  Craig,  recently  deceased, 
took  it  over  and  put  the  Craig  Bill  in  1931.   So  they  set  up 
this  federal  deal  of  senate  reapportionment,  and  they  kept  the 
old,  so-called  "federal  spook"  thing,  see. 

But  Bonelli  was  reasonable.   His  deal  was  not  to  completely 
reapportion.   It  was  based  on  a  percentage.   In  other  words, 
southern  California  would  get  more  representation,  but  it 
wouldn't  achieve  any  where  near  the  'one  man,  one  vote1 

Rowland:   I  believe,  if  my  recollection  is  correct,  that  the  first  Bonelli 
initiative  of  1960  was  to  divide  the  state  senate  representation 
by  the  Tehachapi  mountains.   You  would  have  twenty  state  senators 
from  southern  California  and  twenty  state  senators  from  northern 

Allen:    Yes.   That's  right.   His  was  a  north-south  division,  using  the 
Tehachapi  mountains,  which  we  have  always  used  for  a  division 
between  north  and  eouth. 

Rowland:   Now,  was  there  any  third  house  support  against  the  Bonelli 

initiative,  do  you  recall?  Did  key  leaders  in  the  senate  rally 
third  house  -- 

Allen:    There  was  probably  some  contributions  made,  but  they  weren't  overt 
contributions  at  all. 

Rowland:   Do  you  recall  oil,  for  instance,  getting  involved  in  the  campaign 
against  the  Bonelli  initiatives? 

Allen:    No,  I  really  don't. 

Rowland:   Standard  Oil,  from  George  Miller's  district. 

32   - 

Allen:    Well,  of  course  we  had  a  hell  of  a  big  Standard  Oil  holdings 
down  in  Los  Angeles,  far  greater  than  the  storage  tanks  that 
Senator  George  Miller  had  in  his  district.  Also  his  boyhood 
chum,  Al  Shults,  chief  legislative  counsel  for  Standard  Oil 
and  a  truly  great  lawyer  in  his  field  — 

Of  course,  you  see,  George  Miller  and  Al  Shults  were  class 
mates  —  schoolmates  together.  And  they  were  closer  than  close. 
Now  there  may  have  been  contributions  as  a  token  of  respect,  but 
by  and  large,  I  know  that  many  of  the  oil  people  stayed  away 
from  it,  for  fear  they'd  have  another  Sharkey  battle  on  their 

Rowland:   "Sharkey  battle?" 

Allen:    Yes.   You  know,  conservation. 

.  • 

Rowland:   I  don't  quite  understand  what  -- 

Allen:    Well,  the  major  oil  companies  didn't  want  to  take  out  any  of  the 
California  oil.  They  wanted  to  go  abroad  and  buy  it.  And 
several  times,  Senator  Will  R.  Sharkey  had  a  bill  on  the  —  what 
they  called  the  "Sharkey  amendment"  «  to  do  just  that,  many  years 

Then  the  major  oil  people  had  the  Atkinson  oil  bill,  similar  to 
the  Sharkey  bill,  that  the  independents  knocked  down  in  1940. 
Then  they  had  another  one  in  1956  --  as  I  used  to  say,  a  battle 
between  the  billionaires  and  the  millionaires. 

Rowland:   Ir.  1956,  proposition  4,  that  is? 

Allen:    Yes.   So  anyhow,  if  they  had,  I  would  have  noticed  it.   I  would 
have  known  it. 

Rowland:   Any  other  prominent  third  house  -- 

Allen:    None  that  I  know  of,  except  maybe  some  agricultural,  like  Clarence 


Salycr,  known  as  old  "Cyclops"  because  he  had  one  eye  -  a  large 
land  holder  and  grower  along  with  the  associated  fanners  known 
as  the  Montgomery  Street  Plow  Boys  or  Plow  Jockey's  and  others 
of  the  agriculture  crowd  did  not  want  to  lose  the  rural  power 
enjoyed  by  them  under  the  so  called  federal  system  -  always  did 
battle  against  any  changes. 

Rowland:   The  Farm  Bureau,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce? 

Allen:    Well,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  didn't  want  anybody  rocking  their 
boat.   I  would  have  to  go  back  and  look  at  the  people  who  wrote 
the  arguments,  and  then  I  could  tell  you.   I  had  all  of  that  at 
one  time  under  study.   I  think  I  carry  some  of  it  here  in  my 
book,  too. 

Rowland:   That's  the  Legislative  Source  Book. 

Allen:    Yes.   So  anyhow,  in  getting  back  'to  this  situation,  then  the  next 
attempt  that  came  up,  Bonelli  had  a  kind  of  a  fixed  formula,  if 
you'll  remember. 

Rowland:   It  was  three  additional  state  senators  from  Los  Angeles  and  an 
extra  one  from  San  Diego  -- 

Allen:    And  one  from  San  Francisco. 

Rowland:   And  one  from  San  Francisco,  yes.  The  Wellman  Commission  came 

after  that.  What  was  the  reaction  to  Pat  Brown's  all  of  a  sudden 
involvement  with  legislative  matters  and  senate  affairs?  Did  the 
assemblymen  like  yourself  welcome  Pat  Brown  getting  involved  in  ~ 

Allen:    No,  I'll  tell  you  what  it  was.   Pat  Brown  wouldn't  go  to  the 

bathroom  unless  he  called  Earl  Warren  and  got  permission.  And 
you  might  just  as  well  know,  right  now,  that  Earl  Warren,  as  a 
U.S.  Supreme  Court  Justice,  still  fingered  this  state.   Look,  Pat 
Brown  was  to  Earl  Warren  what  Charley  McCarthy  was  to  Edgar  Bergen, 

Rowland:   Or  what  Artie  Samish  was  to  the  -- 

Allen:    Artie  Samish  was  a  fourteen  karat  faker.   I  read  his  book,  and  I 


can  show  you  a  hundred  and  seventy-one  discrepancies.  Gardner 

Johnson,  who's  a  good  historian  and  past  president  of  the  State 
Historical  Society  and  a  former  member  of  the  legislature  and  a 
tremendous  lawyer,  will  point  out  to  you  better  than  two  to  three 
hundred  instances  where  Artie  Samish  was  a  downright  liar.   He 
was  the  biggest  fake  I  have  ever  seen  in  my  life.   The  only 
difference  between  him  and  this  guy  Jim  Jones  is  that  he  just 
didn't  feed  anybody  strichnine  and  Kool-Aid.   But  Samish  had  some 
of  these  guys  mesmerized  around  here  that  he  was  the  power  of 
California.   M 

Rowland:   But  getting  back  to  Earl  Warren  and  Pat  Brown  -- 

Allen:    And  to  get  back  to  Artie  Samish,  Artie  Samish  was  a  faker  in  this 
respect  —  I  documented  twenty  eight  measures  that  Art  Samish  was 
defeated  on.  One  of  them  happened  to  be  the  one  that  Jeanette 
Daley  pinned  his  ears  back,  and  we  skipped  rope  with  it.   It  was 
the  Yountville  Veterans'  Home  and  the  dam  at  Yountville. 
She  laid  it  into  him  like  Willie  Mays  would  lay  into  a  home  run. 
And  then  Gardner  Johnson  —  there  was  many  bills  that  Gardner 
Johnson  beat  him  on.  As  egotistical  as  I  know  certain  people  are, 
they  couldn't  write  that  good  themselves  about  Artie.  That's  what 
got  him  in  trouble. 

When  Artie  began  to  lose  that  little  redhead  that  he  had  around 
here,  that  little  hatcheck  chick  that  he  picked  up  out  at  Santa 
Anita  racetrack  and  would  taunt  and  abuse  before  everybody  —  that's 
when  he  started  to  show  his  muscle,  this  great  guy,  when  he  talked 
to  Velie,  and  when  he  put  that  dummy  on  his  lap:   the  dummy  called 

"Mr.  Legislator." 

Rowland:   Getting  back  to  Earl  Warren  and  Pat  Brown,  then  the  suggestion 
for  the  Wellman  Commission  came  from  Earl  Warren. 

Allen:    Yes. 

Rowland:   Was  the  action  welcomed  in  the  assembly? 

Allen:    No.  Well,  we're  talking  about  blue  ribbons  —  Gov.  Brown  asked 
me:   will  you  accept  membership  on  a  blue  ribbon  committee?  The 
only  thing  is  that  you  go  out  and  work  your  head  off  and  you  send 
in  your  recommendation,  nobody  pays  a  damn  bit  of  attention  to 
them  and  nothing  is  done  it  about,  and  that's  why  you  get  blue. 
And  that's  why  they  call  it  "blue  ribbon."   Because  you're 
hunting  for  a  ribbon  to  hang  yourself  with.   I  wouldn't  serve  on 
one  of  them  any  more  to  save  your  soul.   Now  — 

Rowland:   Now,  what  was  the  reaction  in  the  assembly  to  that?  Was  it 

Allen:    To  what? 

Rowland:   That  the  governor  was  stepping  in  creating  this  commission  that 
might  possibly  work  out  some  reapportionment. 

Allen:    Look,  this  vacillating  Pat  Brown  could  double  deal  you  over,  just 
for  the  practice,  like  this  kid  of  his.  Those  two  guys  should' ve 
been  used  car  salesmen.   Really  and  truly.  They  could  turn  right 
around  and  sell  you  the  state  capitol  as  an  apartment  building. 

And  nobody  knew  about  the  Wellman  Committee,  or  a  lot  of  it.   I 
said  to  Pat  Brown,  "Look,  how  about  calling  Earl  Warren  on  the 
phone,  or  when  you're  talking  to  him  getting  your  instructions 
for  tomorrow  morning,  tell  him,  'Here's  the  idea  for  phasing  this 
thing  out.'"  And  Pat,  you  know,  he's  a  dudderhead  anyhow,  he  said, 



And  so  he  took  those  things  and  he  went  over  to  his  office  — 

he  came  back  and  he  said,  "Well,  Don,  I  got  to  thinking  about 

that  last  night  and  I  got  to  thinking  about  it  this  morning," 

and  he  said,  "I  don't  think  it's  a  good  idea."  He  said, 

"We're  under  a  court  of  law,  and  being  a  lawyer  —  and  you're 

not  —  you  don't  dare  approach  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court." 

And  I  said,  "Well,  sure  you  do,  for  instructions  from  to  time. 

That's  been  the  history  of  the  Supreme  Court." 

"Well,  okay,"  he  said,  "But  I  don't  think  we'll  get  anywhere 

with  it.   I'll  let  you  know  in  two  or  three  days."   So  in  two 

or  three  days,  it  was  a  no  no. 

Anyhow,  then  Warren  sent  a  guy  out  from  Georgetown  University, 

Washington  D.C. ,  who  was  out  here  looking  down  everybody's  throat. 

I  found  out  about  it.   I  got  it  in  a  peculiar  way,  about  the 

stranger  from  abroad.   That's  why  we  held  to  the  line  —  to  do 

everything  to  wash  our  own  linen. 

Maneuvers  Around  Reapportionment 

I  don't  know  whether  you're  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  when  we 
had  bills  by  Senator  Teale,  we  had  bills  by  myself,  and  young 
Senator  Tommy  Rees  took  a  hand  in  the  thing,  and  he  tried  a  bill, 
and  he  tried  to  come  over  to  the  assembly  with  one,  but  the  only 
unfortunate  thing  about  Tommy  was  that  he  thought  his  perfect  bill 
was  perfect.   But  he  had  only  left  out  of  his  reapportionment  map 
about  200,000  people  sitting  out  around  Bel If lower  and  down  in  that 
country.   He  didn't  even  have  them  in  the  books.   So  he  said,  "Oh." 
So  he  shut  up  on  that,  but  he  tried  to  tirade  me,  and  I  started 

calling  him  "Baby  Snooks,"  and  he  didn't  like  that. 

Rowland:   What  was  your  reaction  to  the  Warren  Court  decision  in  '64.  Were 
you  surprised,  or  were  you  — 

Allen:    No,  no.   I  suspected  all  along  that  it  would  be  coming,  and  that's 
the  only  time  that  Jess  and  I  were  ever  close,  was  that  we  were 
matching  information  back  and  forth  and  watching  Warren's  attitudes 
and  we  were  noting  the  action  of  his  stooge*,  "Edmund  -  call  me  Pat  - 

Rowland:   But  Warren,  as  governor,  was  always  against  reapportionment. 

Allen:     Oh,  he  was.  So  was  Pat  Brown. 

Rowland:   As  attorney  general,  you  mean. 

Allen:    Oh,  yes.   Oh,  yes.   Pat  Brown  was  always  against  it.   See,  he 

wanted  to  get  even  with  some  of  the  boys  up  here  like  Hugh  Burns 
and  the  rest  of  it.  The  funny  part  of  it  was  -- 

Rowland:   Why  did  he  want  to  get  even  with  Hugh  Burns? 

Allen:    Oh,  I  don't  know.   Just  different  things,  a  little  bit  —  which 
started  with  Brown's  vacillating  during  the  1960  presidential 

convention.   But  he  went  down  to  Los  Angeles,  and  instead  of 

calling  me,  the  author  of  the /bill,  and  saying  —  this  is  a 

historic  bill  —  "How  about  coming  in  here  and  — 
Rowland:   "participating  in  the  signing  of  the  bill?" 
Allen:    Participating  in  the  signing  of  the  bill  has  been  customary. 

But  he  goes  down,  and  he  chooses  Bonelli's  office  in  southern 

California.   Because  more  votes  down  there,  I  guess  and  to 

anger  Hugh  Burns. 
Rowland:   So  you  weren't  shocked  at  all  when  Earl  Warren  came  through 

with  the  one  man-one  vote  decision. 

Allen:    Oh  no,  no,  no.   No,  I  wasn't  at  all  because  I  knew  that  —  you 


know,  I've  known  this  Earl  Warren.   I've  been  out  fishing  with 
him.   I've  been  on  the  trail  with  him  many  times.  And  I  know 
that  Earl  Warren  himself  had  never  participated  in  private 
business.  The  guy  had  always  been  on  a  public  payroll.   He  had 
been  a  hatchet  man  for  various  things. 

By  the  way,  later  I  wrote  a  letter  —  I  don't  know  whether  I 
have  it  around  here  any  more  or  whatever  I  did  —  to  President 
Lyndon  Baines  Johnson  and  told  him  that  I  anticipated  that 
Earl  Warren  was  going  to  be  head  of  the  committee  investigating 
the  Kennedy  assassination,  I  told  him  that  Earl  Warren  couldn't 
find  a  giraffe  in  a  flock  of  sheep,  and  he'd  screw  any  kind  of 
a  report  like  that  up  so  bad  that  it'd  be  a  controversy  from  now 

on  out.   But  Johnson  didn' t  pay  any  attention  to  it. 

[See  following  page] 
Rowland:   One  of  your  early  suggestions  / —  it  looks  like  to  preserve  the 

makeup  of  the  senate — was  to  increase  the  senate  to  sixty  members. 

Allen:    That's  right.   So  the  state  wouldn't  lose  some  of  that  expertise 
over  there.   Look  what  you  lost!   Look  what  was  wiped  out!  Wiped 
out  five  senators  in  one  district!   In  other  words,  the  district 
that  Teale  served  used  to  have  six  members  in  it. 

Rowland:   What  was  the  reaction  of  senators  to  that  suggestion? 

Allen:    Well,  at  that  time,  they  had  a  lawsuit  going  on.  They  had  Herman 
Selvin,  noted  constitutional  lawyer  from  Los  Angeles  in  Sacramento 
handling  the  lawsuit  for  them,  and  they  didn't  want  anything  that 
would  rock  the  boat.   But  you  see,  we  had  this  equal  division, 
"one  man,  one  vote,"  years  ago  in  this  state.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  — 

Rowland:   Before  1926  you  had  a  "one  man,  one  vote"  proportioned  senate? 

Allen:    Yes,  sure.  We  started  out  with  it.  We  had  thirty  senators  and 


Sacramento  Bee 

February  24,  1965 

LA  Assemblyman  Allen  Feels  Way 
Out  Is  To  Increase  Senate  To  60 

Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  dervd  the  legislature  to  reap-jquired  reapportionment  in 
of  Los  Angeles  Countv.  chair-i  portion  the  senate  on  the  basis  1971." 

f  .1  ~KI,,  oi^,,«nciof  population  rather  than  geo-l    Allen  stated  if  the  plan  were 

man  of  the  assembly  elections!      ™££|,y  ag  a[  present  B       adopted  lt  could  be  ratl(ied  in 

'and  reapportionment  commit-      -while  Northern   California  a  statewide  vote  next  Septem- 
tee.  today  said  enlargement  of  stands  to  lose  15  senators  to'ber. 

the  state-senate  membership  Southern  California  under,  "If  a  clear  majority  of  the 
from  40  to  HO  would  be  one  court  ordered  reapportion-  legislature  approves  of  the 
way  out  of  the  dilemma  fac-  ment,  one  pten  that  has  been  plan,"  Allen  said,  "it  can  be 
ing,  the  legislature  on  reappor-  suggested  to  expand  the  sen-  passed  early  in  the  session  and 
tionment.  ate  would  give  the  south  15  the  legislature-  could  then  pro- 

Allen  said  he  has  deter-ior  slightly  in  excess  thereof  ,  j  ceed  with  reapportionment  of 
mined  many  people  are  con-1  the  north  losing  only  six  or;60  senatorial  districts  pending 
cerned  there  will  be  "irrepar-  seven  to  the  populous  coun-|  approval  of  the  people  in  Sep- 
able  damage  caused  by  the,,  ties,"  Allen  stated.  tember." 

loss  of  experience  and  wisdom      "By    a    proper    phase    out 

in  the  senate  which  we  face,  there  would  be  no  need  to  lose 
as  a  result  "of  the  supreme!  the  valued  services  of  any  un- 
court's  ruling".  The  court  or-  'til  after  the  constitutionally  re- 

Allen  said  he  has  been  ad- 
vised  the  federal  court  likely 
would  approve  such  a  proce- 


sixty  assemblymen,  and  in  the  Mother  Lode  country,  why  there 
were  assemblymen  living  within  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  of 
one  another.  One  district,  once  served  by  assemblyman  Chappie, 
had  sixty  assembly  members  in  it  at  one  time,  —  and  thirty 
senators,  also.   Do  you  want  this  read  into  the  record,  or  -- 

Rowland:   We  could  put  it  in  the  appendix. 

Allen:    Yes.  Well,  I  didn't  know  whether  you  wanted  it  in  the  trans 
cript  because  I  think  you  gain  something  out  of  reapportionment 
when  I  say  these  hearings  are  a  vital  issue,  and  I  want  to 
express  the  thoughts  and  so  forth. 

But  I  said  this;  we  had  taken  an  oath  of  office.   The  U.S. 
Supreme  Court  had  made  this  reapportionment  decision.   Now  how 
are  we  going  to  get  around  it?  So  let's  cut  the  argument  and 
let's  get  down  and  go  to  work.   (See  page  485  of  my  Legislative 
Source  Book. ) 

Rowland:   Now,  in  the  Legislative  Source  Book,  you  said  that  the  senate  third 

house  representatives  used  their  money  to  try  to  defeat  the  U.S.  Supreme 
Court  decision  through  federal  constitutional  amendment. 

Allen:    That' s  right. 

Rowland:   What  third  house  -- 

Allen:    Well,  now  wait  a  minute.  What  actually  happened,  U.S.  Senator 

Everett  Dirksen  had  a  measure  that  once  it  was  put  on  the  ballot, 
it  would  become  a  constitutional  amendment. 

Okay.   Now,  the  senators  and  assemblymen  from  the  rural  areas  were 
trying  to  gain  support  for  it.   Some  of  our  crowd  made  the  rounds 
through  the  East. 

Rowland:   What  do  you  mean  by  "our  crowd?" 

Allen:    Well,  some  of  our  members  of  the  legislature  --  northern,  especially 


--  made  the  rounds  through  the  East,  and  each  one  of  them  took 

various  states  of  the  union. 
Rowland:  Do  you  recall  what  senators? 
Allen:  Oh  yes.  There  was  George  Miller,  Jr.,  Hugh  Donnelly,  Steven  Teale,  Sts. 

Arnold,  Luther  Gibson  and  James  Cobey. 
Rowland:   Burns  was  a  part  of  that,  wasn't  he? 

Allen:    Well,  Burns  didn't  get  out  in  the  area  like  they  did. 
Rowland:   Rattigan  and  Teale? 
Allen:     Yes,  Joseph  Rattigan  and  Teale  and  Miller.   I  remember  Jerry  Waldie,  wl 

was  an  assemblyman,  and  he  was  a  floor  leader,  told  me  that  he 

had  gone  to  Massachusetts,  that  they  (senators)  had  chosen  him. 

And  he  got  to  talking  about  —  you  know. 
Rowland:   And  he  was  part  of  the  team  to  convince  states  to  support  the 

Dirksen  amendment? 


Allen:    Right.  And  they  told  him  to  get  his  ass  out  of  their  state. 
That's  just  exactly  what  he  told  me.   He  said,  "That's  just 
exactly  —  and  here  it  is  in  writing."  And  that's  what  it  said: 
We'll  run  our  own  business.  We  don't  need  any  help  from  you 

And  he  got  the  same  thing  in  New  Hampshire. 

And  when  these  guys  came  back,  they  were  defeated,  because  none 
of  the  Eastern  people  wanted  any  part  to  do  with  them.   See  what 

I  mean?  It  broke  them  up.  The  California  legislators  touring 

other  states/were  turned  down  on  the  Dirksen  amendments, decided 

it  was  time  to  get  down  to  business  and  proceed  to  carry  out  the 
court's  edict. 

Now,  you  take  one  of  the  states  that  has  about  two  hundred  seventy 
five  members  in  the  lower  house.   Practically  every  township  had 


one.  They  had  to  cut  way  down  —  to  about  150  members. 

Rowland:   Senator  Teale  recalled  to  me  a  ticklish  situation  in  which  the 
Southern  states  wanted  to  preserve  their  present  apportionment 
that  prohibited  blacks  from  getting  voting  and  representation 
in  the  state  legislature.  And  there  was  a  position  where  some 
liberals  in  the  California  Senate  were  speaking  in  behalf  of 
the  Dirksen  amendment  and  had  to  compromise  with  the  Southern 
states  -- 

Allen:    That  is  true.  That  did  come  up.  A  black  civil  rights  leader 
brought  that  up.    His  name  was  James  Meredith. 
Now,  getting  back  to  this  other  situation  here,  one  of  the 
amusing  things  I  think  you'll  find  in  the  book  there,  I  had  a 
kid  by  the  name  of  Steve  Smith,  who  was  my  consultant.  And  I 
had  to  knock  Steve's  ears  down  one  way  and  up  the  next,  but  he 
was  a  worker.   He  had  a  personality  that  wasn't  the  greatest 
in  the  world  but  he  sat  down  one  afternoon,  evidently  not 
having  too  much  to  do  at  the  moment  I  suppose,  and  he  wrote  to 
one  of  the  federal  judges.  This  is  when  the  federal  judges  had 
reapportionment  under  their  jurisdiction.  And  he  said:   Here's 
our  problem.  Our  state  constitution  says  that  we  can't  break 
across  county  lines,  break  up  counties,  and  so  forth  and  so  on. 
But,  we're  going  to  have  to  do  it. 

So  the  minute  I  seen  it,  I  flipped  the  letter  to  the  legislative 
counsel,  and  the  next  thing  everybody  was  in  the  room.  And  every 
body  was  waving  hands,  and  I  guess  they  thought  we'd  go  to  jail 
for  contempt.   Because  you  don't  do  that  in  a  lawsuit.   You  have 
to  ask  it  in  open  court  before  your  opponents. 
Three  days  later,  one  of  the  nicest  letters  from  this  appellate 


federal  judge  —  said:   "If  it  (the  state  constitution)  stands 
in  your  way,  go  ahead  and  ignore  it  -  because  if  it  stands  in 
the  way  of  carrying  out  the  orders  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court, 
do  it! 

And  that  left  Steve  off  the  hook.   But  nevertheless,  veteran 
lawyers  say  they've  seen  it  done  before. 

Now,  I,  in  addition,  had  published  a  couple  of  documents  on  our 
method  of  reapportioning  that  we  could  put  in.  My  report  (Legis 
lative  Source  Book);   I  put  a  price  tag  on  it  for  three  dollars 
seventy  five  cents,  so  everybody  bought  it  up.  All  the  time 
that  this  was  going  on,  during  the  controversy,  my  feelings  were 
well  known:   that  I  would  have  much  rather  enlarged  the  senate; 
or  I  would  have  much  rather  phased  reapportionment  in  over  a 
period  of  time;  or  I  saw  the  inevitable  handwriting  on  the  wall, 
and  I  was  laying  back,  making  moves. 

Now,  we  spent  some  ninety  thousand  to  get  the  job  done;  other 
years,  it'd  been  a  million  and  half,  three  million,  six  million  — 
previous  years  and  subsequent.   Not  now:   I  didn't  spend  much 

I  got  to  thinking:   let's  try  this!   I  went  over  and  I  talked  to 
some  friends  of  mine  over  at  Aerojet.  And  at  the  time  they  were 
selling  computer  space.   I  was  pretty  much  intrigued  with  it. 
So  I  got  a  hold  of  an  operator  that  they  recommended  --  a  big,  tall, 
gangling  kid  by  the  name  of  Bill  Below.  And  I  went  to  Jess,  said: 
I'm  going  to  hire  him.   Jess  said:   Look,  I  told  you  this  was  your 
job;  I'm  not  going  to  interfere. 

Okay,  so  I  got  Below  in  there.  And  we  got  him  to  come  in,  and  I 
got  a  hold  of  Steve  and  we  talked  it  over.   So  we  went  out  and  we 


had  a  trial  run  with  a  computer.  We  liked  what  we  saw.  We 
showed  it  to  Jess,  and  we  showed  it  to  some  of  the  others,  and 
that  became  part  of  AB  (assembly  bill)  number  one,  my  bill.   It 
became  the  first  computerized  reapportion  in  the  nation. 

Rowland:   But  going  back,  though,  there  was  the  original  Teale  bill,  SB 

(senate  bill)  6,  which  never  was  passed  and  never  met  the  federal 
court  deadline  of  June  30th  of  '65.  Why  didn't  that  pass? 

Allen:    Because  of  this  lawsuit,  and  because  of  the  Dirksen  amendment. 

Rowland:   The  press  said  that  there  was  bickering  between  the  senate  and 
the  assembly  over  the  at  large  election  suggestion  in  the  Teale 
bill,  for  Los  Angeles  county. 

Allen:    There  was  ~  that  and  others.  Of  course,  there  were  blocks 

being  thrown  in  the  way  by  the  senate.  They  had  to  create  some 
sort  of  diversion;  you  had  to  see  it  from  a  legislative  viewpoint. 
And  there  was  that  at-large  —  you  go  down  into  Los  Angeles  county, 
the  one  place  — 

Rowland:   What  would  be  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  an  at— large 
election  for  Los  Angeles? 

Allen:    This  was  just  a  diversionary  tactic.  That's  all  I  could  ever  make 
out  of  it.  Then  too,  all  of  the  senate  membership  could  come  from 
the  same  area.  We  had  that  experience  when  the  City  of  Los  Angeles 
had  nine  members  -  all  at-large  -  seven  of  the  councilmen  lived  in 
a  three  block  radius.  That' s  why  the  charter  was  revised  into 
equal  districts  with  defined  boundaries. 

Rowland:   Did  Tom  Rees  have  some  influence  there?  Was  he  trying  to  preserve 
his  seat  by  — 

Allen:    No,  Tom  Rees  tried  to  preserve  his  seat  by  cutting  down  on  the 
numbers.   Of  course,  Tom  was  -- 


Rowland:   Cutting  down  on  the  numbers,  which  --  ? 

Allen:    Number  of  districts!   In  other  words,  instead  of  taking  the  full 
fourteen  to  sixteen  districts  Southern  California  was  entitled  to 
ia  Los  Angeles,  Orange  and  San  Diego  counties  -  about  8  districts. 
What  he  did  was  to  try  and  fashion  --  he  had  also  -  knowing  the 
history  of  the  Los  Mgeles  experience  being  repugnent  -  picked 

up  a  portion  of  my  attempt  to  phase-in  reapportionnent.  But  he  was  in 
/senate,  and  he  had  to  get  along  with  those  guys  over  there. 

But  that  Teale  bill  was  diversionary. 

Rowland:   This  is  SB  6  we're  discussing.  This  is  the  first  bill  from 

the  senate,  which  Senator  Teale  authored.  The  main  stumbling 
block,  according  to  the  press,  was  that  Los  Angeles  county,  or 
any  senatorial  office  elected  would  be  elected  at-large. 

Allen:  Oh,  yes.  That's  right.  We  did  conduct  a  meeting.  It  did  get 
over.  And  they  threw  that  at-large  bit  in  there.  Knowing  the 
history  of  Los  Angeles  -  I  still  go  back  to  my  original  premise. 

Rowland:   A  diversionary  tactic? 

Allen:    It  was  a  diversionary  tactic,  because  at  that  time  they  had  first, 
the  lawsuit,  and  they  had  Dirksen  --  the  Dirksen  deal. 

Rowland:   Now,  when  the  state  senate  failed  to  reapportion  itself  by  the 
deadline  the  federal  court  set,  the  State  Supreme  Court  stepped 
in  and  ordered  senate  and  assembly  reapportionment. 

Allen:    That's  right.   Now,  let  me  tell  you  this:   what  we  did  —  we  had 
taken  in  the  assembly  for  so  long  the  premiss  that,  by  God,  this 
is  your  house  (the  senate)  and  you  guys  move.  You  guys  (senators) 
put  it  over  with  us,  and  if  we  can  live  with  it  and  it's  within 
that  point  that  was  set  (at  the  time,  I  think  it  was  fifteen  per 
cent  or  something  like  that)  -- 


Rowland:   It  was  a  ten  percent  or  twelve  percent  margin. 

Allen:    No,  fifteen  high,  and  five  low. 

So  anyhow,  in  getting  back,  we  took  that  position,  in  all  fair 
ness  to  the  senate  —  that  was  their  job.   "You  guys  do  yours, 
give  it  to  us.  We'll  put  it  with  ours,  and  no  more." 

Rowland:   This  was  the  "two-way  street  agreement"  between  the  — 

Allen:    Well,  years  ago,  yes,  it  started  in  the  thirties.   So  anyhow, 
when  Judge  Fred  Houser  was  chairman  of  the  Reapportionment 
Committee  in  1940  and  41,  I  was  a  member  of  the  committee,  and  — 
we  had  that  way  of  doing  those  things,  you  see. 
Now,  in  getting  back  to  this  thing,  there  was  so  much  diversion 
over  in  the  senate  at  the  time  that  it  was  darn  shame  that  I 
didn't  record  a  lot  of  it  and  put  it  down.   Because  there  was 
no  question  about  it.  The  senators  doing  everything  in  the 
world,  and  they  were  moving  not  to  touch  reapportionment  at 
all.   Hoping  for  the  miracle  of  relief.  See  what  I  mean? 

Rowland:   Yes. 

Allen:  All  right.  Now,  they  (senators)  exhausted  every  means,  and  when  I 
finally  told  them:  Look,  I  know.  I  hate  this  as  much  as  you  cats 

And  they  (senators)  said:   Well,  by  God,  you're  going  to  build 
yourself  a  good  senate  seat. 

I  said:   I  will  never,  never  run  for  the  state  senate  in  this  state. 
I  will  quit  before  I  have  to.   (Well,  fortunately,  the  doctors  came 
along  and  said  I  had  to  quit.)   But  anyhow,  I  said:   I  couldn't  sit 
with  comfort  in  the  assembly  chamber  knowing  that  I  was  sitting  in 
a  seat  of  somebody  that  I  had  destroyed  over  here.  And  Senator 
Begovich,  you  know,  I'll  never  forget  him  —  kind  of  an  emotional 


guy  —  he  got  up  and  he  said:   We'll  always  have  to  love  you  for 

being  fair,  Don.  He  put  his  arm  around  me  and  told  members  of 

the  senate — Don  didn't  want  reapportionment ,  but  he  got  it  to  us  in 

an  outstanding  way. 

See,  I  had  a  little  difficulty  once  in  a  while  with  Teale  and 

his  people,  but  — 

Rowland:   His  staff  people  you  mean? 

Allen:    Yes.   But  his  staff  people  were  good,  and  they  worked  right  on 
over  there  with  us.   But  like  I  say,  then-we  went  over  to  the 
senate,  after  we  got  this  thing  started,  we  got  straightened 
out  with  this  computerization, 

Rowland:   The  press  was  stating  that  the  big  battle  between  the  senate  and 
assembly  was  the  battle  between  the  senators  and  Assemblyman 
Unruh,  claiming  that  Unruh  wanted  to  get  control  of  the  senate  by 
offering  his  lieutenants  senate  seats  in  1966  and  having  them  take 
over  the  senate  and  depose  Hugh  Burns  from  pro  tern. 

Allen:    Well,  mister,  I  want  to  tell  you  a  little  story,  that  might  have 

been  in  the  wind.   But  like  I  say,  it  all  goes  back  to  diversionary 
tactics:   anything  that'll  knock  it  down,  anything  that'll  cause 
dissension  or  delay,  let's  use  it  —  let's  try.  And  see  if  a 
miracle  will  happen.  Then  we  can  get  the  Dirksen  amendment,  or  we 
can  do  thus,  thus,  and  so.   But  that's  the  way  that  it  worked  out, 
you  see;  it  was  one  of  those  things.  Now,  you  had  another  one  in 
here  — -  how  far  along  are  we  now?  What  do  you  want  to  hold  me  to? 

Rowland:  Well,  what  I  was  going  to  ask  you  next  is  the  question  of  why  was 
the  assembly,  as  well  as  the  senate,  ordered  to  reapportion  itself 
in  1965,  by  the  California  Supreme  Court?  Was  that  just  a  technical 
problem  with  reapportioning?  Some  might  speculate  that  it  was  the 


senators  putting  pressure  on  the  court  to  force  the  assembly  to 
reapportion,  therefore  breaking  up  the  battle  between  — 

Pensions  and  Reapportionment 

Allen:    No.   The  first  thing  that  I  knew,  I  was  called  down  by  Pat  Brown  ~ 
the  only  honest  thing  he  ever  did  in  reapportionment  question  was 
to  call  me  down  in  his  office  and  tell  me,  or  ask  me  one  question 
and  tell  me  one  thing.  He  said:   Tonight,  Earl  Warren  is  holding 
a  telephone  conference  with  the  state  Supreme  Court  to  talk  this 
thing  over.   He  will  have  them  take  jurisdiction  tomorrow  morning. 
"Oh."   I  said,  "How  can  you  believe  in  that  timetable?" 
He  (Warren)  says,  "They  will.   It's  been  in  the  mill  for  several 
days."  So  he  said,  "Now,  there's  one  thing  I  want  to  know  from 
you.   You  know,  Stanley  Arnold's  bill  ~  Senator  Arnold."   (He 
was  later  appointed  a  Superior  Court  Judge. )  "Stanley  Arnold  wants 
to  put  in  a  bill  to  provide  retirement  benefits  for  guys  who  don't 
have  too  much  time  in  the  senate,  if  they  served  in  city  councils 
and  in  the  — " 

Rowland:   I  believe  it  just  said  "public  office." 

Allen:    Yes,  public  office.  Well,  he  went  on  to  elaborate.   So  I  said: 
Well,  I'll  tell  you.   I  won't  introduce  such  a  measure,  but  if 
there's  some  place  along  the  line,  or  some  of  the  other  boys  want 
to,  I'll  go  for  it.  I'll  promise  you  this:   that  I  don't  get  any 
retirement  at  all  from  my  ten  years  of  city  council  in  Los  Angeles; 
I  won't  touch  it." 

So  he  said,  "Well,  okay."   But  he  said,  "Do  you  think  it'd  help  out? 
I  understand  ~" 

Rowland:   What  was  Brown's  position  on  the  Arnold  bill? 


Allen:    Oh,  he  was  for  it. 

Rowland:   He  was  for  the  Arnold  bill? 

Allen:    Oh,  hell  yes.   He  issued  a  proclamation  and  issued  a  statement  in 

its  favor.   It  and  other  correspondence  in  this  matter  is  included. 

Rowland:   That  bill  was  defeated,  wasn't  it? 

Allen:    The  Arnold  bill  never  rocked  out  of  the  legislature.   So  the 

Arnold  bill  was  dropped,  with  the  understanding  it  would  be  in 
cluded  as  amendments  in  an  appropriation  bill,  and  then  we  had  a 
cleanup  bill  — 

Rowland:   It  was  SB  (senate  bill)  13  introduced  by  Senator  Teale. 

Allen:    That's  right,  SB  13.   But  it  eventually  came  over,  and  it  was  a 
cleanup  bill. 

Rowland:   It  was  a  cleanup  bill  to  the  reapportionment  legislation  that 
Governor  Brown  signed? 

Allen:    Yes.  ## 

Some  of  the  members  said,  "Well,  now  what  are  we  going  to  do  about 

this  Arnold  bill?" 

I  said:   Well,  the  governor  indicated  to  me  he  was  for  it.  And  I 

said:   I  don't  know.   I  don't  think  it's  going  to  affect  too  many. 

Now,  I  happen  to  know  two  or  three  guys  it  would.   I  said:  I  will 

disqualify  myself  on  it,  with  regards  to  the  service  military  or 

city  council  of  Los  Angeles. 

But  there 're  some  guys  with  military  service  and  others  that  have 

short  term,  like  two  years  city  council  -  one  a  Justice  of  the 

Peace  for  three  years  until  the  justice  of  the  peace  courts  were 


Rowland:   You  were  getting  a  military  pension,  weren't  you? 

Allen:    No.   I  want  to  lay  that  one  to  rest,  too,  right  quick.   I  got 


injured  down  there  in  Nicaragua,  and  they  were  going  to  give  me, 

after  sixteen  years,  a  retirement  based  on  forty  percent  of  pay 

at  that  time.   If  I  accepted  retirement  I  couldn't  pass  civil 

service  disability  with  such  a  percentage,  so  I  said:  The  hell 

with  it;  I  won't  take  it.   So  I  waived.  Anyhow,  the  statute  of 

limitations  had  run  out  on  it  now,  so  I  can't  get  it.   So  I 

don't  want  it.  At  that  time,  it'd  have  only  been  about  fourteen, 

fifteen  dollars  a  month. 

Finally,  they  said:  Will  you,  as  chairman  of  one  of  the  committees, 

order  a  pension  amendment  instead  of  the  Arnold  bill? 

Teale  said  to  me,  "Oh,  hey,  go  ahead,  Don.   I've  ordered  a  lot 

of  amendments."  And  he  said,  "Get  your  amendment  in  here."  So 

we  promised  Arnold  and  some  of  the  boys  that  this  would  happen. 

I  went  down  to  the  legislative  council  and  received  amendments  to 

SB  13  exactly  as  the  governor  asked  for  in  his  special  call  and 

his  press  release  on  it.   [See  following  page] 

And  a  funny  part  of  it  was,  Arnold  never  held  any  other  position 

that  would  give  him  anything  out  of  it,  except  maybe  three  years 

of  legislative  service. 

So  anyhow,  we  [assembly]  get  that  one  (SB  13)  and  we  amend  it.  We 

put  it  out,  we  tell  everybody  about  it.   So  I  told  the  governor,  and 

I  said,  "Now,  look  governor,  we  have  taken  care  of  your  call 

request  on  the  Arnold  bill." 

Rowland:   You  told  the  governor  yourself? 

Allen:    Oh  yes. 

Rowland:   Did  you  see  Frank  Mesple",  too? 





WHI.REAS,  The  Legislature  of  the  State  of  O.lif-  rrn.i  rus  U-i-n  tailed  in 
extraordinary  traion  and  hai  convened  on  |une  25,  1 965;  and 

WHEREAS,  On  account  of  extraordinary  occasions  which  have  arisen  and  now 
exist,  ir  is  deemed  desirable  and  necessary  to  submit  additional  subjects  to  the 
Legislature  for  consideration;  now,  therefore, 

I.  EDMUND  G.  BROWN,  Governor  of  the  State  of  California,  by  virtue  of  the 
power  vested  in  me  by  law,  hereby  amend  and  supplement  my  Proclamation  dated 
June  24,  1965,  by  adding  the  following  additional  purpose  thereto,  and  thereby 
permitting  the  Legislature  to  legislate  upon  the  following  subject,  in  addition  to 
the  subjects  specified  in  the  original  Proclamation,  to  wit: 

Item  6.  To  consider  and  act  upon  legislation  relative  to  retirement  benefits  under 
the  Legislators'  Retirement  Law  for  legislators  affected  by  court-ordered  reappor- 

IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  Great 
Seal  of  the  State  of  California  to  be  affixed  this  twenty-ninth  day  of  June,  1965. 



IrrrrUry  tf  S/.lr 


PRESS  RELEASE  -  LCH  -  *614 
Governor  Edmund  G.  Brown 
June  29,  1965 


Governor  Edmund  G.  Brown  announced  today 
that  he  has  placed  a  sixth  item  on  special  call 
for  consideration  by  the  legislature. 

The  new  item 'is  "to  consider  and  act  upon 
legislation  relative  to  retirement  benefits 
under  the  legislators'  retirement  law  for 
legislators  affected  by  court-ordered  reappor tionment 

A  bill  by  Senator  Stanley  Arnold  (D-Susanville) 
to  provide  certain  retirement  benefits  for 
Senators  died,  awaiting  concurrence,  in  the  final 
hour*  of  the  Legislature,  although  it  had  passed 
both  houses  of  the  legislature. 

*  *  *  * 


Allen:    Not  until  later.  Frank  stated!   Don  you  have  done  a  fine 

historic  job  on  reapportionment.  This  Arnold  thing  could  erase 
all  the  good  work  you  have  done  on  it.   I  agreed  with  Frank 
Mesple.   I  said,  "Look,  the  governor  asked  me  about  this  -  he 
even  put  it  on  special  call.   You  get  the  governor  to  tell  this 
to  me  -  personally  tell  me  -  Don  drop  the  Arnold  amendment  and  I 
will.   If  he  says,  no,  don't  include  the  Arnold  amendment,  then 
I'll  cut  it  right  out,  boy." 

Rowland:   But  you  did  see  the  governor  personally  on  this? 

Allen:    Before  I  even  went  down  and  got  the  amendment. 

Rowland:   What  did  he  say? 

Allen:    He  said,  "Well,  you  might  just  as  well  clean  the  whole  thing  up." 
But  in  the  meantime,  the  air  control  people  appointed  by  Governor 
Brown,  had  slipped  one  of  the  senators  a  measure  on  air  pollution 
control  that  brought  about  an  air  pollution  device  deal  that  would 
give  a  contract  to  the  firm  —  a  complete  monopoly,  estimated  at 
about  $400  million  that  the  people  who  drive  automobiles  would've 
had  to  pay.   Some  of  the  reporters  found  out  that  the  attorney 

for  this  firm  was  the  son-in-law  of  Edmund  G.  "Call  me  Pat" 

Brown.  So  /the  need  to  find  a  new  white  hat  and  a  villain  to  get 

the  stink  off  that  little  gem,  he  found  the  white  hat  in  the 
amendment  to  SB  13  and  a  villain  named  Don  Allen.  And  when  the 
newsboys  got  onto  that,  all  hell  broke  loose. 

So  to  kill  my  pension   amendment  was  another  diversity:   Pat  seized 
upon  this.  Mesple  has  never  told  me  to  this  day  that  that  was  the 
case,  but  I  have  many  indications  from  it. 

Rowland:   That  this  is  why  he  vetoed  the  entire  bill? 

Allen:    That's  right.   But  then  he  turned  around  and  asked  the  California 


Supreme  Court  to  allow  it  (retirement  benefits)  without  that 
amendment  in  there.  And  I  wrote  a  little  classic  over  here 
that  the  press  boys  have  applauded,  that  I  bombed  hell  out 

of  Brown  with.  fSee  the  Westgate  Broadcast  and  letter  to  Governor  Brown, 

Appendix  A] 

It's  one  of  those  things  Brown  would  tell  you  to  your  teeth. 

You  have  breakfast  with  him  in  the  morning,  and  he'd  tell  you 
to  your  teeth  at  dinner  that  he  hadn't  seen  you  in  a  week.  I 
called  him  "the  great  vacillator." 

Rowland:   "The  tower  of  jello"  —  I've  heard'  that,  too. 

Allen:    Sure  and  the  "Tower  of  Jello." 

Rowland:   There's  one  thing  that's  just  been  coming  up  in  the  press  recently 

that  I've  been  asking  everyone  about,  and  you  would  probably  be  a  good 
one  to  ask  because  you  were  chairman  of  the  retirement  committee. 
Max  Rafferty  and  various  other  public  officials  are  getting  a 
huge  retirement  benefit  due  to  an  inflation  factor  that  had  been 
put  in  to  legislative  members'  and  state  employees'  retirement 
benefits  in  1964  and  had  been  approved  by  Pat  Brown.  Do  you  re 
call  that? 

Allen:    Yes,  I  do.  That  was  Elliott's  bill.  Of  course  there  is  another 
reason.  A  law  suit  brought  about  for  former  State  Treasurer, 
Bert  Betts  - [Tee  Betts  vs  the  Board  of  Administration.  Aug.  19, 
1978,  21  Cal  3rd  859T) 

Rowland:   Ed  Elliott? 

Allen:    Yes.  Which  raised  three  percent  a  year  over  the  fifteen  years. 

You  see,  our  bill  started  out  --  our  original  contract  —  started 
out  that  we  would  get  five  percent  of  salary  and  limited  to  15 
years  of  service.  We  paid  in  four  percent  and  received  a  five 
percent  of  salary  times  years  of  service.  This  passed  the  State 


Supreme  Court  in  mid  1948  -  Knight  and  Collins  vs  Retirement 
Board.  The  judges  were  paying  in  two  percent  of  their  salary 
and  we  were  paying  in  four. 

Also,  there  was  a  bill  introduced  by  one  of  the  San  Francisco 
legislators  to  allow  an  aide  of  Governor  Brown  to  join  the 
State  Retirement  System  and  receive  credits  for  service  in  the 
San  Francisco  District  Attorney's  office  when  Brown  was  District 
Attorney.   It  failed  passage.   However,  at  the  next  session,  it 
was  sneaked  into  another  bill  by  amendment  -  it  passed  and  the 
governor  signed  the  bill  -  the  aide  got  a  bargain. 

Rowland:   Legislative  members,  you  mean? 

Allen:    Yes.   So  it  went  along  for  a  number  of  years.   All  of  a  sudden, 
some  of  the  bright  boys  over  there  seized  upon  the  idea  to  sell 
the  press  on  a  salary  raise,  which  had  been  recommended  some 
twenty  six  years  previous. 

Rowland:   The  legislative  members'  salary  raise. 

Allen:    Yes.   It's  in  this  little  booklet.  You'll  find  what  the  hell 

it  was  at  the  time.   But  anyhow,  when  I  retired,  I  was  supposed 
to  draw  five  percent  of  the  new  salary  per  month,  times  the 
number  of  years  served.  Then  after  fifteen  years  of  legis 
lative  service  I  would  get  three  percent  per  year  additional 
thereto.  That  was  the  provisions  of  the  Elliott  bill.   So  as  a 
consequence,  when  it  came  in,  unbeknownst  to  most  of  us  until 
after  the  bill  had  got  on  the  ballot  — 

Rowland:   Do  you  recall  the  bill  number? 

Allen:    Oh,  it  was  constitutional  amendment  number  1-A,  1966  election. 
But  I  also  noted  afterward  that  it  had 
been  amended  twelve  times  one  day,  with 


senate  amendments.   They  loved  it  to  death. 

And  as  a  consequence,  we  guys  who  came  up  to  the  legislature 
for  a  hundred  bucks  a  month  and  absolutely  no  per  diems  or 
anything  of  that  kind,  except  when  we  was  on  investigations  -- 
we  were  ripped  off.  We  couldn't  draw  any  of  it  unless  we  were 
twenty  five  miles  from  our  homes.   I  had  that  experience. 
Here  is  an  example.   Elmer  Lore,  who  was  a  member  of  the 
assembly  from  San  Fernando  Valley  from  1933  -  1941,  lived  in 
San  Fernando,  he  was  a  pressman  for  the  Los  Angeles  Daily  News. 
He  and  I,  and  several  of  the  members  on  a  committee  that  I  was 
chairman  of  —  took  off  for  northern  California,  and  we  boys  all 
met  down  in  Los  Angeles  at  the  Los  Angeles  train  depot.   Some 
got  on  the  train  over  at  Glendale.  And  Elmer  got  on  at  his 
home  town  on  the  Daylighter.  We  received '$8.00  per  diem  on 
investigations,  4  dollars  for  hotel  and  4  dollars  for  meals. 
The  railroad  first  served  breakfast  in  the  dining  car  when  we 
reached  Simi  Valley,  and  lo  and  behold,  when  I  filed  the 
committee's  claims,  I  was  notified  by  Claire  Brown  in  the 
controller's  office,  that  I  had  made  an  error  on  Mr.  Lore's 
claim.  They  found  out  that  the  breakfast  had  been  served  at 
Simi,  California,  and  that  was  eighteen  miles  from  Mr.  Lore's 
home.   So  therefore,  they  were  deducting  eight-five  cents  for 
that  breakfast.   Now  that's  how  close  the  controller  watched 
expense  vouchers.  We  didn't  get  the  per  diems  in  those  days 
like  these  cats  over  here  now.   Previous  to  1948,  the  legis 
lators  were  allowed  during  the  sessions  only,  one  round  trip 
between  their  district  and  Sacramento  at  the  rate  of  5  cents  per 
mile.  We  were  given  one  set  of  Deering  codes,  1500  letterheads 


and  envelopes  and  only  twenty  five  dollars  postage.   In  the  assembly  we  had 
eight  stenographers  for  the  eighty  members  during  the  session.   We  were  not 
allowed  free  long  distance  phone  calls.   If  we  needed  more  typing,  we  paid 
for  it.   We  had  no  district  offices  and  no  use  of  state  cars.   And  up  to 
1940,  the  desk  in  the  Assembly  Chamber  was  it. 

When  we  came  in  here,  we  worked  from  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  'til 
three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  around  the  clock,  to  get  the  bills  out,  or 
to  get  the  job  done.   We  would  drop  all  bills  in  in  January  and  recess  for 
thirty  days,  came  back  in  March,  and  then  all  hell  would  break  loose. 
Each  house  used  a  legislative  ploy  and  many  times  they'd  stop  the  clock. 
We  had  fifty-four  committees  in  the  assembly  so  that  the  work  could  be 
divided  up  and  our  one  hundred  legislative  day  limitation  could  be  met. 
For  example,  you'll  find  statements  in  the  Assembly  Journal  that  were  highly 
critical  of  that.   One  of  them  was  from  the  Honorable  Gardiner  Johnson 

which  was  published  much  to  the  chagrin  of  the  governor  because  Johnson  in- 

[see  following  page] 
eluded  the  envelope  it  came  in  showing  the  date  on  the  cancellation  mark./ 

That  fixed  them  from  stopping  the  clock  and  we  had  to  adjourn  because  this 

was  well  into  July. 

Now,  have  you  got  any  further  questions. 


June  13,  1930] 


)>•   violated,  no   . 


«.   ,,,,,,1,1,.,..,  I 

GERALD  C.  KKIM'l.i:. 

reason  for  r  1 1     I  i>i  u  Assembly 
Bill     ;<£2£    :     consideration  un 

lawful,   being  within  seven  daya 

of  final  adjournment.     Current  date 

shown  on  attached  postmark. 

Through  the  years  I  have  consistently  opimiod  control  of  tin-  oil  imluslrv  l>\ 
commissions  eom|MMrd  of  th*  industry  itself. 

I  am  i-ntinc  for  this  Atkinson  bill  because  the  industry  will  lie  i-ontrolled  hv  the 

S.  1..  HKISINGEH. 

~f~  Having  been  called  to  answer  a  telephone  cull  from  Santa  Cruz  at  the  time  the 
final  vote  was  being  taken  on  Assembly  Bill  No.  1926,  I  was  unable  to  cast  my 
vote.  Had  I  been  present  I  would  have  voted  agnin*t  this  bill. 


Our  rote  for  the  Atkinson  oil  control  bill  \v:is  not  cast  on  the  bnsig  of  our  own 
knowledge,  and  we  regret  the  precipitate  manner  iu  which,  necessarily,  the  subject 
was  considered  on  the  last  day  for  the  disposal  of  Assembly  bills.  Wo  voted  our 
confidence  in  the  judgment  and  wishes  of  the  Governor. 


My  vote  "no"  on  Assembly  Bill  Xn.  11)20.  due  to  hasty  consideration  on  last  dny 
for  Assembly  bills  and  its  potentiality  for  dangers.  I  feel  thiit  iiuijor  comiMinies 
supporting  bill  will  create  further  monopoly  by  driving  out  independents.  In  my 
opinion,  intense  pressure  from  them  stampeded  several  members  to  vote  "aye." 


Assembly  Bill  No.  1020  substitutes  a  "Conservation  Commission"  comjiosed  of 
representatives  of  the  people  for  the  "Oil  Umpire"  nuw  chosen  by  the  oil  companies 
themselves.  The  bill  has  the  support  of  our  couserration-minded  Xutional  Adminis 
tration.  In  my  opinion,  the  Government  should  regulate  oil  production  to  conserve 
this  invaluable  resource. 


House  Resolution  No.  193. 

By  Mr.  Watson : 

WHEREAS.  The  Fifty-third  Session  of  the  California  legislature  will  rank  us  one 
of  the  seven  wonders  of  the  world  due  to  ihe  action  of  the  ins  and  outs,  tne  out* 
and  ins,  the  RejHihlicuns  and  i  lie  Democrats  rnmhincd :  :ind 

WHERXA8,  California  lotlny  will  be  blessitl  wilh  another  "wonder  of  the  tiges" 
when  the  members  of  the  Legislature  :ind  the  |n>opl<'  ,,r  <'nlit'nrni»  learn  of  the 
entrance  into  the  National  Democratic  I'arty  of  u  member  of  (he  family  at  our  «,i 
California's  outstanding  Rfpulilicnus,  Charles  W.  Lyon,  Jr.;  ami 

WUEBKAS.  Politics  always  make  utruiist:  lied-fi-llows,  it  will  be  more  tbun  worth 
while  the  price  of  admission  to  *«•  Asuemblynian  Charles  W.  L.tou,  staunch  Itepnbli- 
can.  and  John  J.  Raskob,  National  Uemocmti.-  Commitiecniiin,  throngli  the  marriage 


Rowland:   Was  there  any  argument  opposing  the  retirement  increase,  the 
Edward  Elliott  bill? 

Allen:    No,  it  went  through. 

Rowland:   But  you  said  the  senate  liked  the  bill,  and  they  added  amend 
ments  to  increase  -- 

Allen:    No,  I'm  talking  about  the  bill  gypped  us  retiree's  prior  to 

Rowland:   When  did  the  contract  begin? 

Allen:     1947.  The  whole  provision  was  drafted,  practically,  by  the 
California  Supreme  Court,  unanimously. 

There  was  a  later  measure  on  the  ballot  that  allowed  these  cats 
to  raise  their  salaries,  and  they  double-crossed  everybody  that 
was  entitled  to  a  retirement  prior  to  1967. 

Rowland:   Oh,  I  know  what  you're  talking  about.   You're  talking  about  the 
constitutional  revision  that  also  included  the  — 

Allen:    That  wasn't  only  a  constitutional  revision.   It  was  also  a  bill 
that  was  put  in  by  the  Joint  Rules  Committee  —  and  Jess  Unruh. 
It  was  done  in  such  a  fashion  that  many  of  us  did  not  catch  it 
until  it  was  too  late  —  that  these  provisions  that  had  been 
amended  in,  over  in  the  senate,  twelve  times.   Brother  Jimmy  Mills, 
Chairman  of  the  Assembly  Rules  Committee,  and  a  few  on  the  Joint 
Rules  Committee  of  the  senate  and  assembly  were  the  guys  who  were 
responsible  for  that. 

Rowland:   Now  this  was  the  one  that  became  the  proposition  in  1966  — 

Prop  1. 
Allen:    Yes,  to  raise  their  salaries.   It  was  Proposition  1-A.   It  should 


have  been  referred  to  my  committee  on  retirement  and  then  to 
the  committee  on  constitutional  amendments. 

Rowland:   Wasn' t  that  the  constitutional  revision? 

Allen:    Well,  now  wait  a  minute.   Proposition  Number  One  was  my  bill 

that  allowed  us  to  invest  our  retirement  funds  in  common  stocks 
and  also  in  FHA  (Federal  Housing  Authority)  guaranteed  loans. 
The  earnings  jumped  from  two  and  a  half  percent  to  better  than 
nine  at  the  present  time.  That  bill  has  made  the  State  of 
California  —  not  only  the  PERS  (Public  Employees  Retirement 
System),  but  it  has  made  the  various  other,  like  the  Los 
Angeles  City  retirement  systems,  the  1937  Act  counties  --  six 
and  three  quarters  billion  dollars  since  its  adoption. 

Rowland:   But  you  were  behind  the  legislative  salary  increase.   You 
campaigned  for  it,  and  ~ 


Allen:    Well,  hell  yes,  I  was  for  it,  but  I  didn't  know  what  was  in  the 


constitutional  [proposition  1A]  amendment  because  my/  attention  was 

directed  towards  reapportionament  and  retirement  investment 
measure  and  above  all  to  assist  in  anyway  to  offer  inducement 
to  cause  longevity  to  bring  about  good  legislative  practices. 

Rowland:   Was  the  pre-reapportioned  senate  opposed  to  salary  increases? 
That  was  the  feeling  I  got  in  talking  to  senators:   they  felt 
that  ever  since  salaries  were  increased,  you  got  a  different 
type  of  legislator  in  the  — 

Allen:    There  is  some  growing  apprehension  to  the  present  system  -  as 
to  the  success  or  failure  of  the  principal  motive  to  recover 
the  true  legislative  system  which  we  all  labored  and  sacrificed 
to  bring  about.  We  still  believe  in  adequate  salaries  and  some 
reasonable  tools  to  perform  good  services  with. 


We  have  noted  many  abuses  and  indulgences  of  recent  date  -  such 
as  one  member  living  in  Inglewood  -  flying  down  to  his  home  and 
returning  each  day  when  the  assembly  was  supposed  to  be  in 
session.  The  first  steps  toward  legislative  betterment  is  noted 
in  the  paper  I  prepared  called  Historical  Benchmarks  of 
Legislative  Compensation.   It  does,  however,  need  updating  on 
the  last  two  salary  raises. 

Many  of  us  do  not  quarrel  -  we  do  believe  more  moderation 
should  be  practiced  in  the  fringe  benefits.  There  is  no  question 
the  past  few  years  has  created  a  different  type  of  legislator. 
It  is  a  far  call  from  the  dedicated  citizen  legislator  of  a 
brief  few  years  ago. 

Senator  Ralph  Dills  was  trained  in  the  concept  of  the  dedicated 
citizen  legislator.  Two  others — 
/Senator  Rodda  and  Assemblyman  Knox — arrived  just  as  the  curtain  was 

going  down  on  the  citizen  legislator.   Incidently  -  with  the 
retirement  of  Knox,  there  will  be  only  19  members  of  the  assembly 
out  of  80  with  more  than  6  years  service. 

The  new  members,  despite  calling  themselves  "Professional  Law 
Makers"  with  all  the  help,  salaries  and  other  fringe  benefits, 
are  constantly  seeking  greener  pastures.  They  have  a  greater 
turnover.   They  need  to  get  the  ideas  out  of  their  heads  that 
this  20  billion  yearly  corporation  is  bush  league. 
Another  cause  of  concern  is  the  lack  of  personal  attention  and 
investigation  by  the  elected  member.  The  delegating  of  those 
duties  to  staff  members  makes  one  think  they  just  don't  give  a 
damn.   They  either  don't  know  or  care  of  the  first  rule  of 
self  government.  A  public  servant  is  one  who  serves  the  people 
and  not  rule  them. 


Another  cause  for  concern  is  the  beginning  erosion  of  direct  district 
representation.   This  is  accomplished  by  some  aides  who  find  out  an 
incumbent  is  quitting — the  aide  sets  up  a  suitcase  residence  and 
runs  for  election.   Sometimes  without  knowing  the  main  street  of 
the  principal  cities  within  the  district. 

Many  long  time  observers  of  the  Sacramento  scene  believe  the  vanity 
of  Earl  Warren  not  wanting  to  face  a  billion  dollar  biennial  budget 
before  his  term  ended  and  creating  the  annual  session,  planted  the 
seed  of  a  legislature  of  professional  office  holders — has  caused 
great  mischief  for  California. 

Rowland:   There  must  be  a  relationship,  then,  between  salary  increases  and 
retirement  benefits. 

Allen:    Sure  there  is,  a  natural  relationship.   Because  you  must  remember 
salaries  jumped  from  six  thousand  a  year  to  sixteen  thousand  on 
their-  first  jump.   This  was  recommended  by  the  T.  Fenton  Knight 
Task  Force/1941  {see  Kilpatrick  letter,  Appendix  III],  and  they're 
entitled  to  five  percent  each  year  therafter. 

Rowland:  When  the  proposition  was  passed  in  1966,  salaries  rose  to  sixteen 

Allen:    Yes,  sure.  And  then  they're  entitled  to  five  percent  of  the  current 
salary  up  to  15  service  years,  and  then  a  percentage  based  on  the 
cost  of  living.   The  injustice  occurred  to  those  of  us  who  were 
retired  with  service  ending  in  1966.  We  were  frozen  at  the  salary 
of  that  date.  And  I  had  twenty-two  years  in  the  legislature. 
Now,  there  have  been  sixty-four  cases  by  public  employees  for 
current  salaries  and  every  one  has  been  granted 
in  favor  of  the  plaintiffs.  Those  of  us  who  were  retired 


in  1966,  many  caused  by  reapportionment,  are  bringing  suit  on 
the  same  basis  as  Betts.   I'm  joining  this  lawsuit.   I  think  it's 
the  only  honorable  thing  to  do.   I  think  we  were  double-crossed, 

so  here  we  go.  These  legislators  are  getting  forty-five  dollars 
a  day  per  diems.   Tax  free.  We're  going  to  pay  taxes  on  our 
pension,  whatever  we  get. 

See,  Betts  vs  Retirement  Board  went  through  the  California 
Supreme  Court,  and  it's  the  same  thing.   Betts  has  it.   He's 
got  his  situation  there.   Betts1  wife  von  it.  She's  an  attorney. 
The  Supreme  Court  recognized  the  contractual  basis  that  Betts 

And  I've  always  recognized  that.  And  for  a  number  of  years,  the 
legislative  counsel  -  Ralph  Kleps  -  always  said,  "There  is  no  way 
to  breech  or  down  grade  a  retirement  contract.   If  you  try  to, 
you  are-  in  a  law  suit,"  in  his  opinion  to  Hon.  Allen  Miller,  when 
Miller  was  chairman  of  the  Assembly  Rules  Committee.  Miller  is 
now  a  Supreme  Court  Judge  retired.   So  it's  only  fair.  The  hell 
of  it  is  is  that  the  Betts  favorable  decision  limits  it  to  about 
thirty-five  or  thirty-six  of  us  while  there  are  other  retired 
legislators  just  as  deserving. 

Rowland:   Now,  I'm  not  quite  sure  what  you're  talking  about  here,  but  let 
me  — 

Allen:    I  mean  legislators  retirement. 

Rowland:   You're  talking  about  a  suit.   You're  involved  in  a  legal  suit  to 
get  retirement  benefits  that  you  feel  are  — 

Allen:    Similar  to  Betts,  Cranston,  Rafferty  and  Pat  Brown. 

Rowland:   To  get  back  —  ? 

Allen:    Sure,  like  the  Betts.   It's  filed  on  the  same  basis  of  Betts. 


Now,  the  Supreme  Court  has  said  that  in  the  Betts  case  that 
there  was  a  breach  of  contract.  So  if  Betts  is  entitled  to 
it,  am  I  not?  Or  anyone  else  covered  under  .the  same  contract? 

Rowland:   Were  not  talking  about  the  same  thing.  We're  not  talking  about 
the  Edward  Elliott  bill,  are  we? 

Allen:    Well,  Assemblyman  Edward  Elliott's  bill  was  a  measure  that 
provided  three  percent  additional. 

Rowland:   When  was  that?  Do  you  recall? 

Allen:    That  was  1963. 


Rowland:   Okay.   So  that's  the  one  I'm  — 

Allen:    And  it  came  under  special  session  of  '64. 

Rowland:   That  is  the  one  that  is  now  getting  press  coverage  about  the 
tremendous  retirement  benefits. 

Allen:    I  would  suggest  the  Betts  case,  and  by  the  way,  the  press  re 
leases  are  quite  exaggerated. 

Well,  some  of  --.  These  people,  like  Marty  Salditch  in  Sacra 
mento,  a  nice  guy  -  he  was  always  objective  as  hell,  but  I 
think  he  got  on  the  wrong  place. 

Rowland:   He's  with  the  Riverside  Press  Enterprise? 

Allen:    Yes.   But  he  got  sucked  in  on  that  and  got  into  a  battle  with  me 
that  neither  one  of  us  had  a  right  being  in,  because   he's  always 
been  an  objective  little  guy,  I  always  thought.   He  got  sucked  into 
the  controversy  about  me  putting  the  amendments  in,  because  I  came 
right  out  and  said,  "Yes,  there  was  some  other  motive." 

Rowland:   The  amendments  into  the  Elliot  bill? 

Allen:    No,  the  Teale  bill. 

Just  a  second.   I  know  I'm  getting  awful  around  the  bush  here. 
I'm  sounding  like  Pat  Brown  and  Jerry  now.   But  getting  back  to 


the  Teale  bill,  where  I  didn't  complete  one  of  the  things  about 
this  bill  that  I  should  have.  Mesple  came  over  to  me,  and  he 
said,  "If  you  were  asked,  would  you  drop  the  pension  amendment?" 
I  said,  "Sure.  That  don't  make  any  difference  to  me.   If  the 
governor  tells  me  to  drop  it,  it'll  be  dropped.   I'll  get  it 

amended  out." 

Rowland:   You're  going  back  to  SB  13,  the  technical  correction/  your  rider? 

Allen:     Yes.   Later  Frank  Mesple  came  over,  and  he  said,  "When  you  come 
down  to  the  governor's  office  at  the  signing  of  the  bill  AB  1, 
the  governor  will  sign  it  in  a  couple  days  —  why  don't  you  and 
the  governor  go  over  the  amendment  at  that  time?"  Mesple  said 
to  me,  "You  know  I  don't  think  that  either  of  you  wants  that 
measure.   You've  done  a  marvelous  job  up  to  now,  so  why  louse 
it  up  with  controversial  language?" 

And  I  said,  "Yes,  I  agree  with  that.  To  drop  the  amendment  If 
the  governor  tells  me  to  in  writing  -  I'll  drink  to  that."  So 
that  was  the  story.    Getting  back  to  reapportionment ,  I 
waited  for  the  governor  to  call  roe.   I  was  called 
about  eight  o'clock,  at  home,  and  they  told  me  that  the  governor's 
plane  had  already  gone  south,  and  I  said,  "That's  nice.   I  hope 
him  a  great  trip." 

And  not  thinking  of  anything  else,  the  palace  guard  in  there  said, 
"Well,  you  know  he  is  going  down  to  sign  the  bill  in  the  Los 
Angeles  supervisors'  chambers  with  Mr.  Bonelli." 
"Oh?"  I  said.  "Well,  fine,  but  I  can't  get  away  this  morning." 
And  they  had  talked  to  Hugh  Burns  about  the  governor's  trip  pre 
viously,  and  I  didn't  know  about  it.   That's  when  Hugh  Burns  told 
the  press,  "I  don't  give  a  damn  if  he  signs  that  bill  in  the  men's 


room."  He  said,  "I'm  just  damn  glad  it's  out  of  our  way."  So  he 
was  really  put  out  about  that  bill.   He  came  to  me  and  he  told  me, 
he  said,  "Did  you  know  that  the  "Tower  of  Jello"  has  moved  down 
to  Los  Angeles  to  sign  your  bill,  with  your  fomer  seat-mate  on 
the  Los  Angeles  Board  of  Supervisors,  Frank  Bonelli,  who  had 
not  a  damn  thing  to  do  except  cause  the  rest  of  us  grief  around 

Backing  Ronald  Reagan 

Allen:   And  I  said,  "Well,  you  know — that's  our  Pat. 

Brown  has  got  a  guy  coming  up  here  to  Sacramento  and  wants  me 

to  endorse  him  this  afternoon,  and  I'm  going  to  tell  him  just 

like  a  couple  of  the  other  boys  did:   that  he  can  go  whistle 

Dixie  through  a  broken  comb,  for  my  endorsement." 

And  the  funny  part  of  it  was  that  Brown  double-crossed  my  friend 

and  campaign  chairman  over  the  years  (we  had  first  worked  together 

in  the  Al  Smith  bid  for  president  in  1928)  :  Robert  "Bob" 

Bushnell.   My  friend  (Bob)  went  home  and  died  of  a  heart  attack, 

and  his  wife  died  later.   I  was  in  the  St.  Vincents  Hospital 

recovering  from  major  surgery  which  forced  me  into  retirement. 

So  when  Bob's  daughter  Liz  came  into  see  me  and  told  me  her 

dad  was  dead  and  her  mother,  Helen,  was  in  intensive  care  with 

a  massive  coronary  and  in  the  same  hospital  with  me,  I  called 

the  Republican  Committee,  and  I  said,  "You  birds  got  anybody  down 

there  that  can  read  or  write  or  type  letter?   I  got  some  stationary 


up  here."  I  told  them  who  I  was.   And  I  said,  "I  might  just 
endorse  Reagan,  despite  the  fact  that  the  So-and-So  once  caused 
picketing  in  front  of  my  house,  when  he  was  an  ultra-liberal 
Democrat."  So  I  said,  "But  trot  the  stenographer  over  here,  and 
let's  go  over  a  letter." 

Gee,  whiz,  members  of  his  staff  were  down  there  in  record  time. 
They  were  there,  at  the  hospital,  followed  by  Reagan,  who  came 
running  in  and  said,  "Can  we  go  on  the  air?"  I  said,  "Sure  we  can 
go  on  the  air."  And  he  asked,  "Right  now?"  I  said,  "No,  no.   I 
will  have  to  get  my  doctors  permission."   (Which  the  doctor  gave  and 
stood  by  me  during  the  broadcast.) 
Then  he  said,  "Well,  we'll  be  down  tomorrow  morning." 

Rowland:  You're  talking  about  the  Republicans  that  were — 

Allen:   Yes.   Oh  hell,  they  were  down  at  St.  Vincent's  Hospital  real  early — 
Reagan  must  have  camped  there.   See,  I  had  a  big  hernia  operation. 
And  they  were  down  there  full  blast.   So  that  too.k  care  of  that.  And 
that  was  the  way  the  tune  went.  And  I  endorsed  Reagan — the  only 
Democratic  officeholder  that  did.  Not  because  of  the  vetoed 
legislation,  but  the  double-cross  of  my  friend,  Bob  Bushnell. 
Conflicts  with  the  Republican  Assembly 

Rowland:  Now,  what  was  your  response  to  charges  of  the  California  Republican 
Assembly  President  Stevenson  that  you  had  been  a  lobbyist  for  Harmes 
Votetronics,  a  manufacturer  of  vote  tabulating  equipment.  He  said 
you  were  in  conflict-of-interest  by  holding  hearings  on  a  bill  which 
would  prohibit  centralized  vote  tabulation.  You  were  chairman  at  that 
time  of  the  Assembly  Elections  and  Reapportionment  Committee.  These 
charges  originally  appeared  in  the  Sacramento  Bee  on  June  10,  1965. 


C^eck  On  Allen 

President  Cyril  Stevenson,  Jr., 
of  the  California  Republican  As 
sembly  said  today  he  plans  to 
ask  for  an  investigation  of  a 
possible  conflict  of  interest  on 
the  part  of  Democratic  Assem- 
lyman  Don  A.  Allen,  of  Los. 
Angeles  County,  whose  elections 
committee  has  scheduled  hear-1 
ings  on  a  bill  which  would  pro 
hibit  centralized  vote  tabulation.! 

believe  Allen  could  give  the  bill) 
a  fair  hearing  because  Allen  last 
fall  acted  as  a  lobbyist  for  Har-| 
ris  Votetronics,  a  manufacturer 
of  vote  tabulating  equipment. 

Stevenson  said  he  would  ask 
the  CRA  board  to  authorize  a 
letter  to  Attorney  General 
Thomas  Lynch  asking  him  to 
"explore  the  possibilities  of  a 
conflict  of  interest." 

June  10,   1965 
Page  D2,   column  5 

The  billl,  which  would  pro-; 
hibit  centralized  vote  tabula 
tion,  was  sponsored  by  Demo-j 
cratic  Senator  George  Miller  ofi 
Contra  Costa  County.  Stevenson 
said  the  CRA  "strongly  sup 
ports"  the  measure. 

"The  bill  would  insure  that 
ballots  would  be  counted  at  the 
polling  place,  which  I  think  is 
inherent  in  our  form  of  govern 
ment,"  Stevenson  said. 

He  said  with  centralized 
tabulation  "we  would  be  trust 
ing  just  one  man  and  a  ma 
chine  which  is  supposed  to  be 

Stevenson  said  Allen  repre 
sented  the  Harris  firm  before! 
Los  Angeles  County's  board  of 
supervisors  last  August  as  a 
lobbyist,  offering  the  firm's! 
services  free  on  a  trial  basis. 

"I  don't  know  how  he  could 
give  this  bill  a  fair  hearing,, 
since  he  worked  as  a  lobbyist 
for  Harris  last  fall,"  Stevenson 

Allen:      Yes,  he  had. been  up  to  see  me,  this  fellow  Cyril  Stevenson,  Jr. 

He  was  president  of  the  California  Republican  Assembly,  and  he 
came  up  to  see  me  and  he  asked  me  about  this  Harmes  Votetronics 
manufacturing  firm,  and  I  said  I  never  heard  of  it  (there  never 
was  such  a  firm).   So  then  he  said,  "Now  look,  we  have  asked 
you  to  set  aside  a  Republican  district  in  San  Francisco  in  the 
assembly,  and  if  you  don't,  we're  going  to  -pin  this  conflict 
of  interest  charge  on  you?" 

"Well,"  I  said,  "Right  about  now,  I'm  going  to  pin  a  black  eye 
right  on  you,  kid,  and  maybe  a  broken  jaw  while  I'm  at  it." 
Now,  the  only  time  that  I  ever  horsed  around  was  with  a  voting 
machine  brought  to  my  attention.   It  was  Joel  Harris,  who  was 
with  the  University  of  California,  School  of  Political  Science, 
and  Dr.  Rubenol,  who  was  in  the  School  of  Mechanical  Engineering, 
told  me  that  they  had  a  voting  machine.   I  said,  "Fine.   I'll 
go  down  to  the  basement  and  look  at  it." 

He  said,  "No,  you  don't  have  to  do  that.   Here."   I  was  imagining 
one  of  these  big,  hulking       machines  that  would  never  work. 
He  said,  "No,  we've  got  it  right  here  in  the  briefcase." 
And  all  of  a  sudden  I  looked  at  these  guys.   I  knew  Dr.  Harris 
very  well,  and  I  just  wondered  when  his  mind  got  twisted  and  he'd 
done  a  reverse  turn.  And  they  pulled  this  thing  out  of  the 
briefcase.   I  played  around  with  it  for  fully  three  hours,  and 
couldn1 t  beat  it. 

So  I  said,  "Sure,  I'll  put  a  bill  through  for  you."  And  I  did. 
I  thought  it  was  the  thing  to  do.   It  is  a  terrific  fool  proof 
device.  They're  using  it  now.   I  think  Dr.  Harris  got  gypped 
on  it.   I  think  he  and  Rubenol,  both,  got  horsed  out  of  it  by 

Secretary  of  State  Frank  Jordan  examines  the  votomatic  voting 
device  in  1965,  developed  by  Professor  Joel  Harris,  Department 
of  Political  Science,  University  of  California,  Berkeley. 
Left  to  right:   Assemblyman  Don  Allen,  Secretary  of  State 
Frank  Jordan,  Professor  Joel  Harris. 

Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  Senior,  Mrs.  Margaret 
Allen,  and  Don  Allen,  Junior,  now  retired  master 
technical  sergeant,  United  States  Marine  Corps. 


So  as  far  as  that  was  concerned,  that  conflict  of  interest  charge 
was  made  by  a  mad  individual,  and  it  was  a  piece  of  attempted 

blackmail,  and  I  called  the  San  Francisco  district  attorney 

[see  following  page] 
about  bringing  a  criminal  law  suit./  The  district  attorney  called 

me  back  and  said,  "You're  damn  right  you  can  bring  criminal  libel." 
He  said,  "This  guy  has  admitted  it."  He  said,  "I'm  telling  him 
that  he  better  get  with  you  and  better  go  right  down  to  the  press 
and  square  himself  with  them  and  right  now.   I've  got  to  give  him 
an  opportunity,  Mr.  Allen,  to  repudiate."  And  the  guy,  Stevenson, 
did.   He  said  he  was  intemperate  and  lost  his  temper  and  so  forth 
and  so  on. 

And  one  of  the  newsmen  asked  me,  and  I  said,  "Yes,  he  damn  near 
lost  his  head,  too."  Because  I  was  ready  to  serve  it  to  him  on 
a  platter. 

Rowland:   What  was  the  blackmail  again?  I  missed  that. 

Allen:    Stevenson  told  me  that  if  I  didn't  set  a  Republican  district  in 
San  Francisco,  where  a  Republican  could  be  elected,  he  would 
throw  the  so-called  conflict  of  interest  matter  at  me. 

Rowland:   Did  he  refer  to  a  particular  Republican  in  a  San  Francisco 
assembly  district? 

Allen:    No,  he  didn't  put  it  by  name.   No,  he  just  wanted  an  assembly 

district  created  out  there.  And  I  told  him  at  that  time,  I  said, 
"Man,  you  can  put  every  republican  in  one  area  and  you  would  be  short 
two  thirds  of  a  numerical  needs  of  a  district. 

Rowland:   An  assembly  district  to  be  apportioned,  you  mean. 

Allen:    I  said,  "If  you  tried,  you  haven't  got  enough  down  there  that 

meets  the  criteria."  When  we  were  talking  and  I  showed  him  what 
the  Supreme  Court  had  held,  I  said,  "Here's  what  your  registrar 


July  2,  1965 
page  A4,  column  3 

May  Sue  CR A 
Chief  For  Libel 

Assemblyman  Don  Allen  (U) 
of  Los  Angeles  County  reported 
to  the  assembly  he  has  asked 
District  Attorney  John  Ferdor. 
of  San  Francisco  County  to  de 
termine  whether  there  is  a  ba 
sis  for  filing  charge  of  criminal 
libel  against  Cyril  Stevenson. 
Jr..  president  of  the  California 
Republican  Assembly. 

Allen  late  yesterday  got  per 
mission  to  have  printed  in  the 
assembly  journal  a  letter  in 
which  he  denied  a  statement  by 
Stevenson  accusing  the  assem 
blyman  of  a  conflict  of  interest 
by  acting  as  a  lobbyist  for  the 
Harris  Voteromcs  Manufactur 

ing  firm. 

No  Hesitancy 

"I  declare  no  hesitancy  ;n 
stating  that  I  have  never  been 
employed  or  received  any  com 
pensation,  nor  do  I  own  any 
stock  in  any  voting  machine,  de 
vice,  tabulating  equipment,  nor 
does  any  member  of  my  fam 
ily."  Allen's  letter  to  District 
Attorney  Ferdon  reads. 

Allen  said  Stevenson's  accusa 
tion  was  made  in  a  UP1  story 
filed  by  the  United  Press  Inter 
national  out  of  San  Francisco. 

Allen  reported  to  the  assem- 
b  I  y  he  appreciated  the  con 
fidence  shown  in  him  by  mem 
bers'- of  the  assembly  since 
Stevenson  made  his  conflict  of 
i  interest  charge. 

Seeks  Opinion 

"My  purpose  in  writing  this 
letter  is  to  ascertain  your  opin 
ion  on  the  desirability  and  feasi 
bility  for  filing  charges  for 
criminal  libel  against  this  per 
son  who  has  no  basis  or  founda 
tion  of  fact  whatsoever.  '  Al 
len's  letter  to  the  district  attor 
ney  reads.  "I  Jo  not  intend  to 
file  a  civil  libel  action." 

Allen's  letter  noted  United 
States  Senator  Thomas  H.  Ku- 
chel  of  California  set  a  pattern 
when  he  "with  great  courage, 
filed  a  suit  against  individuals 
who  attempted  to  assassinate 
his  character.' 

Allen,  chairman  of  the  assem 
bly  committee  on  elections  and 
reapportionment.  wrote  "I  do 
not  intend  to  stand  idly  by  and 
be  the  melancholy  victim  of  any 
one  who  seeks  to  use  my  good 
character  for  his  perscuul  .ag- 


of  voters  tells  me  is  the  number  of  Republicans  you  got.V  And 
I  said,  "You  wouldn't  have  half  enough  to  elect  a  Republican." 
Stevenson  then  got  to  mouthing  off.  He  was  going  to  throw  his 
weight  around.  (Mimicking)  He  was  the  State  President  of  the 
Republican  assembly. 

And  you  know,  three  of  the  guys  that  founded  the  Republican 
assembly  went  after  him  right  away.  They  said,  "You  don't  do 
that  to  Don  Allen.  We  put  you  (Stevenson)  in  office.  We  can 
take  you  out,  if  Allen  don't  send  you  to  the  slammer." 

Rowland:   That  was  the  only  conflict  with  the  Republican  party  you  had, 

Allen:    Hell,  they  wrote  me  in  over  their  own  man  one  time  during  1940. 
Yes!  ff 


Endorsing  Max  Rafferty 

Allen:  I  endorsed  Rafferty. 

Rowland:  Against  Tom  Kuchel? 

Allen:  No. 

Rowland:  Was  that  the  Kuchel  campaign? 

Allen:  Oh,  no,  no,  no.   I  would  never  go  against  Tom  Kuchel. 

Rowland:  But  you  did  endorse  him  for  re-election  as  superintendent  of 

public  — 

Allen:  Yes.  Well,  when  he  ran  against  Tom  Kuchel,  I  toldMax,  I  said, 

"You're  crazy.  You're  going  to  ruin  everything  here." 

in  1970 
Later/  he  came  to  me  for  my  endorsement,  and  I  said,  "All  right, 

I'll  endorse  you  because  I  don't  like  this  cat  Riles."  He  was 
in  my  district.  That  campaign  for  superintendent  of  public  in 
struction  followed  the  campaign  for  senator  two  years  later. 


Rowland:   Wilson  Riles? 

Allen:    Wilson  Riles.   He  was  in  my  district  at  one  time.   He  (Riles) 
was  trying  to  find  himself  around  in  the  political  scene.  And 
the  thing,  too,  that  appealed  to  me  was  that  when  Riles  was 
hunting  for  a  job,     Max  Rafferty  came  to  his  aid.   I  thought 
he  was  an  ingrate  to  run  against  Max,  to  be  honest  with  you. 
Still  do. 

So  I  tried  to  contact  March  Fong  this  last  election*    Riles 

with  her 
got  into  this  argument /you  know,  about  him  not  signing  and  not 

filing  properly  for  reelection.   Kiddingly  I  told  her  to  go 
ahead  and  use  the  prerogative  of  her  office  on  him.  There  was 
precedent  when  a  former  secretary  of  state  got  into  a  wangle 
with  a  news  publisher  and  they  went  out  here  near  Elvis  and 
the  secretary  of  state,  John  Denver,  shot  the' guy  very  dead 
in  a  duel.   That's  the  guy  that  Denver  is  named  after:   John 
Denver.  And  he  was  a  state  senator  here  and  also  a  secretary 
of  state  and  then  a  congressman  from  here  for  a  while.   But  he 
was  also  a  governor  of  all  of  the  territories  west  of  the 
Mississippi  at  one  time.   Quite  a  man. 

And  I  was  going  to  tell  her,  "Make  him  (Riles)  come  out  singing 
•Lay  that  pistol  down,  babe.'"   But  I  couldn't  get  a  hold  of 
her.   I  was  going  to  kid  her  about  it. 

The  Inheritance  Tax  Appraisal  Episode 

Rowland:  One  last  question,  and  that's  I'd  like  you  to  comment  on  your  in 
vestigation  of  Alan  Cranston's  U.S.  Senate  bid  in  1964.  You  were 
investigating  an  inheritance  tax  appraiser  problem  there  with 

Alan  Cranston  when  he  was  -- [See  following  page] 

Allen:    That  thing  was  handed  to  me. 

Rowland:   Handed  to  you  by  whom? 

Allen:    Well,  I  got  it  through  the  clerk  of  the  assembly.   It  had  to 
have  been  authorized  under  the  law  by  the  rules  committee  and 
the  assembly  and  assigned  to  me  by  Speaker  Unruh. 

Rowland:   Why  was  Unruh  ~ 7 

Allen:    I  don't  know  why.   It  seems  that  there  was  a  guy  by  the  name  of 
Assemblyman  Bagley  ~  Bill  Bagley,  who  wanted  a  job  done  on 
Cranston,  I  guess,  and  he  demanded  an  investigation.  So  I 
went  into  the  investigation,  and  hell,  I  went  into  the  history 
and  oh,  did  they  drop  it  in  a  hurry.  The  Republicans  especially. 

Rowland:   Bill  Bagley  was  a  Republican? 

Allen:    Yes.  They  hushed  that  in  a  hurry.   Because  from  1906  with  the 
appointment  of  A.  B.  Nye,  each  succeeding  controller  was  first 
appointed  by  the  governor,  so,  Cranston  was  the  first  controller 
to  be  elected  in  contest  with  an  incumbent  in  52  years.   It  was 
my  findings  that  Alan  Cranston  had  cleaned  up  a  real  mess  and  he 
put  the  appraisers  on  an  equal  basis  and  secured  the  assistance 
of  the  Superior  Court  Judges  to  assist  him. 

Rowland:   He  must  have  taken  over  from  — 

Allen:    Oh,  I'll  tell  you  in  a  minute  —  Kirkwood.   He  defeated  former 
Assemblyman  Robert  Kirkwood.   Kirkwood  was  from  Saratoga.   He 
served  as  an  assemblyman.  Anyhow,  he  was  a  nice  enough  office 
holder,  but  Cranston  ran  and  won  it.  The  first  time  in  52  years 
an  incumbent  controller  had  been  defeated  at  the  polls. 
You  see,  what  had  happened  would  be  that  a  controller  would  get 

Sacramento  Bee 
May  24,  1964 
page  A3,  column  1 


Cranston  Calls  For 
Appraiser  Case  Probe 

MOUNTAIN  VI!  \V  S.i:ua  her  when  Cranston  «us -run- 
Clara  Co. —AP  — Stale  CKII-  nillK  f("'  election  as  controller, 
irollei  Alan  Cranston  said  Cranston  said  that  the 

charge  w*s  "ridiculous.'    that 
jeslerday  he  would  welcome,  he  d*d  no[  ujk  to  appraisers 

a  fair  and  impartial  mvestiga-  about  money,  and  that  he 
lion  by  any  responsi  ble  nre(j  Soehnel  last  January, 
source  of  charges  that  inheri-  The  controller  said  further 
tance  tax  appraisers  appoint-  Soehnel  was  ousted  after  an 
ed  by  him  have  been  forced}  investigation  disclosed  him  to 
to  contribute  to  his  campaign.1  be  an  officer  in  a  corporation 
Cranston  is  running  for  the  which  acquired  property  from 
Democratic  nomination  for  an  estate  in  which  he  had 
United  States  senator  acted  as  appraiser. 

He  said  in  an  interne1*  he 
questions  whether  he  could 
get  such  a  ht-ownn  from  as 
semblyman  Don  A  Allen  (D» 
of  Los  Angeles. 

Allen  on  Friday  told  I'M  in 
heritance  tax  appraisers  to 
prepare  to  disclose  their  fi 
nancial  records. 

Unruh  Link 

Cranston    said    Allen    was 
one  of  Assembly  Speaker 
Jesse  Unruh's closest  political 
associates  and  an  announced' 
supporter    of    former    White! 
House  Press  Secretary  Pierre: 
Salinger,  his  rival  for  the  sen-j 
ate  nomination. 

The  controller  said  he  pre 
dicted  several  days  ago 
"there  would  be  a  smear  a 
day  now  that  Unruh  is  play 
ing  a  key  part  in  the  Salinger 

Cranston  claimed  this  has 
been  occurring  "with  clock- 
like  regularity." 

Asked  if  he  thinks  the  ap 
praiser  appointment  system; 
should  be  revised,  Cranstoni 
said  responsible  legislative! 
committees,  as  well  as  the! 
state  bar,  have  praised  the 
present  system. 

No  Retreat 

He  said  he  was  the  first 
controller  10  establish  a  code 
of  ethics  tor  appraisers  and 
he  refuses  to  "retreat  from 
something  that  is  being  done 

In  Los  Angeles  Friday.  Sal 
inger  supporters  sponsored  a 
news  conference  for  Edward 
J.  Soehnel.  a  San  Francisco 
real  estate  man.  who  said  he 
got  a  job  as  an  appraiser  in 
1959  by  contributing  to  Cran 
ston's  campaign  a  year  ear- 


another  office,  or  by  death,  vacate  the  office  and  the  governor 
would  make  an  appointment.   In  many  instances,  the  governor  and 
controller  had  a  few  little  things  going  for  them  such  as 
appointing  inheritance  tax  appraisers.  The  inheritance  appraisers 
would  be  charitable  and  grateful  appointees  and  could  be  a  nice 
source  of  campaign  help. 

The  federal  government  allows  self-appraisals,  by  the  attorney  and 
trustee  of  an  estate,  and  then  they  investigate  later.  They'll 
send  you  to  jail  right  quick  if  you  don't  do  the  right  job. 
All  right.  And  I  thought  it  would  be  a  damn  good  thing  to  abolish 
state  appraisers  sometime  along  the  line  and  adopt  the  federal 

Some  stories  have  long  been  told  that  the  contributions  of  ap 
praisers  would  go  into  a  general  pot  for  campaign  purposes  and 
the  governor  would  get  fifty  percent  for  his  fee  —  or  not  fee. 
No  fee  —  Let's  not  talk  about  fee.   But,  some  governor's,  but 
not  all,  would  get  a  contribution,  and  whatever  appraisers 
contributions  would  come  in,  the  governor  would  split  it  four 
ways.  This  occurrs  in  the  governor's  office  without  the  governor 
being  aware  of  it.  The  governor  would  get  half  of  it,  the  con 
troller  would  get  twenty-five  percent,  and  then  they  would  split 
between  the  secretary  of  state  and  the  treasurer  the  other 
twenty- five  percent  —  twelve  and  a  half  percent  each.  And  that 
kept  on  for  years  and  years.  There  was  no  governor  that  ever  escaped 

I  have  never  found  the  slightest  bit  of  evidence  to  substantiate 
those  rumors  or  allegations.   If  it  ever  did  happen,  it  could 
never  happen  again  due  to  the  Cranston  action. 


Rowland:   But  why  did  you  launch  this  investigation  right  after  Cranston 

announced  his  bid  for  the  U.S.   Senate  in  '64,  instead  of  support 
ing  Cranston  as  a  Democrat?  Is  it  just  coincidence,  or  was 
Jess  Unruh  — 

Allen:    No!   No,  I  don't  know  why  the  timing.   I  believe  I  answered  this 
previously.   Jess  acted  in  full  accordance  with  the  rules. 

Rowland:   There  was  talk  in  the  press  about  Jess  Unruh  supporting  Salinger 
for  the  U.S.  Senate. 

Allen:    Yes,  Salinger.   I  didn't  have  anything  to  do  with  any  of  the 

Senatorial  races  at  the  time.  They  gave  me  a  job  to  do,  and  I 
went  ahead  and  did  it.  And  then  all  hands  ditched  it.  Right 
now.  And  I  showed  where  these  guys,  see,  that  — 

Rowland:   Unruh  gave  you  the  assignment? 

Allen:    Well  sure,  the  rules  committee.   I  was  chairman  of  the  elections 
committee,  and  they  asked  me  to  go  in.   Cranston  liked  it,  though. 
He  didn't  talk  to  me  until  later  on,  many  years  later  he  talked 
to  me  about  it  and  said,  "You  were  really  fair  about  it  and 
decent."  Well  anyhow,  I  found  out  there  that  Cranston  had  been  — 
and  I  published  it  —  that  he  was  the  only  guy  that  had  ever  been 
elected,  straight  out,  and  that  is  what  he  did  was  to  divide  these 
appraisals  up.  He  went  to  the  various  courts  and  had  a  rotating 
assignment  set  up. 

Rowland:   We  can  always  seal  it  if  it's  too  sensitive. 

Allen:    Well,  it  might  be.   Let's  say  that  one  individual  had  control  of 
one  county,  and  that  a  huge  landowner  or  person  of  great  wealth 
in  that  county  died:   the  appraisal  of  a  multi-million  dollar 
deal  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  half  a  million  dollars. 
Yes.   Well,  Cranston  went  in  on  that  Democrat  landslide  with  the 


rest  of  them  —  and  Betts.  And  so  Cranston  divided  the  in 
heritance  tax  revenue  up.   In  other  words,  he  rotated  the 
appraisers,  and  everything  was  completely  watched.   He  had  a 
regular  report  from  each  appraiser  and  he  had  it  down  to  one 
of  the  fairest  situations  I've  ever  seen  in  that  office. 
The  record  will  show  Cranston  conducted  a  large  scale  house 
cleaning  and  set  the  pattern.   I  think  the  last  two  con 
trollers  have  been  as  fair  since,  including  a  very  high-class 
persons  like  Hugh  Flournoy  and  Cory.   But  it  was  there  at  one 
time  --  it  was  payoffs. 

I  know  another  fellow  that  once  served  in  the  legislature  and 
quit  to  be  an  appraiser.   He  told  me  that  he'd  make  a  hundred 
thousand  dollars  a  year  out  of  it  -  when  Ray  Riley  was  con 
troller.  And  all  he  had  was  a  gal  in  his  office  doing  the 
work.   He  would  go  out  and  bring  in  the  data,  make  the  in 
spection  and  bring  it  in,  she'd  type  it  up  and  mail  in  a  re 
port.   The  tax  appraisers  fees  are  set  under  the  government 
code  now  -  cut  to  one  tenth  of  one  percent.   Recently  con 
troller  Cory  fixed  the  maximum  of  $50,000  any  one  appraiser 
could  handle. 

Now  another  little  thing  in  the  late  20' s  and  early  30' s,  when 
we  had  the  old  Matoon  in  the  controller's  office,  a  serious 
situation  regarding  the  tax  deeded  property  resulting  from  that 
act,  in  the  controller's  office  -  under  the  matoon  act  the 
controller  became  the  custodian  of  all  tax  deeded  properties. 

Rowland:   The  old  —  what  was  that? 

Allen:    The  Matoon  Act.   It  was  an  assessment  act.  Any  public  agency 
that  wanted  to  build  a  road  or  a  highway  or  a  storm  drain  or 


anything  of  the  kind,  the  governing  body,  either  city  or  state 
or  county,  would  just  Jjui  Id  Cl    and  then  they  would  go  back 
and  assess  the  people  for  the  full  cost  of  it.  There  was  an 
awful  lot  of  people  that  lost  their  homes  that  way.  All  of  a 
sudden  you  have  a  home  that  you  built  that  you  probably  spent 
about  eight  thousand  or  more  for,  and  you  come  up  with  a  six 
percent  interest-bearing  assessment  against  your  property,  or 
lien  against  your  property.   In  many  instances,  it  was  down 
right  confiscation. 

So  under  one  controller  —  there  was  a  gentleman  down  in  Los 
Angeles  that  made  himself  several  million  dollars  and  bought 
three  or  four  ranches  off  of  tax  deeded  property  manipulations. 
He  would  go  out,  especially  over  in  the  Negro  district  on 
Central  Avenue,  and  down  through  there,  and  he'd  find  ,  I 
personally  believe  he  was  tipped  off  by  the  controller  -  he 
would  find  this  tax  deeded  property,  and  would  be  zoned  as 
one  family  residential,  R-l,  and  he'd  let  these  buildings  out 
to  people  to  three  and  four  families  in  one  property.  And  he 
would  get  the  check  direct  from  the  SRA,  the  State  Relief 
Administration.  They  paid  him  from  thirty  five  to  fifty 
dollars  a  month  -  each  family  -  and  yet  he  had  only  given  the 
state  something  like  seven  or  eight  dollars  a  year  in  taxes  for  the 
property.   He  also  made  great  profits  by  buying  and  selling  tax 
deeded  properties.  This  guy  was  drawing  as  much  as  a  hundred 
eighty  dollars  per  month  in  some  instances  per  property  out  of 
the  relief  rolls  for  rental  on  these  properties,  you  see  what  I 
mean?  He  made  a  fortune  at  it.  Well,  I  broke  that  thing  up  in 
1941,  with  a  simple  little  bill.  And  the  guy  never  knew  he  was 


bit  until  he  went  back  for  more  properties. 
Controller,  Ray  Riley,  was  a  character.   He  was  a  member  of 
forty  seven  committees,  and  he  was  the  chairman  of  about 
thirty  five,  thirty  six  of  those  committees.   He  would  call 
meetings  throughout  the  state.   Calling  three  or  four  of  them 
at  a  time,  and  draw  his  per  diems  on  each  one.   This  is  the  same 
guy  that  knocked  Elmer  Lore  out  of  eighty  five  cents  for  break 

Riley  would  go  down  to  Los  Angeles  when  Notre  Dame  was  playing 
USC,  and  he  would  leave  Sacramento  and  go  down  on  four  or  five 
of  these  committees.   He'd  call  them  all  simultaneously.  Of 
course,  he  always  was  well  taken  care  of  on  football  tickets 
for  the  folks. 

So  anyway,  Riley  had  devised  this  little  program  of  tax  deeded 
property  and  later  brag  about  it.   Some  suspected  that  he  was 
actually  getting  a  little  money  in  on  this  deal. 
So  anyhow,  Governor  Frank  Merriam  caught  up  with  him.  The 
governor  said,  "How  about  going  on  the  railroad  commission  for  a 
short  time  and  behaving  yourself.  I  don't  want  to  have  to  get  out 

and  knock  hell  out  of  you  at  the  next  election."  And  of  course, 
Ray  Riley  served  for  a  number  of  years  on  the  railroad  commission  • 
now  Public  Utilities  Committee. 

Rowland:   One  last  thing  here,  since  I've  got  you  down  sitting  in  front  of 
me,  and  we  would  like  to  have  more  information  about  the  assembly 
and  how  Speaker  Unruh  ran  the  assembly  in  those  years,  was  there 
any  change  in  assembly  committees,  as  far  as  status  was  concerned? 

Allen:    Well,  when  Jess  took  over,  he  took  over  the  same  committees  — 
that  he  had  inherited  from  Ralph  Brown  -  about  24  standing 


committees.  When  I  came  to  the  assembly  in  1939,  we  had  54 
standing  committees.  And  there's  a  little  —  let's  say  a 
little  bit  of  apocryphal  stories  going  around  about  Jess.   I 
kidded  one  time  on  the  floor  and  called  him  "Big  Daddy  Warbucks," 
because  here  he  was  the  chairman  of  the  ways  and  means  com 
mittee,  with  all  this  money,  and  Jess  had  been  raised  very 
frugally  as  a  kid. 

So  I  kidded  him  about  it,  and  at  first  he  liked  it,  see.   Be 
cause  a  lot  of  the  newspapermen  thought  it  was  tied  to  the 
"Cat  on  a  Hot  Tin  Roof,"  the  Tennessee  Williams  play.   But 
then  pretty  soon  it  became  a  drag  on  him. 

The  Assembly  Lockup 

Now,  there  was  a  big  article  about  how  he  whipped  the  Republi 
cans  into  line  by  holding  these  Republicans  overnight,  under  a 
call  of  the  house. 

Rowland:   Were  there  any  Republicans  that  Jess  worked  with  well? 

Allen:    He  worked  with  them  all,  or  tried  to.   But  anyway,  you  must 

remember  that  call  of  the  house  is  called  by  the  members,  not 
the  speaker.  There  has  to  be  a  bona  fide  motion  made  and  a  vote 
taken  on  it.  And  if  you'll  go  over  the  records,  you'll  find  that 
a  motion  was  made  by  William  Bagley,  Assemblyman  Bagley,  and 
seconded  by  John  Veneman  —  both  Republicans  —  that  we  got  to  a 
call  for  the  house.  This  was  on  the  closing  night.   So  Jess 
wanted  to  get  on  with  the  business  of  the  day. 

Rowland:   This  is  the  assembly  lockup  you're  describing? 

Allen:    That's  right.   So  the  thing  passed.   It  was  courtesy  to  give  a 

guy,  generally,  a  call  of  the  house  over  there.   I  was  locked  Tip 


hammering  away  and  causing  trouble  between  Brown  and  Jess  Unruh. 
Pat  Brown  told  Jerry  Waldie  and  myself,  and  others,  that  he  was 
only  going  to  serve  two  terms  as  governor  and  would  help  Jess 
campaign  for  governor. 

Rowland:   Who  was  the  palace  guards  during  this  ~? 

Allen:    Oh,  Hale  Champion  and  some  of  those  guys. 

Rowland:   Mesple,  or  —  ? 

Allen:    No,  Mesple  was  not  that  kind  of  a  person.  Mesple  was  a  guy  that 
stuck  to  his  own  knitting.  Mesple  was  a  pretty  down-to-earth 
guy.   He  was  honest. 

Rowland:   Warren  Christopher? 

Allen:    Christopher  wasn't  with  Brown,  was  he? 

Rowland:   Yes,  he  was.   Maybe  he  wasn't  at  first. 

Allen:    But  there  were  these  able  people  like  Julian  Beck.   The  governor's 
office  persuaded  Judge  Beck  to  come  up.   Beck  did  and  soon  asked 
to  go  back  on  the  bench  again  because  he  couldn't  take  what  the 
Brown  palace  guards  were  doing.   It  was  the  talk  of  Sacramento 
that  Hale  Champion  wanted  his  wife,  Marie,  to  be  a  running  mate  — 
wanted  Pat  Brown  to  drop  Glenn  Anderson  this  last  go-«-ound  when 
the  governor  got  beat  —  drop  Glenn  Anderson  and  put  his  [Champion's] 
wife  Marie  up  as  lieutenant  governor. 

Champion  is  supposed  to  have  said,  "Well,  you  know,  the  Mrs.  has 
got  a  lot  of  publicity  out  of  this  kidnapping  of  ours,  you  know," 
and  so  forth  and  so  on. 

Hale  Champion  didn't  like  Jess.  Anybody  that  had  any  kind  of  an 
inside  track,  or  anybody  that  looked  like  they  were  going  to  get 
an   inside  track  would  get  his  head  chopped  off  by  Champion 
around  the  governor's  office.   I  think  I  went  in  the  governor's 



in  the  chambers  and  so  was  Jess,  There  was  Democrats 

locked  up  over  there,  all  the  Democrats.  Everybody  had  to  be 
there.   All  you  had  to  do  was  rise  up  and  call  for  a  quorum 
call,  and  by  God,  they  had  to  be  there,  see,  or  you  had  to  know 
where  they  were,  excused. 

So  anyway,  this  was  a  farce.   Brown  had  left  Sacramento  and  he 
went  over  to  Israel.   He'd  been  invited  over  to  Israel,  and  the 
Republicans  said  he  should've  stuck  around  so  they  could've 
made  some  deals  with  him  on  the  budget.  Well  their  attitude  was 
to  raise  the  budget  and  not  lower  it.   So  they  (Republicans)  was 
the  ones  that  put  the  call  of  the  house  on.  So  Jess  was  pretty 
sore  that  night.   He  said  he  was  going  to  get  out  of  the  God 
damn  place.   He  was  going  to  resign.   Jess  had  had  it  about  that 
time  because  they  had  five  Republicans  —  they  were  little  hell 


And  then  the  next/   all  hell  broke  loose,  about  "Big  Daddy" 

locking  them  up.  Well,  the  press  don't  go  back  on  a  story  like 
that.   They're  not  about  ready  to  tell  you  the  truth  at  all  times 
about  a  story  like  that. 

You  hear  an  awful  lot  about  Jess  being  tightened  down.   Jess1 
great  ambition  over  there  was  to  raise  and  elevate  and  get  more 
salary  for  the  legislature  --  more  prestige.  And  you'll  notice 
out  through  some  of  these  publications  and  other  places  that  we 
had  under  Jess  Unruh  what  they  called  "the  number  one  business 
like  legislature  in  the  United  States. 
Interpreting  the  Unruh-Brown  Differences 

Then  too,  not  only  did  the  Republicans  get  to  it,  but  some  of  the 
palace  guards  of  Pat  Brown,  who  had  ambitions  for  themselves,  were 


office  four  times.   You  would  hear  of  these  things. 

Rowland:   What  was  Unruh1 s  relationship  with  the  third  house? 

Allen:    About  so-so.   See,  if  you'll  remember,  Jess  wrote  many  articles 
about  the  lack  of  independence  from  the  third  house  of  the 
legislature.   He  was  very  critical  of  the  third  house  —  very 
critical,  most  all  times. 

He  had  some  backers,  I  don't  mind  telling  you.  And  I  don't 
think  Jess  would  mind  me  telling  you,  either.   Howard  Ahmanson 
liked  Jess.  Also  that  Jess  became  Howard's  protege  which  lasted 
until  Ahmanson'  s  death. 

Rowland:   Who  was  once  a  Republican  and  a  strong  financial  backer  of  the 
Republican  party,  was  he  not? 

Allen:    Oh,  yes.  Oh.he  remained  a  Republican  until  his  death,  and  a 
contributor  to  the  Republican  party  when  he  would  feel  he  was 
backing  the  right  candidate.   Jess  brought  him  into  the  campaign 
for  Pat  Brown  —  and  of  course  if  you  know,  he  was  the  guy  that 
founded  that  $13  billion  building  and  loan  set  up. 

Rowland:   He  founded  Home  Savings,  didn't  he? 

Allen:    Home  Savings,  yes,  and  the  Ahmanson  Bank.   Howard  was  a  very 
generous  person.   Besides  making  donations  to  his  alma  mater, 
the  University  of  Southern  California,  donations  were  made  to 
the  Los  Angeles  County  museum.  He  constructed  the  thirteen 
million  dollar  Ahmanson  theater.  Adding  also  considerable  money 
to  the  Dorothy  Chandler  Pavilion  which  was  raised  by  public 
subscription.  A  dedicated  financeer,  Mark  Taper,  also  donated 
a  thirteen  million  dollar  music  center,  making  a  tremendous 
cultural  center  on  Bunker  Hill  in  the  heart  of  Los  Angeles. 
Not  only  was  Jess  firmly  in  the  friendship  of  Howard  Ahmanson, 


but  with  Howard  Edgerton,  the  founder  of  the  Federal  Savings 
and  Loan.   Unfortunately  for  Jess,  the  two  Howards  died  about 
6  months  before  Jess  started  his  campaign  for  Governor. 
You  know,  Jess  would  find  out  about  a  building  and  loan  going 
in,  and  Jess  would  buy  into  it,  then  he  would  sell  out  later 
because  the  building  and  loan  company  would  rise  real  fast  at 
that  time.   Jess  made  some  good  money  doing  that.  And  he  made 
no  bones  about  it  at  all,  no  conflict  of  interest,  but  he  was  — 
and  is  an  excellent  economist.   I'm  talking  now  like  I'm  an 
admirer  of  Jess,  but  really  and  truly,  we  had  our  differences  of 

Rowland:   Didn't  he  have  a  testimonial  dinner  committee  also  that  forced 
lobbyists  and  third  house  — 

Allen:    Well,  he  had  a  testimonial  dinner  committee.  They  raised  money 
for  Pat  Brown  and  the  others.   He  was  the  one  that  put  Pat  into 
the  governor's  office,  and  Pat  admitted  it  time  after  time,  and 
said,  "Now,  I'm  going  to  only  serve  two  terms,  and  then  we're 
going  to  have  to  go  out  for  Jess,"  before  many  of  us. 
And  then  however,  the  palace  guards  (governor's  office  staff) 
wanted  no  part  of  Jess  and  just  kept  building  and  building  a  fire 
and  cutting  Pat  and  Jess  off  from  one  another  and  caused  the 
whole  damn  ruckus. 

Rowland:   That  would  be  Hale  Champion  and  —7 

Allen:    Oh,  Hale  Champion  and  Don  Bradley,  and  who  in  the  hell  was  the 

other  one?  There  were  several  of  them  around.  Oh,  yes.   I  know 
one  of  the  guys  was  the  very  guy  that  Jess  took  under  his  wing 
and  put  his  wife  in  the  City  Council  of  Los  Angeles  and  got  him 
started  out  as  a  lawyer  when  he  came  to  California  from  Chicago. 


Rowland:   Wyman? 

Allen:     Yes.   Wyman.   He  had  everything  full  go  for  Wyman.   I  was  never  so 
embarrassed  in  all  my  life  as  Ros  Wyman,  who  was  a  very  brilliant 
girl,  got  carried  away  as  chairman  of  the  Governor's  second 
inauguration,  which  was  held  at  the  Veteran's  Memorial  Auditorium, 
showing  two  brigadier  generals  and  three  major  generals  on  how 
to  salute  the  flag  as  though  they  were  rookies. 
Oh  yes,  and  of  course,  Jess  had  received  great  support  from 
Lawrence  Harvey  and  Harvey's  sister,  Carmen  Warschaw,  for 
Governor  Brown.  They  were  all  friends  of  Jess  and  Brown 
double-crossed  them  by  promising  his  support  to  Carmen  for  the 
State  Chairman  of  the  Democratic  State  Central  Committee  and 
then  seconded  the  nomination  of  another  person.   I  think  some 
where  along  the  line  it  must  be  told  -  Jess  Unruh  was  the  one 
that  took  Pat  Brown  by  the  hand  and  caused" his  election  to 
governor  the  first  time  -  only  later  to  get  the  shaft  from 
ingrate  Brown. 

Another  substantial  contributor  to  Pat  Brown's  campaign  at  the 
behest  of  Jess  Unruh  was  Bart  Lyton  -  another  building  and  loan 
tycoon.   Bart  had  started  his  career  as  a  studio  writer  and  a 
leader  of  his  craft  in  the  motion  picture  industry.   He  started 
out  over  in  Las  Vegas  loaning  money  to  entertainers  of  star 
status.  When  these  guys  would  get  into  trouble  and  needed  two 
thousand  or  so,  Bart  would  loan  it  to  them.   He  was  a  brash 
little  guy.   I  liked  him,  but  he  was  as  loud  as  a  brass  band. 
With  the  interest  on  these  loans  he  was  able  to  start  a  large 
building  and  loan  company  in  Beverly  Hills.   He  even  had  his 
house  wired  with  loud  speakers.  When  he  put  on  a  party,  every- 


body  in  the  canyon  would  know  about  it  and  who  was  attending 

the  party. 

The  Brown  forces  took  him  for  money  when  needed  in  campaigns. 

One  time  they  got  money  from  Bart  to  donate  to  a  candidate  who 


was  a  friend  of  Jess  Unruh's.  They  did  not  hesitate  a  damn  bit 

to  call  Bart.  This  really  upset  Jess  because  Bart  was  a  great 
friend.   Jess  went  to  the  governor  and  told  him  about  some  of 
the  tactics  of  some  of  the  so  called  Democrats  who  were  friendly 
to  Brown.   Jess  told  him  to  "knock  it  off"  and  it  was  done 

But  I  can  see  this  little  fellow  before  me  (Lyton) ,  Damn,  he  was 
a  good  guy!   Incidently,  Bart  Lyton  purchased  the  old  Garden  of 
Allah  -  a  historic  place  where  many  of  the  Hollywood  greats  had 
lived.  The  Garden  of  Allah,   a  once  swank  rambling  motel  type 
of  building,  was  rapidly  deteriorating.   Bart  purchased  it  for 
the  site  of  his  12  story  building.  When  the  old  building  was 
to  be  demolished,  Bart  sent  out  invitations  to  all  of  the  old 
tennants  and  others.  Movie  stars  of  the  bygone  days  and  present 
ones  showed  up.   I  think  it  was  probably  Mary  Pickford's  last 
public  appearance.   Bart  showed  up  in  a  devils  suit  with  all  his 
loud  speakers  and  a  bash  that  lasted  a  full  week  round  the  clock 
took  place.   I  leave  Bart  Lyton  on  one  more  note.  When  he  died, 
someone  at  the  funeral  said  if  Bart  has  taken  his  amplification 
system  along, 

Rowland:   What  was  Unruh's  relationship  with  people  like  Ed  Pauley,  for 

Allen:    With  Ed  Pauley,  it  was  very  good.   Just  thoroughly  good. 

Rowland:  E.  George  Lucky,  was  he  another  backer  of  Unruh's? 


Allen:    No.   No,  E.  George  Lucky  was  from  El  Centre.   He  got  mad  at  them 
around  here.   He  was  a  former  state  senator  and  cattleman  from 
Imperial  County.   He  wanted  the  personal  property  tax  removed 
on  livestock.   Each  year  the  personal  property  was  inventoried 
and  collected  by  county  assessors  statewide.  This  caused  live 
stock  growers  to  ship  or  drive  their  herds  over  into  Arizona. 
Many  large  department  stores  have  inventories  in  Arizona  and 
Nevada  for  this  purpose.   Brown  promised  him  he  would  en 
courage  and  sign  such  a  bill. 

Rowland:   Lucky,  you're  talking  about? 

Allen:    Yes,  E.  George  Lucky.   He  said  he  got  tired  of  running  his  cattle 
across  to  Arizona  every  time  they  appraised  personal  property. 
When  such  a  measure  was  sent  to  Brown's  office,  he  vetoed  it. 
When  the  bill  was  vetoed,  Lucky  sold  every  damn  thing  he  had  in 
California  and  went  down  into  Texas.   He  was  one  of  the  lucky 
Texans  that  hit  water,  which  was  in  an  area  where  water  was 
worth  more  than  oil. 

Rowland:   He  was  a  Democratic  financier  for  the  party? 

Allen:    Oh,  yes.  He  was  just  like  Bart.  That  3art  was  a  writer,  and 

when  he  went  to  Las  Vegas  and  some  movie  star  would  need  a  few 

/bucks  in  Las  Vegas,  he  would  let  him  have  it.   It  was  always  re 
paid  within  72  hours.   Bart  once  told  me  the  interest  rate  on 
these  loans  allowed  him  to  start  his  building  and  loan  company. 
When  Bart  died  he  left  a  raultimillion  dollar  estate. 

Rowland:  Was  Kent  Redwine  one  of  Unruh's  supporters? 

Allen:    No,  no.   Kent  Redwine 's  a  Republican.   He  represents  the  major 
motion  picture  industries. 
Those  were  Jess1  friends.   Jess  didn't  go  out  for  the  big  — 


scatter-gun  deal.   He  stuck  pretty  much  to  his  testimonials 
and  so  forth. 

Now,  somebody  told  me  that  Jess  put  money  in  campaigns  of 
members  of  the  legislature.   But  I  can  tell  you  this  --  he 
didn't  in  mine.   Because  Jess  knew  that  I  didn't  care  for  it. 

Although,  he  did  attend  a  couple  of  my  testimonial  dinners  and 

bought  a  table  or  two/  brought  some   name  entertainers  along. 

I  think  we  were  charging  at  that  time  something  like  fifty 
bucks.   So  he  come  up  with  a  five  hundred-dollar  bill  for  a 
table  of  10  persons. 

Since  our  interview,  one  of  my  former  colleagues  refreshed  my 
memory  on  another  possible  break  between  Pat  Brown  and  Jess. 
Unruh  was  a  John  F.  Kennedy  man  from  the  1956  national  Demo 
cratic  convention.  During  that  date  and  1960,  Jess  began 
soliciting  votes  for  Kennedy  at  the  1960  convention. 
He  knew  of  my  close  friendship  with  Jim  Farley  and  Joe  Kennedy 
and  from  time  to  time  would  confer  with  me.   He  thought  he  had 

Pat  Brown  in  his  corner,  but  here  again  goes  the  "Great  Vacillator." 

If  Pat  Brown  had  been  a  woman,  he  would  have  been  pregnant  every 

15  minutes.  The  trembling  heap  of  Jello  from  time  to  time  jumped 
on  every  hopeful  presidential  candidates  band  wagon,  like  a  frog 
on  a  hot  stove.   Just  before  the  roll  call  did  Jess  get  him  to 
stay  hitched  and  hardly  believed  him  when  Brown  answered  roll  call. 
President  Kennedy  remembered  this  and  Jess  became  known  as  the 
Kennedy  man  in  California. 

It  got  to  be  a  game  that  would  send  Brown  or  his  palace  guards  up 
the  wall  into  orbit  when  something  was  wanted  from  Washington  and 
the  president's  office  would  inquire  "Has  this  been  cleared  by 


Jess  Unruh?"  One  of  the  most  comical  bits  of  history  ever  to 
hit  the  floor  of  a  national  political  convention  occured  when 
Pat  Brown  got  his  comeuppance  for  vacillating  and  broken 
promises  by  Hon.  Augustus  Hawkins,  then  Dean  of  the  Assembly 
and  now  a  member  of  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives.   Hawk 
ins  rose  after  the  first  roll  was  called  and  demanded  the 
California  delegation  be  polled.  When  they  reached  Hawkins 
name  -  Gus  rose  to  his  feet  and  said,  "I  think  it  is  time  to 
keep  the  integrity  and  promise  by  our  Governor  Brown,  who  has 
been  all  over  the  lot  with  his  promises.  The  people  of  this 
state  elected  him  as  a  favorite  son  -  to  stand  for  president. 
I  am  keeping  that  faith  to  the  people  of  our  state  -  for  him 
I  cast  one  quarter  of  my  vote  for  Governor  Brown. 
The  convention  exploded  into  the  old  time  Brooklyn  anvil  chorus. 
They  booed  Pat  Brown  for  almost  a  half  hour  on  national  television. 
The  convention  chairman  let  them  do  it.   Several  of  us  heard  the 
chairman  say  Brown  has  had  this  coming.   He  has  vacillated  and 
promised  support  to  every  hopeful  candidate.   We  all  knew  why 
Gus  did  it  -  because  so  many  times  Hawkins  was  humiliated  by 
Brown  —  that's  why  the  governor  deservedly  got  the  shaft  he 
had  coming.  After  that,  he  would  have  given  Gus  the  capitol 



The  bugging  of  Speaker  Garland  became  known  as  the  dictagraph  case  of 
1940.   Robert  E.  Voshell  was  charged  with  maintaining  a  recording  device  in 
his  room  in  the  Senator  Hotel  connected  to  a  microphone  planted  in  Garland's 
room  in  the  same  building.   Upon  Garland's  discovery  and  pronouncement  of  the 
deed  to  the  assembly  in  1940,  the  assembly  created  the  Assembly  Investigating 
Committee  on  Interference  with  the  Legislature.  The  majority  report  of  the 
committee  was  a  severe  indictment  of  the  Olson  administration  for  alledgedly 
spying  upon  legislative  opponents  of  the  governor.  For  text  of  majority  and 
minority  report  see  Assembly  Journal,  May  24,  1940,  pp.  870-889. 

Arthur  H.  Samish  and  Bob  Thomas,  The  Secret  Boss  of  California;  the  Life 

and  Times  of  Art  Samish,  (New  York:  Crown  Publishers,  1971). 

The  "one  man-one  vote"  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court, 

headed  by  Chief  Justice  Earl  Warren,  was  given  in  June  1964.   Citing  the  U.S. 
Constitution's  fourteenth  amendment  equal  protection  clause,  the  court  declared 
that,  for  both  houses  of  a  state  legislature  the  principle  of  equal  population 
must  prevail.  Accordingly,  a  panel  of  federal  district  court  judges  in  Calif 
ornia  had  declared  the  California  "federal  plan"  of  senate  apportionment 
unconstitutional  and  ordered  the  legislature  to  adopt  a  new  senate  apportion 
ment  plan  no  later  than  July  1,  1965. 

A  panel  of  California  federal  district  court  judges,  in  ordering  senate 

reapportionment,  established  a  population  variance  of  ten  to  five  percent 
from  the  mean  in  creating  new  senate  districts. 

Historical  Benchmarks  of  Legislative  Compensation,  researched  and 
documented  by  the  Honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.,  California  Legislator,  Retired 
and  Commissioned  Legislative  Historian  for  Life  by  the  State  Assembly  and 
Senate  in  1966.   For  copy  of  document,  see  Assemblyman  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr., 
supplementary  materials  file,  The  Bancroft  Library,  University  of  California, 


TAPE  GUIDE  -  Don  A.  Allen 

Date  of  Interview:  January  16,  1979 

tape  1,  side  A  1 

tape  1,  side  B  14 

tape  2,  side  A  34 

tape  2,  side  B  48 

tape  3,  side  A  W 



Hon.  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.,  retired  California  Legislator  -  1966,  and  Legislative 
Historian,  Commissioned  for  life  by  the  assembly  and  senate  chapters  of 
1966.   Is  married  to  the  former  Margaret  Sachs  who  was  born  in  Hanover, 
Germany  and  they  have  one  son,  Master  Sgt.  Don  A.  Allen,  Jr.,  U.S.M.C. 
retired  -  4  grandchildren:  Michael,  Diane  Murray,  Don  III,  and  Margaret 
Strain;  3  great  grandchildren:  Tyler  and  Cody  Allen  and  Joshua  Murray. 
The  Hon.  Don  A  .  Allen,  Sr.  was  born  in  the  state  of  Iowa,  educated  in  the 
public  schools  of  Iowa  and  Nebraska,  completed  civil  engineer  course  in 
M.C.I.  Service  Schools;  completing  additional  courses  in  engineering, 
science  and  management  and  war  training,  University  of  Southern  California 
and  California  Institute  of  Technology.  He  is  the  author  of  the  California 
Legislative  Source  Book. 

Allen  served  with  the  5th  and  llth  Regiments,  Intelligence  Section,  U.S. 
Marine  Corps  Expeditionary  in  Central  American  Republics.   He  was  elected 
for  11  terms  in  the  California  Assembly  and  3  two  year  and  one  four  year 


term  in  the  Los  Angeles  City  Council. 

Don  Allen  served  on  36  standing  and  special  committees.   In  his  last  term/, 

1963  to  Dec.  31,  1966,  Allen  was  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Elections 

and  Reapportionment  where  he  received  national  recognition  for  setting 

the  pattern  for  district  representation  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  ordered 

equal  district  representation. 

At  the  same  time,  Allen  as  chairman  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Retirement 

introduced  measures  for  investment  of  retirement  funds  which  have  earned 

several  billion  dollars  for  state  employees,  city  and  county  employees  and 

special  district  employees  retirement  funds. 

During  1968,  Allen  founded  the  Association  of  California  Legislators.   He  is 



a  life  member  of  the  Veterans  of  Foreign  Mars  with  over  fifty  years  active 
service,  member  of  B.P.O.  Elks,  United  Commercial  Travelers,  California 
Historical  Society  and  American  Association  of  Retired  Persons. 



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Elections  and  JReappartianment 

November  16,  1965 

Honorable  Edmund  G.  Brown 
Governor  of  California 
State  C  pitol 
Sacramento,  California 

Dear  Governor: 

Yesterday  I  sent  to  your  office  and  to  all  the  members  of 
the  Legislature,  as  well  as  to  the  press,  a  communication  responding 
to  the  charge  that  neither  yon  nor  they  were  familiar  with  the  sub 
ject  matter  of  the  amendments  which  I  incorporated  into  S.B.  13-2X 
(Teale) .   I  did  this  because  I  was  deeply  touched  by  the  predicament 
in  which  you  have  placed  yourself  by  pretending  ignorance  of  the  sub 
ject  matter,  by  feigning  shock  to  your  sensibilities,  and  by  dissimu 
lating  an  attitude  of  innocence  while  attempting  a  grandstand  play  at 
the  expense  of  the  Legislature  over  the  question  of  legislative  retire 
ment  occasioned  by  reapportionment. 

Since  you  and  I  both  know  the  background  of  this  legislation, 
since  you  were  fully  aware  of  the  contents  of  the  Arnold  bills  (S.B. 
1068  in  the  General  Session  and  S.B.  6X  in  the  First  Extraordinary 
Session) ;  since  you  demonstrated  that  awareness  by  placing  the  subject 
matter  on  the  agenda  of  the  First  Extraordinary  Session  by  way  of  Item 
No.  6  of  your  Proclamation  of  June  29,  and  since  you  and  I  discussed 
the  rnaestion  of  the  possible  necessity  for  having  such  legislation  in 
the  Special  Session  in  order,  to  use  your  terminology,  "to  provide 
extra  leverage  on  the  Senators  to  support  senatorial  reapportionment," 
your  efforts  to  dissociate  yourself  from  knowledge  of  or  responsibilit; 
for  this  matter  produces  in  me  an  overwhelming  sense  of  sympathy  and 
pity  on  your  behalf.   I  should  like,  however,  to  remind  you,  my  dear 
Governor,  that  the  ostrich-like  behavior  of  burying  one's  head  in  the 
sand  tends  to  produce  an  elevated  and  exposed  dorsal  posterior. 

How  noble  it  is  to  read  and  hear  your  pronouncements  about 
back-door  legislating  and  how  gratifying  it  is  to  learn  that  you  inten 
to  put  a  stop  to  it!   When  I  read  your  glorious  expressions  of  self- 
righteousness  in  which  you  deplore  the  method  of  legislating  in  this 
manner,  it  almost  causes  me  to  forget  the  piece  of  retirement  legislat>| 
which  you  had  introduced  in  the  1963  General  Session,  on  behalf  of  som  >l 
very  close  to  you.   The  measurr  died  in  Senate  Committee  so  you  put  it  1 
call  in  the  1964  Special  Session,  whereupon  it  passed  both  houses  and  rt 
signed  it  into  law. 


Honorable  Edmund  G.  Brown         -2-  November  16,  1965 

Having  witnessed  your  efforts  to  squirm  out  of  any  personal 
responsibility  for  this  legislation,  I  am  satisfied  that  I  want  no 
part  of  that  enterprise.   I  offered  the  amendments  to  S.B.  13-2X,  I 
am  personally  willing  and  ready  to  take  responsibility  for  having  done 
so,  and  I  propose  to  shift  that  responsibility  to  no  one  else.   This 
is  not  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  this  or  any  other  Legislature 
in  which  the  necessity  to  enact  good  laws  on  behalf  of  the  people  has 
been  accompanied  by  incentives  to  secure  the  support  of  those  who  come 
to  these  halls  with  a  perception  of  the  public  good  which  is  somewha 
less  keen  than  that  which  you  and  I  happen  to  share.   Having  witnessed 
your  performance  on  this  issue  for  the  past  few  days,  it  would  shock 
me  not  at  all  to  discover  that  you  would  deny  any  knowledge  of  such 

Nor  would  I  pretend  that  the  language  I  helped  to  add  to 
S.B.  13-2X  causes  that  piece  of  legislation  to  be  the  finest  enactment 
ever  to  come  down  the  legislative  pike.   I  realize  there  are  deficiencies 
in  it.   The  causes  of  these  deficiencies  have  too  long  a  history  to  re- 
Tuire  repetition  here. 

Suffice  it  to  say  that  in  order  to  organize  the  required  major 
ity  to  pass  such  legislation  as  Court-ordered  reapportionment,  medical 
care  for  our  elderly  citizens,  and  other  vital  laws  to  benefit  our  people, 
I  felt  it  necessary  to  resubmit  the  Arnold  measure  substantially  as  it  was 
offered,  studied  and  voted  upon  in  two  previous  sessions  this  year  and  in 
precisely  the  form  in  which  you  acknowledged  in  your  Proclamation  and  press 
release  of  June  29.   I  did  this  in  the  full  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  this 
measure  would  probably  not  receive  the  highest  accolades  of  that  distin 
guished  institution  in  our  society,  the  free  and  enterprising  press.   I 
did  it  in  the  further  knowledge  that  there  are  those  wizards  of  democratic 
government  whose  reputations  are  so  untainted,  whose  methods  of  operation 
are  so  respectable,  and  whose  contributions  to  the  public  welfare  are  so 
Olympian  that  they  care  not  for  the  grubby  necessity  to  organize  a  majr-- 
ity  that  they  deal  only  in  perfect  solutions  to  complicated  problems.   My 
feelings  on  this  subject  are  well  expressed  by  George  Bernard  Snaw  j.n  a 
famous  statement  which  I  have  attached  to  this  communication  for  your  en 

There  remains  in  my  mind  the  nagging  auestion  about  the  possi 
bility  that  you  really  did  not  know  anything  at  all  about  the  subject  of 
legislative  retirement  as  it  has  been  dealt  with  throughout  this  past  ten 
and  one-half  months  and  despite  our  personal  conversation  on  the  subject 
following  the  close  of  the  1965  General  Session. 

Can  it  be  that  someone  in  your  office  published  Item  No.  6  of 
your  Proclamation  of  June  29  without  your  knowledge?   Is  it  possible  that 


Honorable  Edmund  G.  Brown          -3-  November  16,  1965 

you  were  never  aware  of  the  contents  of  S.B.  1068  (Arnold)  in  the 
General  Session,  a  bill  which  passed  through  two  committees  of  each 
of  the  Houses  of  this  Legislature  and  on  the  floor  of  both?   It 
staggers  my  mind  to  think  that  you  were  unaware  of  the  content  of 
S.B.-6X  in  the  First  Extraordinary  Session  of  1965  which  measure  also 
was  considered  in  two  committees  of  the  Senate,  passed  the  Senate  f~-- 
and  was  considered  in  one  committee  of  the  Assembly. 

Can  it  be  that  you  and  I  stood  face  to  face  in  your  office 
one  day  between  the  end  of  the  General  and  the  beginning  of  the  First 
Special  Sessions  and  discussed  this  matter,  but  that  I  was  there  and 
you  were  not? 

Please  keep  jn  mind,  my  dear  Governor,  that  each  of  these 
measures  and  actions  which  I  have  recounted  in  the  preceding  paragraphs 
of  this  letter  concerned  the  precise  subject  which  is  the  substance  of 
the  current  debate. 

Rather  than  attempting  to  stretch  credulity  to  those  lengths, 
I  must  assume  that  despite  the  overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary, 
you  are  indeed  running  the  government  of  this  State;  that  Proclamations 
issued  over  the  seal  of  your  high  office  are  issued  with  your  knowledgt 
and  that  conversations  held  between  you  and  members  of  the  Legislature 
remain  at  least  as  glimmers  in  your  recollection.   It  has  been  said  thz 
nothing  contributes  so  much  to  an  attitude  of  self-righteousness  as  a 
faulty  memory. 

Even  if  we  can  assume  that  everything  described  to  this  poim 
somehow  escaped  your  attention,  I  suggest  you  may  have  had  an  opportun: . 
to  apprise  yourself  of  this  matter  in  the  closing  days  of  the  Second 
Extraordinary  Session  had  you  been  in  Sacramento  doing  what  Governors 
have  done  since  the  dawn  of  democratic  government  —  guiding,  prod'3 '  nr 
helping  the  Legislature  to  pass  the  bills  which  have  your  sponsors!-  p 
You  may  recall  that  in  those  closing  days  of  the  Second  ExtraorUinc  y 
Session  of  this  year,  while  we  were  doing  battle  in  the  Legislature  ov< 
medical  care  and  the  follow-up  on  reapportionment ,  you  were  engaged  ou' 
side  of  Sacramento  with  activities  concerning  your  next  campaign  and  w:  I1 
publicity-seeking  ceremonies  for  the  purpose  of  signing  bills  over  whi< 
the  battle  had  already  been  won.   In  short,  if  you  had  been  more  conce:  < 
with  being  Governor  in  1965  than  with  becoming  Governor  in  1966,  it  is 
possible  that  you  may  have  been  in  a  position  to  exercise  that  crucial 
leadership  which  would  have  obviated  our  taking  any  action  which  could 
now  offend  that  noble,  moral  sensibility  of  yours  which  is  now  so  outr f 

In  closing,  does  it  not  strike  you  as  ironic  that  all  of  thi 
could  have  been  avoided  by  a  simple  telephone  call  from  you  to  me,  in 


Honorable  Edmund  G.  Brown 


November  16,  1965 

with  your  own  promise  to  let  me  know  if  your  attitude  had  changed  and 
in  accordance  with  my  request  to  your  Legislative  Secretary,  Frank 
Mesple,  to  tell  you  that  I  would  not  submit  these  amendments  if  you 
were  opposed  to  them. 



DON   A.    ALLEN,     SR. 


Shaw  learned  that  a  labor  candidate  named  Joseph  Burgess 
had  refused  to  compromise  on  an  issue  and  had  thereby  lost  his 
seat  in  parliament.   The  playwrite-politician  commented  bitterly: 

"When  I  think  of  my  own  unfortunate  character  smirched  with 
compromise,  rotted  with  opportunism,  mildewed  by  expedience, 
dragged  through  the  mud  of  Borough  Council  and  Battersea  elections, 
stretched  out  of  shape  with  wire  pulling,  putrified  by  permeation, 
worn  out  by  25  years  pushing  to  gain  an  inch  here,  or  straining  to 
stem  a  backrush,  I  do  think  Joe  might  have  put  up  with  just  a  speck 
or  two  on  those  white  robes  of  his,  for  the  sake  of  the  millions  of 
poor  devils  who  cannot  afford  any  character  at  all  because  they  ha\ 
no  friend  in  parliament.   Oh,  these  moral  dandys,  these  spiritual 
toffs who  is  Joe,  anyhow,  that  he  should  not  risk  his  soul  occas 
ionally  like  the  rest  of  us." 





91&445-31 15445    9405  967  -  1628 





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,  .  .  ..  ••  '  -  ' 

3715  Abbott  Road 
Lynwood,  California   90262 

25  January,  1972 

lion.  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr. 

Eleventh  and  L  Building  -  Suite  352 

Sacramento,  California  95814 

Dear  Don: 

Your  letter  advising  me  that  you  have  filed  suit  in  the 
California  Supreme  Court  for  the  recovery  of  that  portion  of 
the  California  Legislators'  retirement  allotment  being  awarded 
to  many  members  but  not  to  all  as  they  end  their  legislative 

It  was  most  gratifying  to  me  to  learn  that  sufficient  funds 
have  been  advanced  by  interested  retirees  to  enable  you  to  em 
ploy  competent  attorneys  for  the  task.   My  contribution  was 
small,  yet  I  had  to  borrow  to  make  the  advance.   But  I  think 
the  measure  squarely  meets  the  equality  principle  laid  down  by 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  their  one-man,  one-vote  ruling. 

Having  read  the  pleas  by  the  attorneys  for  Mrs.  Lyons  and 
now  these  by  you,  there  seems  to  be  something  missing.   It  would 
appear  to  me  that  the  legislative  intent  of  the  original  plan  of 
compensation  has  been  entirely  overlooked,  and  the  following  points 
be  raised: 

That  the  Court's  attention  should  be  directed  to  the  undis- 
putable  fact  that  there  has  been  no  change  in  the  duties  of  the 
present  members  and  that  of  us  who  served  prior  to  1966. 

I  noted  in  some  of  the  briefs  filed  by  the  Attorney  General 
attempting  to  draw  comparisons.   He  did  did  not  know  or  entirely 
ignored  the  circumstances  as  the  records  will  show,  that  we  handled 
equal  to  or  more  than  the  present  Legislature,  as  far  as  bills  were 
concerned,  only  we  did  it  by  the  use  of  54  committees  working  from 
16  to  18  hours  daily  in  committees  or  on  the  floor. 

We  studied  and  set  up  the  Freeway  and  Roads  system.   We  es 
tablished  the  present  Water  System.   Committees  which  I  chaired 
aided  County  Sheriffs  and  Chiefs  of  Police  to  obtain  the  better 
ment  a  hundred  or  more  rundown  and  dilapidated  jails.   I  authored 
and  broke  the  perplexing  problem  of  the  succession  of  persons  to 
run  this  State  in  the  event  of  a  catastrophic  event  that  would 
cause  the  demise  of  the  elected  State  officials. 

I  understand  that  Proposition  "A"  on  the  1966  ballot  allowing 
proper  investment  of  funds  for  retirement  systems,  State,  County, 
City,  Special  District  and  the  Los  Angeles  Teachers  Retirement 
System  to  have  gained  almost  a  half  a  billion  dollars,  thus  adding 


Honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  Page  Two 

25  January,  1972 

new  benefits  to  the  retirees  of  those  systems.   These  items  should 
be  taken  into  consideration  if  any  comparisons  are  to  be  made: 

That  as  far  as  the  Constitution  providing  for  a  full  time  Legis 
lature,  it  has  only  made  legal  the  things  we  used  to  do,  by  the 
fiction  of  stopping  the  clock  and  securing  the  calender.   For  example 
the  history  as  shown  in  the  Hand  Book  shows  the  Legislature  convened 
January  2,  1939  and  adjourned  sine  die  June  20,  1939. 

However,  we  did  not  get  out  of  the  session  until  late  in  July 
through  the  use  of  those  devises.   Then  we  resolved  ourselves  into 
Interim  Committees  and  worked  just  as  hard  from  August  to  December. 
Let  them  notice  the  extraordinary  sessions,  all  five  of  them  which 
started  January  29,  1940  and  finally  adjourned  December  11,  1940. 

When  wo  were  not  actually  on  the  floor,  we  were  holding  exten 
sive  interim  studies  all  over  the  State.   That  resulted  in  reducing 
a  39  million  dollar  deficit  which  was  inherited  by  the  incoming  Gover 
nor  Olson,  so  that  by  June  30,  1941,  not  only  had  we  wiped  out  that 
deficit,  but  created  a  surplus.   That  is  in  the  record. 

We  were  forced  to  maintain  two  homes,  one  by  law  in  our  dis 
tricts,  and  the  second  one  at  Sacramento,  by  necessity,  for  four  to 
six  months  each  year.   WE  RECEIVED  NO  COMPENSATION  FOR  THAT  ONE.   We 
received  but  one  round  trip  mileage  allowance  per  session.   Do  you 
recall  the  $44.70  round  trip  allowance  from  Los  Angeles  to  Sacramento 
when  the  plane  fare  in  those  days  was  almost  $80?   I  understand  one 
of  the  present  members  now  commutes • daily  between  Inglewood  and 

That  when  we  met  in  session, we  received  $12  per  day  for  100 
days.   That  was  our  supposed  salary.   However,  it  barely  covered 
our  hotel  and  meals.   We  had  to  stay  at  hotels  in  those  days,  and 
our  rent  went  on  7  days  a  week,  and  we  had  to  guarantee  we  would 
retain  that  room  for  the  duration  of  the  session.   When  the  100 
days  were  up,  and  we  were  still  in  session  those  extra  20  to  60 
days  overtime,  they  were  at  the  cost  of  the  members. 

We  received  no  per  diems,  district  office,  legislative  help 
and  only  8  secretaries  to  do  the  work  for  80  members.   We  received 
only  $25  per  session  for  postage.   Additional  postage  came  out  of 
our  own  pockets.   We  paid  all  telephone  calls.   When  we  wanted 
extra  typing,  we  took  it  to  the  local  business  college  or  a  public 
stenographer  and  we  paid  for  it  ourselves.   We  furnished  our  own 
cars,  etc. 

When  we  returned  to  the  districts,  constituents  called  at 
our  homes  or  places  of  business  during  the  days  and  many  evenings 
up  to  midnight.   Our  meals  and  any  attempts  to  have  guests  in 
were   interrupted  by  residents  of  our  districts  seeking  information. 

As  Former  Speaker,  the  Hon.  William  Mosely  Jones  recently 
stated  before  the  present  Legislature  when  asked  by  a  member, 


honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr. 

25  January,  1972  Page  Three 

"What  did  you  fellows  do  for  the  poor?"    The  distinguished 
gentleman  replied,  "We  were  the  poor."   None  of  us  envy  the 
present  li:qi.ulative  compensation.   We  made  the  amount  possible 
that  the  present  members  began  to  receive  in  1966.   The  salary 
of  $16,000  per  year  was  the  amount  found  to  be  correct  in  1941. 
a  quarter  of  a  century  previous . 

I  suggest  further,  a  background  should  be  laid  so  that  the 

present  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  could  know  the  legislative 

intent  and  construction  of  AB  1083  which  became  Chapter   879- 

1947  session.   Actually  the  measure  got  its  first  start  during 
late  fall  of  1940. 

When  the  lion.  T.  Fenton  Knight  sought  and  received  permis 
sion  of  the  then  Speaker  Hon.  Gordon  Garland  to  allow  Assembly 
man  Knight  to  form  a  volunteer  unpaid  task  force  to  study  the 
needs  of  the  Legislators.    Mr.  Knight  wanted  an  unofficial  com 
mittee  of  the  Assembly,  strictly  non-partisan  in  nature.   Those 
who  were  invited  to  serve  and  did  were:   Assemblymen  Knight, 
C.  Don  Fields,  Charles  Lyon,  Hubert  Scudder,  Republicans.   The 
Democrat  members  were  Clint  Fulcher,  Henry  Meehan,  Alfred  "Bobby" 
Robertson,  and  myself.   I  am  the  only  survivor  of  that  committee. 

Assemblyman  Knight  had  been  concerned  with  the  turnover,  and 
knowing  that  further  members  could  no  longer  afford  to  serve,  he 
was  very  concerned  by  the  tremendous  cost  to  the  State  of  Cali 
fornia  by  the  loss  of  expertise.   As  he  stated  so  often,  "The 
State  Legislature  is  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  largest  cor 
poration  in  this  State,  and  for  that  matter,  the  fourth  largest 
in  the  world.   No  private  firm  or  corporation  in  existence  could 
survive  such  a  turnover  of  its  Board  of  Directors." 

The  Honorable  T.  Fenton  Knight  was  .a  noted,  trusted,  highly 
distinguished,  well  respected  financier,  a  constructive  conserva 
tive.   Enjoying  such  an  enviable  reputation,  it  was  easy  for  him 
to  assemble  one  of  the  most  outstanding  group  of  business  execu 
tives,  financiers,  economists  and  wage  administrators  from  the 
field  of  business,  industry  and  labor  in  the  State. 

These  people  made  time  and  motion  studies  of  the  Legislature, 
Studies  were  also  made  of  the  salary  of  the  Governor,  Controller, 
Secretary  of  State,  and  Treasurer.   Because  the  compensation  for 
the  four  other  Constitutional  officers  was  extremely  low,  it  was 
an  established  fact  that  the  Governor  of  California  was  paid  a 
salary  of  $10,000  per  year,  and  the  Mayor  of  New  York  $40,000, 
the  Mayor  of  Los  Angeles  received  $15,000,  etc. 

President  Roosevelt's  wage  freeze  which  followed  the  outbreak  of 
World  War  II,  December  7,  1941,  prevented  our  placing  the  issue 
before  the  people  on  the  1942  ballot.   I  am  convinced  it  would 
have  carried,  because  of  the  climate  and  the  high  respect  held 
by  the  people  for  the  Legislature  at  that  time.   Its  passage  would 
have  precluded  this  lawsuit  in  which  we  now  find  ourselves  engaged 

fighting  for  our  just  rights. 

Honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  Page  Four 

25  January,  1972 

Unfortunately,  the  report  with  the  names  of  the  members  of 
the  Task  Force  and  their  detailed  reasoning  was  not  submitted  in 
time  to  be  printed  in  the  Journal  and  become  an  official  part  of 
legislative  history .   I  had  these  reports  until  files  were  removed 
from  my  office  without  my  knowledge  or  consent.   The  1941  Legislature 
adjourned  sie  die  June  14.   The  report  did  not  reach  Mr.  Knight  or 
we  legislative  members  until  almost  July  1,  1941. 

However,  your  paper  does  not  show  why  the  other  three  proposals 
were  not  adopted  at  the  same  time  the  retirement  bill  was  introduced, 
AB  1083,  1947,  passed  and  chaptered  as  879.   The  Legislative  Counsel 
advised  Mr.  Knight  that  the  retirement  portion  was  the  only  one  which 
could  be  passed  by  the  Legislature.  The  salary  feature  needed  a  vote  of 
the  people. 

Further,  in  1948  when  you  were  a  City  Councilman  of  Los  Angeles 
having  resigned  in  1947,  T.  Fenton  Knight  served  notice  lie  was  re 
tiring  in  early  1948  because  he  was  forced  to  defend  the  retirement 
bill  before  the  courts.   Two  measures  were  presented  in  March  of 
1948  -  one  which  would  have  allowed  the  Legislature  to  set  its  sal 
ary  and  that  of  the  other  Constitutional  officers.   The  Legislators 
were  forced  to  exclude  their  salary  fixing  and  the  portion  of  the 
measure  was  adopted  by  the  people  at  the  November  election. 

The  original  Knight  proposal  was  watered  down  to  $3,600  per  year 
salary  with  limited  expense  while  in  session.  By  many  distracting  and 
intervening  other  distractions,  a  perplexing  number  of  political  con 
siderations  arose.   A  watered  down  formula  on  cross  filing  was  then 
occupying  the  attention  of  both  parties.   So,  as  a  net  result  of  that 
climite,  the  Legislature  got  the  customary  backhand  treatment  which 
was  destined  to  repeat  many  times  in  the  future. 

The  items  with  regard  to  using  the  Supreme  Court  was  dropped,  as 

well  as  the  formula  of  placing  the  salaries  at  25%  above  the  pay  to 

the  local  elected  officials  and  the  $16,000  plus  BLS.  not  to  exceed 
5%  was  the  one  to  be  concentrated  on. 

Oh,  yes,  Don,  there  was  one  other  factor  overlooked  by  you  that 
in  addition  to  the  BLS.  cost  of  living  -  the  reports  on  the  rise  in 
the  salary  curves  by  the  State  Department  of  Labor  Relations  could 
be  used  by  the  Controller. 

Of  great  importance,  I  believe,  a  copy  of  the  State  Supreme 
Court's  decision  rendered  August  13,  1948,  Sacramento  5900  in  Bank 
should  be  called  to  the  present  Court's  attention.   I  believe  it 
shows  clearly  the  escalating  factor  which  we  believed  we  had  made 
clear  in  the  original  legislative  intent.   Marked  copy  enclosed. 

To  deny  those  members  who  served  through  those  grubstake  one- 
hundred-dollar-a-month,  or  the  three-hundred,  or  even  the  five- 
hundred-a-month  members  when  they  become  retired  equal  allotment 
compensation  is  an  astonishing  failure  in  consideration  of  the  Third 
Appeals  Court  Ruling.   This  leads  me  to  believe  they  did  not  have 
all  the  facts  before  them  when  they  made  their  decision. 


Honorable  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr.  Page  Five 

25  January,  1927 

Seems  to  mo  the  offense  is  greatly  enhanced  since  most  of 
those  same  patriots  who  served  for  so  little  are  the  very  ones 
who  brought  the  retirement  system  into  being  and  are  now  deprived 
of  its  full  benefits  as  are  even  those  present  legislative  members, 
who  were  not  even  citizens  or  residents  of  the  State  or  Nation. 

I  recall  the  hours  and  days  contributed  to  the  program's  con 
struction  and  enactment  by  the  brilliant  Assemblyman,  the  late  T. 
Fenton  Knight.   After  the  Legislature  of  California  approved  the 
measure,  it  was  finally  approved  by  this  Honorable  Court  before  it 
was  put  into  motion. 

As  for  my  part,  I  lent  every  effort  within  my  time  and  ability. 
However,   it  was  the  Honorable  T.  Fenton  Knight  who  did  the  brain 
and  leg  work  and  met  the  challenges  if  and  when  amendments  were  re 
quired,  while  I  devoted  my  every  minute  to  welfare  and  jail  reform. 

Oldsters  of  California  were,  in  those  days,  suffering  biting 
hardships.   Prisoners  were,  or  had  been,  living  under  most  unsanitary 
conditions;  Health  officers  were  without  directive  authority  as  to 
whether  they  had  legal  command  in  ordering  jail  and  prison  cleanli 

Don,  I  am  positive  you  have  taken  the  justifiable  'course  in 
bringing  this  action  and  I  know  there  are  many  of  our  retirees  who 
are  in  financial  straits  due  to  their  many  years  of  supporting  two 
home  situations  and  at  extremely  low  resources.   In  my   case,  I 
must  remind  you  of  the  fact  that  my  wife,  Hazel,  has  been  under 
doctors'  care  for  the  past  fifteen  years.   Medicare  has  helped  a 
bit,  but  yet  she  has  been  denied,  because  of  money  shortages,  the 
basic  and  refinement  care  she  deserves. 

Thanks  for  keeping  in  touch.   I  hope  for  the  justice  we  strug 
gled  for. 


VK:  jc 

P.S.   By  way  of  suggestion,  in  addition  to  the  copy  or  this 
original  you  may  want  to  send  to  your  or  our  attorney,  I  would 
suggest  you  send  a  copy  of  this  letter  and  your  paoers  to 
Phil  Boyd,  Tom  Erwin,  Ed  Gaffney,  Lloyd  Lowrey  and  Tom  Maloney. 
Although  they  were  not  members  of  the  1940-41  Task  Force,  they 
were  co-authors  of  AB  1083  which  was  the  measure  which  brought 
about  the  original  Legislators  Retirement.   They  may  have  some 
comment  of  value  to  the  case. 





10S2—  Ralph  C.  Dills,  Jan.  28.     To  Com.  on  Ed. 

An  net  lo  n<ld  Suction  0012  to  the  foliicatiou  Code,  relating  to  loans  to  school 

districts  from  the  county  school  service  fund. 
Jnn.    28  —  Kind  fir:.t  time.  To  print. 
Jan.    'J'.l  —  From  printer.  To  nuiniiiltCO. 
M.'ir.  27  —  From  ciMiimiltei?:   \)a  puss. 
Mar.  2S  —  Iteud  M-cuiul   time.  To  engrossment. 
Mar.  31  —  Krporlcd   correctly   <  iiRrossnl. 

A)inl    1  —  H'-ad  lliinl  time,  p.isM'd,  title  approved.  To  Senate. 
April    2  —  In  Scimd'.  Head  lir;4  lime.  To  Com.  on  F.d. 
M;iy    1I>  —  From  nuuniiilee  :   l>o  puss. 
Mny     ]'.*  —  Head  n'cond  time. 

May    L'S  —  Kra-l  tlnrd  tnin1.  passed,  title  approved.  To  ACMUlblJ. 
'•lay    2'.'  —  In  A.v>embly.  To  riirolliiient. 

June     ii  —  UipurUtl  corroctly  riirullnl.  To  (iDvenior  at  2  p.m. 
June   lii  —  Approved  by  (.ovornor.  Chapter  GSO. 

1083—  Knight,  Fiohr,  Boycl,  Cookc,  Enviii,  Gadncy,  Gcddcs,  Grant",  Ilolli- 
batigh,  Lowrcy,  Maloncy,  and  iioberlson,  Jan.  US.  To  Coin. 
on  G.  E.  &  E. 

An  act  to  ndd  Cbupter  3.5  to  Tart  1  of  Division  2  of  Title  2  of  the  Government 

Code,  r-  '..-itinc  to  the  retirement,  with  retirement  allowances,  of  ileuibcru  of 

the  Legislature. 

Jan.    28  —  Heud  first  timo.  To  print.  .       •  -•  . 

•Jan.  .2'.)—  I'rom  priutcr.  To  co;..mittc«. 

'May    15  —  From  eomroitt««:  Amend,  and  do  pass  as  amended. 
May    Hi  —  second  time,  ntiit-ndttl,  to  printer. 

Mny    VJ  —  1'rom  printer.  To  eiiKrossnu-nt.  Hcported  correctly  engroKsed. 
^Iliy    21)  —  Kriid  third  tiitii1,  |i:is>o<I,  ti(U-  npprovcil.  To  Si-naic. 
May    21)  —  In  Senate.  Krml  lirst  time.  To  C'mn.  on  Oov.  IClF. 
May    27  —  From  committee.:  Atnund,  anil  do  n*  nmcuded. 
May    28  —  Krail  nerond  time,  siuiendcd,  to  printer.  From  printer. 
June     2  —  ICeail  third  time,  pus.scU,  title  approved.  Notice  of  motion  to  reconsider 

iriveo  by  Senator  Swine. 

June     I!  —  Notice  of  motion  to  reconsider  continued  until  next  legislative  day. 
x        June     4  —  Reconsideration    grunted.    Rend    third    time,    uasiiod,    title   approved. 

To  Asscmlily. 

June     f  —  In  AwernUy.  Concurrence  In  Senate  amendments  pending.  ^ 

June     G—  Sonate  aiuvudmciilK  concurred  in.  To  enrollment. 
June     ft—  Hcported  correctly  enrolled.  To  IJovcrnor  at  3  p.m. 
June  20—  Automatically  l«-cnme  law  without  Governor's  signature.  Chapter  870. 

30S4--  Gaffncj',  George  D.  Collins,  and  Berry;  Jan.  28.  To  Coin,  on 
Mun.  &  C.  G. 

An  act  to  a.M  Section  20'.)ri?.5  to  the  Covfrnment  Code,  rvbtiii);  to  the  State 
Emjiloyces'  Retirement  System  in  respect  to  the  .-ctireiutnl  of  local  lirctuen. 

Jan.    28  —  Uend  first  time.  To  print. 

Jim.    2!)  —  Krorn  printer.  To  romniittce.  .    .  •         " 

June     5—  J-'ror.i  committee  :  Do  puss. 

Juue     0  —  Ucud  svi-itud  lime.  To  engrossment. 

june     7  —  Krporled  correctly  engrossed.  Head  third  time,  passed,  title  approved. 

To  Senate. 

j,,nc     <(  —  ii,  Senate.  Head  first  time.  To  Com.  on  GOT.  Eff. 
June   17  —  From  committee:  Do  pass. 
June   18  —  Head  second  time. 

June  2iV-  '-Ki-ad  third  lime,  jiassed.  title  approval.  To  Assembly. 
June  21V—  In  Assembly.  Ti>  enrollment. 

June  2(1  —  Urpiirutl  correi-ily  enrolled.  To  Governor  at  11.30  p.m. 
July    23  —  1'otUet  vetoed  l»y  (iovi-rnor. 



INDEX  —  Don  A.  Allen,  Sr. 

Ahmanson,  Howard,   77 

Anderson,  Glen,   76 

Arnold  bill,   47-50 

Arnold,  Stanley,   49 

assembly.   See  California  assembly;  California  Republican  Assembly 

Badham,  Willard  F. ,  8-9 

Bagley,  William!.,   68,  74 

Begovich,  John,   45-46 

Below,  William,  42 

Betts,  Bert,   51,  59-60 

Bonelli,  Frank,   26,  37,  61-62 

Bonelli,  William,   19 

Bowron,  Fletcher,   23-24,  26 

Bradley,  Don,   78 

Brown,  Edmund  G.,  Sr.  (Pat),  33,  35,  37,  47-48,  50-51,  61-62,  75-76,  78-83 

Burns  committee.   See  California  senate;  un-American  activities  committee 


Burns,  Hugh  M. ,   12-13,  16,  37,  46,  61-62 
Bushnell,  Robert,   62-63 
Butler,  Smedley  D.,   5 

California  assembly,   17-18,  21,  36,  46,  73 

assembly  bill  1  (1965) ,  43 

elections  and  reapportionment  committee,   26 

lockup  of,   74-76 

speaker  election,   21 
California  legislature 

economy  bloc,   16-18,  20-22 

perquisites  in,   53-54 

salary  increase  and,   55-56,  58 

un-American  activities  joint  committee  (1941-1947),   13-14 
California  Republican  Assembly,   63-66 
California  senate,   24,  26 

senate  bill  6  (1965) ,  43-44 

senate  bill  13  (1965),  48-49 

un-American  activities  committee  (1947-1970),   13 
Champion,  Hale,   76 
Combs,  Richard  E.,   13-14 
Cranston,  Alan,   68-71 


Daley,  Jeanette,  17,  19,  21,  34 

DeLapp,  Tony,   18 

Democratic  national  conventions 

1920,   7 

1956,   82 

1960,  82 
Democratic  party,   7-10,  21,  70,  75 

state  central  committee  chairman,   79 
dictograph  case,  9-10,  29,  30 
Dills,  Ralph,   57 

Dirksen  amendment  (.f ederal) ,  39-40,  43,  46.   See  also  reapportionment 
disaster  council,   29.   See  also  war  council 
district  attorney's  office,  Los  Angeles  County,   7 
Dodge,  Grenville,   4 

economy  bloc  (Calif ornia  legislature) ,   16-18,  20-22.   See  also  State 

Relief  Administration;  Culbert  Olson 
Edgerton,  Howard,   78 

1934  legislative,  9 

1938  legislavtive,  9 

1956  special  assembly,   25 

1958  state  controller,   68 

1964  U.S.  Senate,   70 

1966  Proposition  1-A,   52,  55,  56 

1966  gubernatorial,   62 

1968  U.S.  Senate,   66 

campaign  endorsements,   62,  66 

campaign  financing,   77-80,  82 
Elliott,  Edward,   51,  60 
Eu,  March  Fong,   67 

Field,  C.  Don,   17-18,  27 

finances,   71-73.   See  also  inheritance  tax  appraising 

Garland,  Gordon,   9,  15,  21,  28,  30 

governor's  office  (Brown),   75-76,  78,  82 

governor's  office  (Olson),  9,  20 

Harris,  Joel,   64 
Harvey,  Lawrence,   79 
Hawkins,  Augustus,   83 
Henderson,  Charles,   30 

inheritance  tax  appraising,   71 
and  state  controller,   67-70 


Johnson,  Gardiner,   21,  34,  54 
Johnson,  Lyndon  Baines,   38 

Kellums,  Jesse  Randolph,   19 
Kibers,  Jeff,   19 
Kirkwood,  Robert,   68 
Kleps,  Ralph,   59 
Knox,  John  T.  ,   57 
Kuchel,  Thomas,   66 

League  of  Cities,   23 

legislative  members  salary  increase.   See  California  legislature,  salary 

increase;  elections,  1966  Proposition  1-A 
Legislative  Sourcebook,  42 
legislature.   See  California  legislature 

lobbying,   31,  33,  77-78,  82.   See_  alsp_  elections,  campaign  financing 
Lore,  Elmer,   53,  73 
Los  Angeles,  city  of,   24-25 
Los  Angeles,  county  of,   7,  43 
Lucky,  E.  George,   80-81 
Lyton,  Bart,   79-81 

Marine  Corps  (U.S.),  5-6,  8 
McAdoo,  William  Gibbs,   30 
Meredith,  James,   41 
Merriam,  Frank  F.,   10,  73 
Mesple,  Frank  A.,   50,  61,  76 
Miller,  George,  Jr.,   31-32 
Millington,  Seth,   17,  19,  21 
Mills,  James  R. ,   55 
Mosk,  Stanley,   10 

oil  interests,   32 

Olson,  Culbert,   9-10,  14-16,  18-20,  28,  30,  54 

Pauley,  Ed,   80 
Philbrick,  Howard  R. ,   30 

Rafferty,  Max,   51,  66-67 

Reagan,  Ronald,   63 

reapportionment  (California  legislature) 

1960  Bonelli  initiative,   30-31 

1962  Bonelli  initiative,   30-31,  33 

1964  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decisions  affecting,  23-24,  37,  43,  44,  46 


reapportionment  (California  legislature)  (continued) 

1965  California  Supreme  Court  decision  affecting,   46-47 

1966  assembly,   45-46 

1966  senate,   26-27,  36,  38-41 

assembly  bill  1  (1965)  and,   43,  61 

Dirksen  amendment  (federal),   39,  44,  46 

Los  Angeles  County  and,   43 

retirement  benefits  and,   47-50,  61 

senate  bill  6  and,   43,  44 

senate  bill  13  (1965)  and,   48-50 

Wellman  Commission,   35 
Rees,  Thomas  M. ,  36,  43 
Republican  party  (California),   8-9,  17,  21,  62,  74-75,  77 

California  Republican  Assembly,   63-66 
retirement  benefits,   51-52,  55,  59-60.   See  also  reapportionment, 

retirement  benefits 
Riles,  Wilson,   66-67 
Riley,  Ray,   73 
Rodda,  Albert  S.,   57 
Roosevelt,  Franklin  Delano,  30 
Rosenthal,  Ben,  18-20 

SCMWA.   See  State,  County,  and  Municipal  Workers  of  America 

SRA.   See  State  Relief  Administration 

Salditch,  Martin,   60 

Salinger,  Pierre,   70 

Salyers,  Clarence,   32-33 

Samish,  Arthur  H.,  34 

Selvin,  Herman,  38 

senate.   See  California  senate 

Shults,  Albert,  32 

Silvers,  Phlll,  26 

Smith,  Steven,   41-42 

State,  County,  and  Municipal  Workers  of  America,  11-12 

State  Relief  Administration,   10,  19,  22,  72.   See  also  economy  bloc 

California  legislature) ;  Culbert  Olson 
Stevenson,  Cyril,  Jr.,   63-66 
Swing,  Ralph,  24,  28 

Teale,  Stephen  P.,   36,  46,  48-49 

Tenney  committee.   See  California  legislature,  un-American  activities  joint 

committee;  California  senate,  un-American  activities  committee 
Tenney,  Jack  B.,   13-14 

Unruh,  Jesse  M. ,   23-24,  26,  37,  42-43,  46,  55,  70,  73-74,  76-83 


Vandergrift,  Rollin,   11 
Veneman,  John,   76 

Waldie,  Jerome  R.,   40 

war  council,   28-29.   See  also  disaster  council 
Warren,  Earl,   27,  30,  33,  36-38,  47 

and  conversion  to  annual  budget,   17,  28,  58 
Warschaw,  Carmen,   79 
Welsh,  Ralph  L. ,   9 
Woolwine,  Tom,   7 
Worker's  Alliance,   11 
Wyman,  Rosalind,   79 

Yorty,  Samuel,   13-15,  24 

James  H.  Rowland 

Holds  B.A.  from  Western  Connecticut  State  College 
and  M.A.  from  San  Francisco  State  University,  with 
additional  studies  at  Hunter  College  and  Columbia 
University  in  New  York,  and  the  University  of 
California,  Berkeley. 

Teacher  and  administrator  in  public  and  private 
schools  for  five  years.  Developed  specialization 
in  California  legislative  history  through  master's 
studies  on  higher  education  and  legislative  affairs. 

Interviewer/Editor  for  Regional  Oral  History  Office, 
1978  to  present. 

Author  of  articles  in  professional  journals. 

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